
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

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CHAMPION CAMPAIGNER

Franklin D. Roosevelt

BY HAROLD F. GOSNELL

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, *New York,* 1952

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PREFACE

THIS book has grown out of a larger scheme for the analysis of what makes for success in American politics. In *The American Party System,* fourth edition, published by the author and his former colleague Professor Charles E. Merriam, is to be found an outline for the analysis of the methods of successful and unsuccessful candidates for elective office.

The author has material for the analysis of many presidential elections other than those of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but he is convinced that the Roosevelt elections furnish an excellent starting point for the testing of certain hypotheses. He has been collecting material on the Roosevelt elections since at least 1928. In connection with the revisions of *The American Party System* he has kept files on the subject. As a result the material for answering certain questions about American politics has been available for the Roosevelt elections. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park has proved to be a gold mine for anyone interested in the inner workings of American politics.

In writing this book the author has found his early research in New York politics invaluable. The materials which he gathered for his *Boss Platt and His New York Machine* fitted neatly into the early years of Franklin D. Roosevelt's political career. His study *Grass Roots Politics* proved to be very helpful for the first three Roosevelt elections.

The author saw President Roosevelt make a number of political speeches and he stayed glued to his radio during the late President's campaigns, but in writing this book he has drawn most heavily upon original sources now available in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the files of newspapers, the memoirs of those close to FDR, and his own

collection of campaign materials, which was made during the various campaigns.

This book could not have been written without the splendid cooperation of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. The director, Dr. Herman Kahn, and his staff have been most helpful at all times. The author's chief regret has been that he has not had more time to spend personally in Hyde Park. His assistant, the late Mrs. Howard D. Marshall, was given every help in finding material in the library. The author is indebted to Vassar College for suggesting her name.

In some of the earlier work of outlining significant hypotheses for the analysis of political success, the author was aided by Drs. Sebastian and Alfred De Grazia.

To his former students Dr. Morris Cohen and Henry Williams, to Miss Grace Tully of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Foundation, to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, to William Sims and Dr. Kenneth Hechler, and to his wife, the author is indebted for reading portions or all of the manuscript. None of these persons is responsible in any way for the final content of the book. For that the author is solely responsible.

The author has thoroughly enjoyed writing this book, for in doing so he has relived these exciting campaigns. Needless to say, he has found the Champ one of the most fascinating figures in American history. As the years roll by, we begin to acquire increasing perspective regarding his words and deeds.

HAROLD F. GOSNELL

July 15, 1952

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CHAMPION CAMPAIGNER: *Franklin D. Roosevelt*

I

THE RECORD

Nothing succeeds so well as success.
—TALLEYRAND

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT (FDR) was a Democratic party candidate for elective office on nine different occasions, and on two other occasions he was a candidate with real opposition in Democratic party primaries. He was successful in nine out of these eleven trials. In a general election contest in which his candidacy stood on its own merits, he never lost.

His two electoral failures were not strictly comparable to the other electoral contests since one was a primary, not a general election, and the other was a contest in which his fortunes were tied to those of the party's candidate for President. In 1914 he lost the battle for the Democratic nomination as United States senator from the State of New York in the first state-wide party primary elections and in 1920 he was defeated for the Vice Presidency in the election which Harding won over Cox.

In this analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt as a champion vote getter, we are interested in presenting the available evidence regarding what sort of man he was and why he was so successful in politics. In what ways was he superior to his electoral opponents and why? How did he acquire the attributes which apparently made him one of the master politicians of this country and of the modern world? What did people see in him and hear about him?

Once Roosevelt's political career was started, one thing led to another. His prominence as a state senator led to his interest in the Democratic National Convention which met in Baltimore in 1912. His activities there on behalf of the candidacy of Woodrow Wilson for the presidential nomination led to his selection as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Holding this office gave him prominence and administrative experience which made him available for political office in the twenties. His ardent championing in 1924 and 1928 of the presidential candidacy of his former legislative colleague Alfred E. Smith made Roosevelt the logical choice for the gubernatorial nomination in 1928. Roosevelt's success in carrying New York for governor in 1928, when Smith lost the state in the presidential race, began another chain of events. That election meant that FDR was on his way to the White House. He continued in elective office for the rest of his life.

It is highly probable that the picture which millions of voters got of Roosevelt was not a true picture. As Charles Michelson has put it:

> The man who is pictured as a marvel of altruism, a spotless example of all that is good and noble, whose farsightedness approaches that of a biblical seer and prophet; and at the same time as an individual who surreptitiously essays the destruction of our economic system, who has been so devious that nobody could trust him, so selfish that his own political future outweighed his patriotism, so weak that he was swayed by dreamers, and so despotic that he wanted all power to reside in himself—such a man never did exist; never could exist.[1]

Our knowledge of candidates for elective office is fragmentary. We know of Roosevelt from what we read about him, from what we heard about him, and from what a few of us may have seen about him. Many harsh things were printed about him, many ugly rumors were circulated regarding him, and many photographers strained to get uncomplimentary poses. When all was said and done, however, these critics could not drown out the sound of the golden voice with its warmth and confidence; they could not erase the vision of that infectious smile as shown in the newsreels and the candid shots; they could not obliterate the magnificent presence of the man who appeared serenely before

[1] Charles Michelson, *The Ghost Talks* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), p. xii.

Magician!

BY SWEIGERT IN SAN FRANCISCO *CHRONICLE,* FEB. 3, 1934. Reproduced by permission.

millions although he could not walk; no, nor could they erase from the hearts and minds of people all over the world the visions of hope which his words aroused. Roosevelt had something which none of his detractors could take away from him.

As a psychological type, Roosevelt was an incurable optimist with boundless confidence in himself and faith in the loyalty of those around him. He believed that he could perform any task presented to him as a human being, that he could win any person to his point of view if given a chance, and that he was a man of destiny, an instrument of divine purpose.

Another one of his characteristics was courage, both physical and moral. In the face of physical danger such as the attempted assassination in Florida when he was President-elect, we have the testimony of Moley that his courage was superb.[2] In face of the banking crisis in 1933, in face of Pearl Harbor in 1941, he never faltered or showed signs of fear.

A central characteristic was his charm. As Moley explained this:

> On the other hand, among those ways "to which nature inclines" Roosevelt, is one of the most precious assets a public man could have—a seemingly unaffected warmth and cordiality. There was nothing that wasn't spontaneous about the reception he gave the two zealots at Warm Springs. It transcended self-interest or formal courtesy. Roosevelt is interested in people. He wants people to like him. And the combination is almost irresistible.[3]

How was his personality formed? Our knowledge of how heredity and environment combine to produce a given personality is woefully rudimentary.

Roosevelt may have inherited the qualities which attracted the voters. Most certainly he possessed above-average intelligence, and until he was stricken with infantile paralysis he enjoyed a strong body. Even after his illness, except for his legs, he was a superb physical specimen. He may have inherited his sunny temperament as well as his mental abilities and physical characteristics.

Although we do not know what traits are inherited, we know that a given environment will bring out certain characteristics. Friendly and

[2] Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1939), p. 139.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 388.

sympathetic surroundings aid the growth of self-confidence. A lack of affection, the imposition of impossible burdens, and unjustifiable condemnation produce feelings of insecurity which retard the development of self-confidence. Roosevelt was fortunate in having a most friendly environment in his early formative years.

We all have enormous capacities which for the ordinary affairs of the day are not brought into play. Franklin D. Roosevelt's innate capacities may not have been measurably greater than those of many of his contemporaries, but no one can deny that fate brought to him opportunities for the fullest development and use of his capacities.

FDR was President for twelve years and forty days after March 3, 1933. No candidate the Republicans could put up, no argument the Republicans could bring forward made any difference. It was the Roosevelt era. Landon, Willkie, Dewey were each defeated in turn. The two-term limitation was smashed in 1940. The issue was not raised in 1944. The argument about Roosevelt's health got a little tiresome by 1944, when it really applied. The Republicans had cried, "Wolf, wolf!" too long. Did not that man ride in an open car around New York in the pouring rain? Did you hear the Fala speech before the Teamsters Union? Was the Champ ever in better form?

II

PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it.

—*Proverbs, 22:6*

In his introduction to *The True Woodrow Wilson,* President Roosevelt wrote that the volume was gratifying because it covered the former President's years from a very early period to the closing day of his life. He contended that to understand properly the greatness or littleness of any man we must know something of the whole life, not just the period after the trumpet of fame had directed the eyes of the world upon him.[1]

In this chapter an attempt will be made to show the influence of Roosevelt's mother, his mother substitutes, his father, his father substitutes, his playmates, his school and college years, and his choice of a profession upon his character development. It is assumed that in his early life are to be found some of the roots of the optimism, gaiety, sociability, volubility, humor, and conviviality of the man who was later to become President. It is also assumed that his acquisition of skill in the use of language to influence the behavior of others began at an early stage. He was continuously exposed to the vocabularies of Christianity, the free-enterprise economic system, the American democratic political system, and the military and diplomatic system of modern nationalism.

[1] Harold G. Black, *The True Woodrow Wilson* (New York, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1946), introduction by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Franklin D. Roosevelt was born on his father's estate near the village of Hyde Park, New York, on January 30, 1882. His parents were moderately wealthy and mingled with the aristocrats who inhabited the Hudson River Valley.

There is an old Jewish proverb to the effect that God could not be everywhere and therefore he made mothers. This proverb applied particularly to Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his mother.

Anyone who has reared a family knows that central problems in the life of a newborn infant are food and drink. If the child does not get enough of both, it has pangs of hunger and thirst. If the temperature of the food is not right, it may burn the child's mouth or chill its stomach. So many things can happen.

On the question of infant feeding, there is a delightful passage regarding Roosevelt's mother in Rita Halle Kleeman's *Gracious Lady:*

> Many years later, Dr. Alexis Carrel, seated beside Mrs. Roosevelt at a dinner, said he was writing a treatise on infant feeding and asked what she had fed her son. Mrs. Roosevelt replied that she was afraid it was too old-fashioned a formula for any modern treatise, that she had fed him nature's own food for almost a year.[2]

From Homer, as translated by Shelley, we have the following:

> A little child born yesterday,
> A thing on mother's milk and kisses fed.[3]

There is no denying that there was a beautiful relationship between Franklin and his mother. As a very young infant, Franklin began to smile, reflecting the joy he saw in his mother's face.

Franklin was the only child of Sara and James Roosevelt. He was born one year and four months after the marriage. His mother at the time was twenty-eight years old. As Mrs. Kleeman indicates, Sara Roosevelt made her son's home a happy one:

> In this home there was always harmony, affection, and understanding, the boy developed as children from such homes usually develop, without self-consciousness or emotional difficulties, happy and well-balanced. He never

[2] (New York, D. Appleton–Century Company, 1935), p. 127.

[3] Homeric "Hymn to Hermes," I, 406 (in Shelley translation, "Hymn to Mercury," St. 69).

saw ugly moods or emotions; he was never the inwardly shrinking victim of conflicting interests, envenomed jealousies or ill-tempered words. During the years when these things can make ineradicable scars on small souls, he did not come in contact with them.[4]

From the same source comes the following entry in the diary of Roosevelt's mother upon her return home from a trip: "Franklin saw a jacket of mine in his nursery and went up to it and kissed it, saying, 'Mama, mama!' Not two years old!" [5]

At the age of four, Franklin showed signs of tightening the bond of affection between himself and his mother. On a wagon ride to visit a relative, "when his mother got into the wagon, he climbed up onto the seat beside her, put his arms around her neck, his face close against hers, and without crying or laughing or speaking, stood thus like a little statue, for all of the two miles to the house." [6]

Franklin Roosevelt's letters, from the very earliest ones written at the age of six, are full of references to love and kisses for his mother. From Groton he wrote on April 13, 1897, "With tons of love and thousands of kisses affectionately Franklin D. Roosevelt." [7]

There is no question that Roosevelt's mother had a profound influence upon him during his entire life. She used common sense when he was young by not overindulging him and thus spoiling him. The home environment was serene, but there were also firm authority and consistency there. Roosevelt loved his home, and when he was away from Hyde Park he longed to be back there.

His mother kept a discreet watch over him at Groton, Harvard, and Columbia, and she was more than glad to take up her duties as a grandmother. Franklin's wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, got along with her mother-in-law by the simple formula of avoiding controversy.[8]

There is abundant evidence that Roosevelt's mother was very demonstrative in granting him affection. The tie that was built between mother and son remained strong as long as she lived. Even after he entered politics and he and his wife set up housekeeping by themselves, the maternal

[4] Kleeman, *op. cit.*, p. 170. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 139. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[7] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, Early Years,* ed. Elliott Roosevelt (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1947), p. 80.

[8] Eleanor Roosevelt, *This Is My Story* (New York, Garden City Publishing Company, 1939), pp. 152 ff., and *This I Remember* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949).

influence was present. When he went to Hyde Park, his mother read to him while he worked over his stamps or pasted photographs in his albums, just as she did when he was a little boy in sailor suits.[9]

The Roosevelt household was run in accordance with a regular schedule. Mrs. Kleeman tells the following story of how Franklin's mother won his adherence to this schedule:

> When he was nine, and they were spending the summer in Campobello, Franklin suddenly rebelled against the simple regulations of his life, the hours for meals and sleep and study, the supervision of his play. He wanted to do entirely as he pleased, he said. His mother's faith in his judgment was put to a severe test, but it won. She agreed to let him have complete freedom the following day nor did she attempt to impose restrictions or unsuspected guardianship. Neither she nor the boy's father questioned him when he returned; they never did learn how he spent the day except that he had been on time for meals, the one condition they had imposed. The next day he went quietly back to his usual routine. This story has been frequently told, and the usual version is that he returned exhausted and begrimed.[10]

As his aunt, Mrs. Forbes, said about Franklin's upbringing, *"Il a été élève dans un beau cadre."* [11]

Roosevelt's mother played a leading role in the moral and ethical education of her son. She told her biographer that she wanted her son to grow up to be a fine, upright man like his father and maternal grandfather. From the beginning she tried to instill in him the virtues of honesty, consideration of others, fairness, sportsmanship, and a sense of responsibility. As soon as he was old enough, he was taken to church.[12] In his play morality was inculcated by a system of rewards and punishments. She relates that when he was four or five, they were playing "steeplechase" with toy horses. Her horse won several times. He protested that she had the better horse. She changed horses with him and still won. He continued to protest. She picked up the horses and took them away, saying that until he learned to lose like a gentleman, she could not play with him.

The bond between Roosevelt and his mother continued to be close

[9] Kleeman, *op. cit.*, p. 229.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 171.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 170, "He was raised in a beautiful frame."
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 169.

until her death in 1941. The son could see no imperfection in his mother. His wife's desire for independence from her mother-in-law was inexplicable to him. In her first autobiography his wife relates the following incident:

> That autumn I did not quite know what was the matter with me, but I remember that a few weeks after we moved into the new house in East 65th Street I sat in front of my dressing table and wept, and when my bewildered young husband asked me what on earth was the matter with me, I said I did not like to live in a house which was not in any way mine, one that I had done nothing about and which did not represent the way I wanted to live. Being an eminently reasonable person, he thought I was quite mad and told me so gently, and said I would feel different in a little while and left me alone until I should be calmer.[13]

In her second autobiography his wife stated her point of view even more strongly:

> I doubt if as long as she lived she ever let [Franklin] leave the house without inquiring whether he was dressed warmly enough. . . . She never accepted the fact of his independence and continued until the last to try to guide his life.[14]

There is a school of psychologists and anthropologists which contends that when the relationship between mother and son is as close as it was in the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his mother, the son may develop pronounced characteristics of optimism.[15] Life was made secure for him from the beginning, and his mother's home was a safe haven. The world was a pleasant place to live in and all human needs would be taken care of. Money was no consideration. As a boy he knew of no other kind of world.

Shortly after Franklin was born, his parents hired Miss Ellen MacRorie as a maid to assist in taking care of the baby. She remained for nine years as part of the household even after a governess had been engaged. Franklin called her "Mamie," and was greatly devoted to her. She was apparently faithful, interesting to the young boy, reliable from the stand-

[13] *This Is My Story*, p. 162.
[14] *This I Remember*, p. 16.
[15] J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936), p. 321.

point of the parents, and indulgent. Regarding Miss MacRorie, Belle Moses wrote:

> His chief companion, however, during his little boyhood, was his nurse. Her name was Ellen MacRorie, so it is easy to guess her nationality. She was doubtless his most intimate friend and confidante; probably, too, in her Scottish mind reposed many old legends, which her "child" drank in most eagerly. When he was too small to roam alone, Ellen went with him, for she was one of those faithful creatures, willing to sacrifice her whole life for this boy, who became her very existence.[16]

The other women who had charge of one phase or another of Franklin's upbringing had pleasant personalities. His German governess, Fraulein Reinhardt, evidently stimulated his interest in German at the age of seven.[17] His Swiss governess, Mlle. Jeanne Sandoz, was very popular not only as a French teacher but also as a companion who entered into his youthful sports.[18]

While the gap between Franklin's age and that of his father was great, fifty-three years, the two were close to each other in companionship and interests. James Roosevelt was a retired businessman and a gentleman farmer who had time to play, travel, and talk with his son. In this busy world that is more than can be said of many fathers who are closer in age to their sons. The published letters of Franklin D. Roosevelt reveal nothing but affection and respect for his father. There are no signs of resentment, jealousy, and fear which sometimes mar filial relationships. It does not appear that the father was jealous of his wife's affection for their son. The available materials on Franklin's early life show no signs of revolt against the authority of his father. Because his father was so much older, he was viewed as a benevolent grandfather type. He was not a domineering head of the household.

It is thus clear that the FDR case does not fit neatly into the theory of the Oedipus complex, according to which Franklin should have been jealous of his father and resentful at his authority. The theory, it should be remembered, describes certain psychopathological conditions. When

[16] Belle Moses, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York, D. Appleton–Century Company, 1933), p. 8.

[17] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, Early Years*, p. 13.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

the mother is indulgent and the father unusually severe and nonindulgent, then the male child may develop unusual love for his mother and hatred for his father. But Franklin's father was not severe. He was indulgent. Why should Franklin dislike him? There was no reason at all. He was a nice old man, serene, dignified, interested in his son, and as he grew older and more feeble, no physical match for his beautiful wife. Young Franklin did not fear his father as a rival for the affection of Sara Delano Roosevelt. That affection was centered on him before his father passed away.

Young Franklin's idea of masculine authority came in part from his father substitutes, the tutors hired by his parents to teach the boy and be his companions.

The importance of the tutors in fixing the boy's idea of authority has been neglected in most of the biographies. These tutors could not exercise the stern authority that a father could. The turnover among them was high, and they were subject to orders from Mrs. Roosevelt. In some of young Franklin's European trips, the tutor joined in the boy's escapades. Franklin relates that he and his tutor were arrested four times in one day for minor traffic violations while taking a bicycle trip in Germany.[19] In London, Franklin persuaded his tutor to use his life membership in the American Museum of Natural History, of New York, as a means of entering as an uninvited guest to an opening of the Kensington Museum by the Prince of Wales.[20] This incident is extremely revealing. The boy Franklin was not awed by royalty. He was not to be stopped from pursuing his objective because of red tape. He gave orders to his tutor, although nominally the tutor was responsible for Franklin's conduct. Franklin Roosevelt, throughout his life, was accustomed to giving orders, he did not like to have strong authority exercised over him by an older male. He chafed under Secretary Daniels's direction as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. When he was elected governor, he at once cut loose the tie that might have kept former Governor Smith within his group of advisers. When he became President, he did not go back to the

[19] Ernest K. Lindley, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Career in Progressive Democracy* (New York, Blue Ribbon Books, 1931), p. 50.

[20] Mrs. James Roosevelt, as told to Isabel Leighton and Gabrielle Forbush, *My Boy Franklin* (New York, Ray Long & Richard R. Smith, 1933), pp. 27–28.

Wilson period for talent and experience. Roosevelt liked men around him who would act like tutors. They had to have his welfare at heart and be ready to do his bidding. Louis Howe had a tutorial relationship toward Roosevelt. Howe taught Roosevelt some of the ins and outs of politics and journalism. Howe could tell Roosevelt that if he did so and so, the consequences would be thus and thus; but Howe never undertook to push Roosevelt. If Roosevelt decided against his advice, then Howe did the best he could to carry out orders.

As Franklin was the only child Sara and James Roosevelt had, it was necessary for them to provide their son with companions near his own age.

The Delano and the Roosevelt cousins were an army in themselves. They were highly sociable and extremely loyal to their clan. Uncle Ted's family was a lively group, as Theodore Roosevelt's *Letters to His Children* abundantly show.[21] The Delano family was also closely knit. Franklin attended gay family parties, beginning at an early age. He met his future wife when he was nine years old.

The James Roosevelts also relied upon the children of their neighbors to furnish companionship to Franklin. The two Rogers boys, sons of Colonel Archibald Rogers, Standard Oil magnate, were close friends, and it was in the Rogers home that Franklin first went to school. As Mrs. Kleeman put it:

> Franklin was not, however, entirely without the companionship of other children. Their friends the Rogers, their nearest neighbors at Hyde Park, had two sons of about his age, Archie and Edmund, and almost from babyhood he played with them, climbing the trees and hiding in the haystacks in the summer, making snowballs and coasting in the winter. With them he built a crow's nest in a tall hemlock, from which they could look out over the Hudson for pirate ships or slinking Indian war canoes. With them he built snow fortresses to repel attack by hostile tribes. With them, on the twenty-second of October, 1888, he began his formal schooling. His mother entered in her diary: "Franklin began going to the Rogers daily for two hours study with the boys and their governess." [22]

On the same subject Ross and Grobin wrote:

[21] New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929.
[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 168.

Franklin had few playmates. But those he had, he treasured. Adjoining the Roosevelt farm was the country place of Colonel Archibald Rogers, a place of many big red barns. The older Rogers boys were Franklin's constant companions.

When the trio wanted to go swimming, they went. And to young Roosevelt, thus came all the joys of the old swimming hole. Nor was this play with the Rogers children restricted to swimming. They played baseball—a game boys call "scrub." They raced on the Hudson in small boats and in winter they skated. They frequently shared their studies; and together developed a community of interest in the tremendous "fun" of seeking new words, fresh mathematical methods, and so on.[23]

While Franklin was at school briefly in Germany during one of the trips on which his father sought health at a German sanitarium, his formal schooling began at the age of fourteen, when he was entered in the third form at Groton, Massachusetts. This private Episcopalian boardingschool was founded by Dr. Endicott Peabody in 1884 and rapidly become a fashionable place for persons of means to send their sons. The evidence which we have about the training given by this school indicates that it maintained high standards not only as a preparatory school for college but also as a school preparing boys for life. Like Eton, Rugby, and Harrow in England, it trained young men to assume civic responsibilities.[24]

Young Franklin adjusted himself quickly to his new environment. In his first letter from school to "Dear Mommerr & Popper," he wrote, "I am getting on finely both mentally and physically." [25] In his next letter he said that he had not been put in the "boot-box" yet. In other words, he had escaped a hazing process designed for "fresh" boys.[26]

The influence of Groton on Franklin Roosevelt's personality development is hard to exaggerate. The roots of many of his later activities can be traced directly to this period of his life. His interest in politics, his belief in a big Navy, his concern for the underprivileged, his love of public speaking, his fondness for conviviality, and his loyalty to the

[23] Leland M. Ross and Allen W. Grobin, *This Democratic Roosevelt* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, 1932), pp. 28–29.

[24] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, Early Years*, p. 30.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

church were inculcated or reenforced by experiences at Groton.[27]

After graduating from Groton, the pattern was for the young man of family to go to Harvard. Unofficial Observer made the following comment on a Harvard education:

> To enter Harvard was something real and to be a Harvard graduate was the highest academic distinction for a well-bred American. Yale and Princeton were already infected with the bustle of American life, clamorous, rowdy and rah-rah, but Harvard preserved something of the spirit of Oxford and Cambridge and, under the guidance of Charles W. Eliot, was America's only really liberal institution of the higher learning.[28]

Even if one does not agree with Unofficial Observer, it has to be admitted that the Harvard of 1900–1904 had a most distinguished faculty; and the student body of those years was destined to contribute heavily to America's political, industrial, professional, intellectual, and social élite.[29] In this training ground of America's future leaders, Franklin proved himself to be a leader. In the fourth year he was elected to one of the high honors of the institution, president of the *Harvard Crimson.*

Franklin came from the right school, the right family; he was accepted by the aristocratic elements of his classmates and he was asked to join the exclusive clubs. He suffered no "snubs" at Harvard. At the same time he began to show an interest in the underdog. He was active from time to time in a local settlement house, and as editor of the *Crimson* he bucked his first "machine" by denouncing the control of class elections by select clubs.[30]

Franklin D. Roosevelt was too busy with the *Crimson* and with his social affairs to be a scholar, and yet he finished the regular undergraduate course in three years and only stayed a fourth year because he was elected president of the *Crimson.* With such teachers as Josiah Royce, Hiram Bingham, George Pierce Baker, Charles Townsend Copeland,

[27] Groton was interested in settlement work and the boys asked their parents for donations for a camp for poor boys (*ibid.*, p. 70).

[28] Unofficial Observer, *The New Dealers* (New York, Simon and Shuster, 1934), p. 10.

[29] Among his classmates were an unusually large number of future Congressmen, diplomats, high administrative officers, governors.

[30] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, Early Years,* p. 453.

Edward Channing, Charles Sumner Hamlin, Roger Bigelow Merriman, Frederick Jackson Turner, William Z. Ripley, A. L. Lowell, and Oliver M. W. Sprague, he did not lack in intellectual stimulus. He was exposed to the best that this country had to offer in economics, American history, diplomatic and world history.

The reading of *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, Early Years,* brings out clearly the close connection between the Groton tie and the Harvard tie. As in the case of British politics, the secondary-school tie may be more important than the college tie.[31] Groton prepared for Harvard, and the school looked after its graduates after they had gone to Harvard. Franklin's interest in the settlement houses of Boston, his interest in going to church, and his interest in civic affairs were originally stimulated by Groton, and during his Harvard days these interests were kept alive by his frequent return to Groton, which was about thirty-five miles away, his contact with Groton graduates at Harvard, and his friendship for Groton faculty members. Thus, a special Sunday Service for Groton graduates who had become Harvard freshmen was a well established institution. These Harvard freshmen sat at a special Groton table in Cambridge. Franklin was introduced to the Boys Club of Boston by Groton, and the tie was strengthened during his Harvard days. In Cambridge he roomed with Lathrop Brown, who had also been his roommate in Groton.

His Personal Letters, Early Years, also show that at Harvard he was frequently a candidate for elective positions in connection with student activities and that he was elated at the successes he achieved in those contests. Thus, he was elected captain of a freshman scrub football team, secretary of the freshman glee club, captain of one of the freshman crews, cheerleader and, the crowning glory of his college career, successively assistant managing editor and president of the *Harvard Crimson.* The latter position was won at the end of his third year and represented the fruition of his college ambitions. As he was about to leave Harvard, he was nominated for the position of marshal but did not win it. Instead he was elected secretary, a permanent position, for the Harvard Class of 1904. There can be no question of his popularity with his fellow

[31] H. F. Gosnell, *Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom* (New York, The Ronald Press, 1948), p. 45.

students. He showed qualities of student leadership. While some psychologists seem to think that the qualities demanded of student leaders are not always those demanded in postgraduate life, this contention is by no means well established.[32] Leadership qualities are usually made manifest by the teen-age period.

Regarding the evolution of Franklin's thinking during his Harvard days, the *Letters* are unfortunately not very complete, but they are sufficient to indicate a trend. Editorials by him that appeared in the *Crimson* clearly foreshadow the shape of things to come. He was not afraid to challenge the existing authorities, faculty or student, and he indicated that he was willing to assume responsibility for his fellow compatriots.[33] He also made it clear that he believed college men had civic responsibilities and that politics should be an honorable profession which a college man should not hesitate to enter. Typical of this attitude was the following editorial in the *Crimson:*

We are reminded by the communication about voting in the New York election that the Political Club here has a field for work which is very large and in which much good might be done. Last year this organization took a good step in arranging a few talks on politics, but these talks would do more good if there were more of them and if they were open to the whole University.

No attempt, however, is made to give a practical idea of the workings of a political system of the machinery of primary, caucus, convention, election and legislature. With such a large city as Boston close at hand it would be easy to send in parties, under the guidance of some experienced man, which in one day could learn more than through the means of lectures. There must be many among us who, whether or not of a voting age, would be more than glad to gain knowledge by actual experience of the intricacies of Federal, State and Municipal politics.[34]

Roosevelt's choice of a profession had a determining effect upon his later political career. At the age of thirteen he wanted to become a naval officer. The influence of the seafaring Delanos is apparent in this choice. His father, however, urged him to continue in his footsteps and become

[32] W. S. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* XXIII, No. 2.

[33] See editorial to freshmen, *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, Early Years,* p. 503.

[34] Oct. 8, 1903.

a lawyer and businessman.[35] The advice of his father prevailed, and young Franklin gave up the idea of a naval career, although he and a roommate were sorely tempted to run away from Groton and join the Navy during the Spanish American War. Had Roosevelt gone to Annapolis and taken up a naval career, he probably would have closed the door to political opportunity. The legal profession, on the other hand, left that door open.

The choice of a law school was determined in part by his plans to get married. He could be nearer his fiancée if he went to law school in New York City. Thus Harvard Law School, his father's alma mater, was passed over in favor of Columbia Law School. He attended Columbia for three years and passed the New York State bar examination in 1907. Because he never received a degree from Columbia Law School and he had to retake examinations in certain subjects,[36] it cannot be said that he distinguished himself in law school or that the law challenged him to put forth his best efforts. It is likely that he was distracted to some extent by the adjustments necessary in early married life. That he could have done better in law school had he exerted himself is clear from the ease with which he passed the course examinations he had failed.[37]

Upon passing the bar examination Roosevelt obtained a position as law clerk with the well known firm of Carter, Ledyard and Milburn, at 54 Wall Street. Before he started the office routine, he referred to his prospective "office boy" duties.[38] He apparently did not look forward to his apprenticeship with the law firm with great enthusiasm.

Regarding his law activities a *Fortune* article said:

> He practiced law in the same spirit. He sat as head clerk in the front office of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn at 54 Wall with his handsome head, his democratic manner, and his unforgettable voice and undertook with delight the kind of work most smart young lawyers avoid. He kept in a large firm hand on the pages of a large black ledger the records of papers served and received. He tried express company cases in remote municipal courts against unscrupulous opponents and before overworked and inefficient judges. He walked around in the rain in his Brooks suits collecting wit-

[35] Lindley, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
[36] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928*, pp. 64, 73.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

nesses. And he loved it. He loved the work. He loved the people—even the people in the municipal courts. He loved the movement. He loved the excitement. He loved to try cases, running his eye through the papers on his way to court. He loved indeed pretty much everything and everybody—except the law. The law he never loved.[39]

Looker reports an example which bears out the above analysis of Roosevelt as a lawyer. The opposing attorney in a questionable lawsuit had taken the case on a contingent basis. Roosevelt discovered that the attorney was in straitened circumstances. He settled the case and gave the lawyer a personal loan of $150.[40]

After a while he did develop a liking for one branch of the law, admiralty law, and his firm assigned him to cases in this field.

Some of Roosevelt's detractors complain that he had achieved no great distinction in the law before he entered politics. In three years a man can hardly be expected to rise to the top of his profession. While some American political leaders achieved eminence in the practice of law before entering politics, as in the case of Samuel J. Tilden, Charles Evans Hughes, and John W. Davis, this is not always the pattern. William Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson did not achieve fame at the bar. It was fortunate for Roosevelt that he could afford to enter politics when he was young. He came to look upon his law practice as a means of supplementing his invested income during periods when he was not holding public office. In other words, public service, not the law, became his career.

As a gateway to political office, the law has always had a prominent place in American history. A majority of the Presidents and a majority of congressmen have been lawyers. The vocabulary of American politics is largely a legal vocabulary. Roosevelt was acquiring proficiency in the use of this vocabulary. That he preferred to use this skill in the political rally rather than in the courtroom was a personal choice.

[39] December, 1933.

[40] Earle Looker, *This Man Roosevelt* (New York, Brewer, Warren & Putnam, 1932), p. 52.

III

THE CANDIDATE'S WIFE

The hearing ear and the seeing eye.
—Proverbs, 20:12

It would be foolish to deny that a candidate's wife made no difference in his chances of success. A candidate's wife can greatly help or hinder her husband in running for elective office. The Republicans who circulated the report that Mrs. Smith would not grace the White House were sinking to a new low level in campaigning, but such tactics lost votes for Governor Smith.[1] Unfortunately, in American politics the end too often justifies the means. If an attack on a candidate's wife can win votes, there are some who stoop to win votes in that way.

There were many attacks made on Franklin Delano Roosevelt's wife and family. Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Roosevelt stood like a rock which the storms and floods could not move. In balance the unfavorable publicity she received did not offset the votes she gained. Eleanor was an asset, a tower of strength, who, starting life with many handicaps, overcame them one by one and developed into a political power in her own right.

In her frank and revealing books and articles, Eleanor Roosevelt has told her story.[2] Slander, misrepresentation, and bitter criticism have not spoiled the picture that millions have of her. Gracious, charming, sincere,

[1] Roy Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, *The 1928 Campaign: An Analysis* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1931), p. 100.

[2] Eleanor Roosevelt, *This Is My Story* and *This I Remember.*

sympathetic, and altruistic, she stands a defender of human rights with a secure place in history.

Ruby Black has discerningly commented upon the seeming contradictions in Eleanor Roosevelt's career:

> That a girl born to this country's most exclusive aristocracy could become the personal friend of hundreds born in slums and on tenant farms, and their public advocate and benefactor; that a girl untrained to work could become one of the highest-paid and most indefatigable working women in the world; that a girl who was a wall flower could become a nation's most gracious hostess, a woman beloved by millions; that a girl brought up to do only what was expected of her could become a woman bold in breaking precedents, valiant in championing those who needed a champion; that a girl afraid to speak her mind to her closest relatives and friends could become a woman who spoke her mind so freely and so vigorously in world affairs that two powerful dictators assailed her opinions and her influence; that a girl reared in an atmosphere remote from politics could become a woman, who, according to astute politicians, played a decisive part in that unprecedented political convention which nominated her husband for a third presidential term—these are ideas with which romancers might play, and then discard as too improbable.[3]

Eleanor Roosevelt was the daughter of Elliott Roosevelt who was President Theodore Roosevelt's brother. She was thus a distantly related cousin of Franklin. While she was very fond of her Uncle Ted and his children, she did not see as much of them as she wished because she was brought up by her maternal grandmother, Mrs. Valentine G. Hall, a very conservative woman who thought that the Oyster Bay branch of the Roosevelt family was too boisterous.

Eleanor's early life was in sharp contrast to Franklin's in many ways. Whereas he had a happy youth, she had a sad one. She felt that her mother did not approve of her because she was not good-looking. She lost both parents by the time that she was not quite ten years old. Especially grievous to her was the loss of her father, whom she adored. He had been understanding and had given her the happiest time of her youth. She went to live in New York with her grandmother, who strictly regimented her life according to the rigid standards of the day. Whereas

[3] *Eleanor Roosevelt: A Biography* (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1940), p. ix.

Franklin engaged in all kinds of sports, Eleanor engaged in none. He went to Harvard, but her grandmother would not allow her to fulfill her wish to go to college. His home life was harmonious, whereas her home life was unpleasant because of the maladjusted cousins with whom she had to live.

But Eleanor's troubles as a young girl apparently left no trace of bitterness. Rather she developed a Spartan courage with which to meet life's hardships. While self-confidence was perhaps slow in developing, nothing had happened to prevent its development under favorable conditions. Her schooling in London at Mademoiselle Souveste's was such a situation. There was nothing wrong with her intelligence, and under the wise guidance of Mademoiselle Souveste she grew in understanding of life and world affairs.

Just what Franklin saw in Eleanor when she was eighteen and he was twenty may never be known. Franklin's published letters, *Early Years,* do not tell us. Subsequent events have proved that he was a very discerning young man. If he had married someone else, he might never have been President. In the dark days after he was stricken in 1921, she helped maintain his morale and encouraged him on his way back to active political life. In 1902 he must have seen in her sweetness, charm, dependability, tact, loyalty, and appreciation. She did not have her mother's physical beauty, but she had a beauty of spirit. Some people have said that Franklin was not a good judge of character. His choice of a wife belies these critics.

Mrs. Roosevelt's upbringing did not anticipate the many demands that were to be made upon her as the wife of a man twice elected governor of New York State and four times elected President. The home and "society" were the principal occupations of young women of her set. Social settlement work was proper, but not the grimy business of ward politics and campaign headquarters.

The first eleven years of her married life were spent bearing and rearing children. Her oldest, Anna, was born in May, 1906, and her youngest, John Aspinwall, in March, 1916. She bore Franklin six children, of whom five survived to reach adulthood. The first Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr., died in November, 1909, at the age of eight months. Between Anna and John came James, Elliott, and Franklin, Jr. Her hus-

band had no complaint to make regarding her fertility and willingness to bear the burdens of motherhood. As she wrote, "I had always been a particularly healthy person, and I think it was a good thing for me to be perfectly miserable for three months before every one of my six babies arrived, as it made me a little more understanding and sympathetic of the general illnesses human beings are subject to." [4]

Politics turned out to be a preoccupation of her husband. As a good wife she tried her hand at this game with all the gusto of her distinguished Uncle Ted. She continued to grow, even after the shattering experience of her husband's tragic death.

Politics offered her an escape from the ever present domination of her mother-in-law when she was in Hyde Park or New York. As she wrote in *This Is My Story* about going to Albany in 1910:

> For the first time I was going to live on my own; neither my mother-in-law nor Mrs. Parish was going to be within call. One did not use the long-distance telephone in those days as we do today. I wrote my mother-in-law almost every day, as I had for many years when away from her, but I had to stand on my own feet now, and I think I knew that it was good for me. I wanted to be independent. I was beginning to realize that something within me craved to be an individual. What kind of individual was still in the lap of the gods! [5]

She went with her husband to Washington in 1913, when he was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and performed faithfully the duties of the wife of an Assistant Secretary. Her husband's position in the Wilson Administration meant that she had a home of her own in Washington. Her children went to the Episcopal schools of the Washington Cathedral.

The taste for independence which her husband's election to the New York State Senate gave her never left her. She was glad when he was reelected in 1912. She even went to the historic Democratic National Convention with him in Baltimore, although such affairs did not interest her as much then as they did later. Who could have foreseen in 1912 that the tall, slender young mother at that convention would be the same person who, twenty-eight years later, was to be the only one who

[4] *This Is My Story*, p. 139. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

could calm the unruly mob which met in the Chicago stadium in 1940 to nominate her husband for President in defiance of the no-third-term tradition?

Franklin's nomination for Vice President in 1920 did not furnish any sure guarantee of his continuance in public office. Nevertheless she went with him on one of the most extensive campaign tours ever undertaken by a candidate. They had to outdo Uncle Ted. Their strenuous efforts did little to stem the tide against the Democrats that year. They were chiefly valuable in experience. She wrote: "I had never had any contacts with newspaper people before. My grandmother had taught me that a woman's place was not in the public eye, and that had clung to me all through the Washington years. . . . But the years had taught me a certain adaptability to circumstances and I did receive an intensive education on this trip, and Louis Howe played a great part in this education from that time on." [6]

When her husband became ill with infantile paralysis, her mother-in-law wanted to treat him as an invalid. This Eleanor and Louis Howe refused to do. Rita Kleeman reports Sara Delano Roosevelt as saying:

> "Eleanor," she added, "was magnificent throughout. From the beginning she had realized the importance of keeping up Franklin's morale, and was always cheerful. She had said to me at once, 'You know, Mummy, you must not let Franklin know we are worried,' and through all the weary, worrying months that followed, I never saw her depressed." [7]

Because her husband could not walk, Mrs. Roosevelt resolved to be his eyes and ears in places where it was hard for him to go. From this came her extraordinary mobility and the development of her reporting abilities. She saw that politics might furnish a way in which he could recover from the blow that illness had inflicted upon his ego. Was he a helpless invalid? They would show the world that he was not. And so she began to take an active part in the affairs of the Democratic party. As she put it, "In New York I had begun to do a fairly regular job for the woman's division of the Democratic State Committee, and was finding work very satisfactory and acquiring pride in doing a semiprofessional job." [8]

[6] *This Is My Story*, p. 314. [7] *Gracious Lady*, p. 276. [8] *This Is My Story*, p. 346.

The next crisis in the life of the candidate's wife came in 1928, when the leaders of the Democratic party, including Governor Smith, Democratic nominee for President, urged her husband to accept the Democratic nomination for governor of New York State. It was a choice, or so husband and wife thought, between further recovery of the use of his legs or service to the people of the state and another rung on the political ladder. She refused to urge him to run, but she helped Governor Smith to get in touch with him by telephone at Warm Springs, Georgia, where he was taking a cure.[9]

The Franklin Roosevelts returned to Albany again, this time to the governor's mansion. Their daughter Anna was twenty-three, and their son James had just become of voting age and was attending Harvard University. As the first lady of the state, she was a leader of mothers, a gracious hostess, a popular speaker, and a fine reporter for the governor. She went with the governor on his inspection trips of state institutions, mostly by the inland waterways of the state, and she acted as his chief inspector, reporting in detail on the conditions she found. She continued her interest in the organization of the women's division of the Democratic party and was credited by James Farley with the victory in upstate New York in 1930, when her husband ran again for governor and piled up an unprecedented majority.

Her part in the Democratic National Convention of 1932 was significant, if not as spectacular as her role eight years later. In the preconvention campaigning, as in the state campaigning, she continued to collect information which her husband found difficult to obtain, to address women's groups, and to assist at headquarters. She accompanied him on the plane ride from Albany to Chicago to accept the Democratic nomination.

In this and the other campaigns that followed she continued her intensive activities on behalf of her husband. With each new campaign she brought fresh assets to the job she had set herself to do. Her tours, her inspections, her contacts with individuals and various groups, her journalistic activities, and her speaking engagements all added to her influence upon the voters' minds.

None of the wives of the eleven candidates against whom Franklin D.

[9] Ernest K. Lindley, *Franklin D. Roosevelt,* pp. 18–19.

Roosevelt ran for public office came near to achieving the distinction which Anna Eleanor Roosevelt won. Mrs. Roosevelt's fame mounted because of the unusual opportunities which her position furnished her. She took full advantage of these opportunities and became a bulwark for her husband. Among women, underprivileged and minority groups, and those in trouble, she became a veritable symbol of Franklin D. Roosevelt's avowed aims. Was she not seen treating whites and Negroes alike as human beings? Were not women higher in status because of her? She could be seen at Civilian Conservation Corps Camps, army barracks, hospitals, ships, canteens, slums—an angel of mercy. What husband-candidate could ask for more?

IV

SENATOR ROOSEVELT

A man that hath friends must show himself friendly.
—Proverbs, 18:24

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT's election as Democratic state senator from the twenty-sixth senatorial district of New York State in 1910 was the beginning of his long career in public service. If he had been defeated in this election, he might have made another beginning. His success was beyond his fondest dreams.

The senatorial district from which he ran was composed of the counties of Columbia, Dutchess, and Putnam, along the east bank of the Hudson directly north of metropolitan New York. It had gone Republican in every election since the Civil War except that of 1884, when Thomas Newbold, a neighbor of the Roosevelts', had won in a three-cornered contest. While the Roosevelts lived in New York City, they kept their voting residence in Hyde Park, Dutchess County. This upstate voting residence was of importance throughout FDR's entire political career. Franklin loved his home in Hyde Park, with its view of the majestic Hudson River and the rolling hills. Like Jefferson, he felt that his roots were in the soil, and he never gave up gentleman farming.

In an extemporaneous speech at Vassar College, on August 26, 1933, President Roosevelt described how he got started in politics:

I want to go back for a minute to the old days before I got to know the United States. It is, I think, just twenty-three years ago that I chanced to be

in Poughkeepsie on a Saturday morning in August, a very hot Saturday morning.

In front of the court house, I ran across a group of friends of mine. As I remember, they were Judge Morschauser, George Spratt, John Mack, and Judge Arnold. I had only intended to stay in town for a few minutes to do some errands, but they kidnaped me—one of the first cases of deliberate kidnaping on record—and took me out to the policemen's picnic in Fairview.

On that joyous occasion of clams and sauerkraut and real beer I made my first speech, and I have been apologizing for it ever since.

And also on that same occasion I started to make the acquaintance of that part of Dutchess County that lies outside of the town of Hyde Park.

And I continued to make that acquaintance all through the campaign that year, although in August I hadn't the foggiest idea that I was going to run for the State Senate; and it was only because another band of kidnapers kidnaped me that I got into public life at all.

For I had to talk, and I was given the opportunity of making the acquaintance of a county.

And today, as I drive along a beautiful concrete highway, or one of the new county roads, I see in my mind's eye that same road as it existed in the autumn of 1910 as I proceeded over it at the dangerous pace of about twenty-two miles an hour in Mr. Hawkey's old red Maxwell, without any front windshield, without any top—an old Maxwell, that, when we met a horse or a team—and that was about every half mile or so—we had to stop, not only the car, but the engine as well.[1]

When interviewed many years later regarding his early impressions of Roosevelt, Mr. Mack said that the young Roosevelt whom they had invited to the policemen's picnic was "very attractive, very friendly—met the policemen and all their guests at the clambake and in general made a definite hit." His speeches were "very clever" and "all over the county this handsome, stalwart young chap appealed to the people."[2]

The recollections of Roosevelt's party committeeman for the town of Hyde Park corroborate Mr. Mack's views. This committeeman was

[1] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933* (New York, Random House, 1938), pp. 338–339.

[2] Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Group 35, interviews recorded by G. A. Palmer, NPS, Superintendent at Hyde Park, N.Y., interview with John E. Mack, Feb. 1, 1949.

Thomas F. Leonard, a journeyman painter, who recalled the democratic manner in which the Roosevelt of 1910 greeted him:

I met him in August of 1910 and at that time I was employed by Mr. John Clay, a painter, and we were doing some interior decorating for his brother, J. R. Roosevelt, his neighbor. . . .

I said, "How do you do, Mr. Roosevelt?" He said: "No, call me Franklin. I'm going to call you Tom."

Tom Leonard recalled that Roosevelt made a very nice speech and that the people were all glad to meet him. Although he was a very young man, the party officials were glad to have him as a candidate.

He had a way of stopping—stopping during the day, wherever there happened to be a gathering of people for any occasion, stop and get acquainted and talk with them and he was what I'd call a top-notch salesman, because of the fact that he wouldn't immediately enter into the topic of politics when he met a party, but he would approach them as a friend and lead up to that—with that smile of his—would lead up to the fact that he was a candidate for the senatorship, and so forth, and I found that he made a lot of friends by that approach.[3]

The Democratic leaders of the area proposed originally that Roosevelt run for the Assembly seat held by a Democrat, Lewis Stuyvesant Chanler, a well known figure in New York politics, and that Chanler run for the state Senate. The latter, however, decided not to run for the state Senate, and the leaders sought to nominate Roosevelt for the post. They counted on his paying his own campaign expenses.

"They told me it was my duty to accept, and thinking it over for twenty-four hours, I felt inclined to agree with them inasmuch as there was such a dearth of material," Roosevelt was quoted as saying in discussing his nomination.[4]

Franklin D. Roosevelt was considered for the nomination because his father and half-brother were known to be prominent Democrats. His father was one of President Cleveland's friends and had been urged by President Cleveland to accept a high appointment. This his father

[3] *Ibid.*, interview with Thomas F. Leonard, Jan. 11, 1949.
[4] New York *Times*, Jan. 22, 1911.

refused to do, but he was pleased to have his son James, Franklin's half-brother, appointed first secretary to the American Embassy in Vienna. In those days appointments to the Foreign Service were made on the basis of political considerations.

Roosevelt's father was a Cleveland Democrat, and therefore he was alarmed by the capture of the Democratic party in 1896 by William Jennings Bryan and his cohorts. He was relieved when he learned of Bryan's defeat.[5] Franklin acquired his attachment to the Democratic party from his father, but this did not prevent his casting his first vote for Uncle Ted.[6] This vote might, of course, have been a reaction against Parker as well as an indication of enthusiasm for his distant relative.

It has already been indicated that Franklin D. Roosevelt showed great admiration for President Theodore Roosevelt, his wife's uncle. When asked in 1911 whether he was an admirer of T. R., he was reported as saying: "Why, who can help but admire him? I differ with him on a great many questions, but they are differences between men who are both seeking to do their best for the public good. Only he is doing it the Republican way while I am trying to do it the Democratic way. It is a difference in method growing out of fundamental differences in party faith, that's all." [7]

Regarding his party faith he said, "I am a Democrat first, last, and all the time." [8] Politics like his religion, was something which he acquired from his family.

Roosevelt's law practice was not so absorbing that he could not wrench himself away from it. Some of his friends, business associates, and relatives urged him not to go into politics. Mr. James Carter, head of the law firm for which he worked, was particularly opposed to his entering politics.[9] But Roosevelt had been convinced by his teachers and colleagues at Groton and Harvard, and by the example of Theodore Roosevelt, that politics could be made respectable by respectable people. Uncle Ted had

[5] John Gunther, *Roosevelt in Retrospect* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 202.

[6] "Address at the Jackson Day Dinner, Washington, D.C., January 8, 1938," from *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1938 Volume* (New York, The Macmillan Company), p. 38.

[7] New York *Times,* Jan. 22, 1911.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Gerald W. Johnson, *Roosevelt: Dictator or Democrat* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1941), p. 74.

had a much more exciting life than he was having in a New York law office.

Upon the occasion of acceptance of his nomination FDR said:

> As you know, I accept the nomination with absolute independence. I am pledged to no man; I am influenced by no specific interest; and so I shall remain. If elected I will give my entire time to serving the people of this district.
>
> In the coming campaign I need not tell you that I do not intend to sit still—we are going to have a very strenuous month.[10]

The emphasis upon independence in this speech of acceptance is understandable in the light of the political events of the time. Former President Theodore Roosevelt had just engaged in the preceding month in a campaign for control of the Republican party in New York State in which he had denounced the bosses of both major parties. "Teddy" Roosevelt had defeated the Republican bosses in the state nominating convention and he strove to defeat the Democratic machine in the election. Henry L. Stimson was the Republican nominee for governor backed by Theodore Roosevelt. The election of the Democratic candidate, John A. Dix, was regarded by Theodore Roosevelt as a victory for Tammany Hall and the Democratic machine.[11] Under the circumstances Franklin D. Roosevelt felt it necessary to emphasize the old campaign cliché that he was independent. He wanted to disassociate himself from the Democratic bosses in every way possible.

Roosevelt and Richard E. Connell, the Democratic candidate for Congress in the twenty-first district, which included the Senate district and one county across the Hudson River, decided to put on a whirlwind campaign. They toured the entire territory in a red Maxwell, making from three to half a dozen speeches each day. This was a precedent-breaking method of campaigning. In those days farmers were apprehensive about automobiles because their horses were not used to such contraptions. But the two candidates had no other way of making sure that they covered the territory. A horse and buggy would be too slow.

"We made bossism the issue," said Senator Roosevelt in 1911. "I knew

[10] Ernest K. Lindley, *Franklin D. Roosevelt,* p. 72.

[11] Joseph B. Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown in His Letters* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), II, 305.

this was a burning issue with the people who had suffered long under the dictation of bosses like Bob Hunter in Dutchess and Lou Payn in Columbia." [12]

Louis F. Payn, the Republican "boss" of Columbia County, had been referred to by Elihu Root as "a stench in the nostrils of the people of the state of New York." [13] Payn had held various state offices in the period following the Civil War, as harbormaster of New York City and state superintendent of insurance, but his chief occupation was lobbying. In a legislative investigation in 1895, he testified that he had "always, in 35 years been interested in the election of speakers, you know, and United States senators and that sort of thing." He also admitted that he was a salaried legislative agent of several undisclosed principals; that he influenced the action of members of the Legislature on bills in which his employers were interested, not by appearance before committees, but solely by personal conversations of a private and confidential nature, and that he had no other remunerative occupation.[14] Governor Theodore Roosevelt had refused to reappoint Payn superintendent of insurance.

Unfortunately, not very much information is available regarding the man against whom Roosevelt was to run. The Republican incumbent, John F. Schlosser, was born in the city of Poughkeepsie. His parents had moved to Schenectady, where he was educated in the public schools and where he later graduated from Union College. After graduating, Mr. Schlosser went to Fishkill Landing, in Dutchess County, and taught school, studied law, and opened a law office. Mr. Schlosser was twice elected a school commissioner in the First Assembly District of Dutchess County. Then in 1908 the Republican party nominated him for state senator and he was elected, receiving 18,366 votes to 16,294 cast for Lester J. Bashford, Democrat. Mr. Schlosser was renominated by the Republicans in 1910. He apparently did not anticipate any difficulty in retaining his seat.

[12] New York *Times*, Jan. 22, 1911.

[13] Some of the materials on Louis F. Payn have been summarized in H. F. Gosnell, *Boss Platt and His New York Machine* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 59–60.

[14] New York State Legislature, investigation of the corrupt negotiators charged by the New York "Press" in relation to the bill for an increase of salaries of the members of the New York Fire Department, *Senate Document No. 56, 1895*, pp. 455, 476.

Roosevelt's campaign against Senator Schlosser was waged in a gentlemanly manner. In a speech at Hudson, New York, he said:

Now I have met my opponent, Senator Schlosser, and I have nothing to say against him personally or against his personal integrity. But I do say this: I do not believe that he has been a real representative of the people of the 26th Senatorial district. Whether it is that he has represented the Sage of Chatham by long distance 'phone, or whether it is that he has represented nobody at all except himself I don't know. But I do know that he hasn't represented me and I do know that he hasn't represented you.[15]

It is difficult to reconstruct the effectiveness of Roosevelt as a campaigner in 1910. His wife, who can hardly be regarded as an objective observer in this situation, was not too impressed with his first political effort. She wrote:

I went with Franklin to one meeting before the end of the campaign. It was the first political speech I had ever heard him make. He spoke slowly, and every now and then there would be a long pause, and I would be worried for fear he would never go on. What a long time ago that seems!

He looked thin then, tall, high-strung and, at times, nervous. White skin and fair hair, deep-set blue eyes and clear cut features. No lines as yet in his face, but at times a set look of his jaw denoted that this apparently pliable youth had strength and Dutch obstinacy in his make-up.[16]

His mother had some misgivings about his going into politics, but from the moment she heard Franklin make his simple, sincere declaration of principles at a political meeting in Poughkeepsie she accepted his decision, knew that it was wise.[17]

F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928, presents the notes for one of the speeches which he made in this campaign.[18] The speech began with a complimentary reference to the locality where the speech was made. This is well tested campaign device of ancient origin. The references to Humboldt and Carlyle seem at this distance somewhat bookish. More in keeping with American campaign customs was the reference to

[15] From a copy of the Hudson, New York, *Evening Register,* Oct. 28, 1910, made by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[16] Eleanor Roosevelt, *This Is My Story,* p. 167.

[17] Rita Kleeman, *Gracious Lady,* p. 252.

[18] Pp. 157–158.

Abraham Lincoln's lines: "I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true. I am not bound to succeed, but I am bound to live up to what light I have. I must stand with anybody that stands right, and part with him when he goes wrong." The notes for this speech do not read like one of his speeches made in the thirties or forties. References made to progress and social service are vague. If this speech is any indication, Roosevelt did not spring into politics as an orator. By the time William Jennings Bryan was twenty-eight he had made a mark for himself as an orator.

As the campaign developed, Roosevelt began to develop a style of his own. Upon being accused of not being a resident of the district, he went into panegyrics about how much he loved Hyde Park.

In the course of the last two weeks I have been travelling from town to town, from farm house to farm house, in these magnificent counties along our great river, and my heart has grown glad and I have thanked God that it fell to my lot to be born and to have lived as one of the people of this Hudson Valley. For with every new face that I have met it has been impressed upon me that here we have a people that is truly American in the best sense of the word; a people alive, a people desirous of progress and of real representation and honest efficient government. And this being so, I have found not many Democrats who hold that every Republican is a crook, not many Republicans who hold every Democrat a rascal. I believe that there is a thorough independence in these counties of the right sort, independence which will look into the qualifications and records of the opposing candidates and choose between them on their fitness.[19]

As a speaker, young Roosevelt was informal and direct. The phrase "my friends" was used in his first speeches. One or two words that were favorites of his uncle-in-law crept into his remarks during the campaign. That he had a good time speaking and enjoyed the humorous side of campaigning is clear from the following:

Last week, Mr. Connell and I went on an automobile speaking tour through Dutchess county and we were both "delighted" at the "bully" reception we got everywhere.

The effect on the Republican politicians was to say the least amusing. One Republican leader in south Dutchess was so upset at our success that

[19] From a copy of the Hudson *Evening Register*, Oct. 28, 1910, made by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

he sent out the report that our car had been upset in the Pawling mountains and we had all been killed or badly hurt. But it acted as a boomerang.

The crowds were bigger than ever and people from all over the country side turned out to hear the corpses. But the trip did more. It woke up the Hon. Hamilton Fish. He so far forgot himself as to launch forth in an attack on the trip and on me.

At the meeting in Poughkeepsie Saturday night he called the trip a vaudeville tour for the benefit of the farmers.[20]

The year 1910 was one in which the tide was running in favor of the Democrats. They won nearly three-fifths of the seats in the House of Representatives. In the State of New York they won the governorship and both houses of the Legislature. The campaign had been waged on such issues as the Payne-Aldrich high-tariff bill enacted by the Republicans, the need for the direct primary and other popular devices opposed by the Republican bosses and the high taxes imposed by Republican administrations, national and state. The growing schism between the progressive and conservative elements in the Republican party, as shown by the revolt against Speaker Cannon in the House of Representatives, Senator Nelson Aldrich's control of the Senate, and by the coolness between Theodore Roosevelt and President Taft, played into the hands of the Democrats.

When the returns came in, it was apparent that Roosevelt ran ahead of the Democratic ticket in the three counties which made up the twenty-sixth senatorial district.[21] He ran nearly 700 votes ahead of John A. Dix, Democratic candidate for governor, and 66 votes ahead of the Democratic candidates for the Assembly. His margin over the Assembly candidates was small because of the great popularity of Chanler in the second district of Dutchess County. Roosevelt far outstripped all the other candidates from the counties within his district. Clearly, although young and inexperienced, he had popular appeal. His margin over his Republican opponent was not large, 1,140 votes out of 30,276, but it was larger than that of any other Democratic candidate who ran in these counties.

If 1910 had not been a Democratic year, the result might well have been different. This is a hypothetical question which has concerned some

[20] Poughkeepsie *Evening Enterprise,* Nov. 1, 1910.

[21] The official returns are given in *New York Legislative Manual.* All compilations are based on these returns.

commentators, but it does not need to bother us here.[22] With the good showing that Roosevelt made as compared to his running mates, it is likely that he could have had other nominations later for posts within the obvious reach of the Democrats. But such later nominations to prove his political capacity were unnecessary. Within a short time Roosevelt, the novice, had achieved astounding success in attracting attention not only in the state but in the nation at large.

In depreciation of his early campaigns it is frequently said that FDR capitalized on the fame achieved by his distant cousin and uncle-in-law. It should be pointed out that a famous name may be a help, but it is never enough in American politics to achieve success. President Theodore Roosevelt's son, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., tried his hand in the political game and never got very far. In 1924, which was a Republican year nationally, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., as the Republican candidate for governor of New York, ran 300,000 votes behind President Coolidge in the state. Where was the magic name of "Roosevelt" in that year? From time to time the voters may be fooled by a name, but in general they insist that a candidate stand on his own feet.

Roosevelt's first electoral victory undoubtedly set the pattern for his later triumphs. Without this early success he might never have acquired the taste for politics. He might have remained a lawyer and a country gentleman if he had not won a spectacular victory in 1910, when he defeated his Republican opponent in what had been a safe Republican district. This victory and his extraordinary success as a state senator went like wine to the head of the twenty-eight-year-old Franklin. The excitement of a campaign, the crowds, the feeling of power, the game of politics got into his blood, and stayed there until he passed on in 1945. There is nothing in the world, except preparations for war, which can equal the thrill of campaigning. Just as war mobilization brings out hidden energies in all of us, so does an election campaign. Roosevelt had never worked so hard before in his life as he did in 1910 to win the seat in the New York State Senate. He found the rewards immediately and abundantly satisfying. It was no wonder that afterward he kept returning to politics.

[22] John Flynn, *Country Squire in the White House* (New York, Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1940), p. 10.

V

SECOND CAMPAIGN FOR STATE SENATOR

Ye shall know them by their fruits.
—Matthew, 7:16

WHEN an incumbent runs for reelection, for better or for worse he must stand on his record. What he has done or what he has left undone may be seized upon by his friends to aid his reelection, or by his foes to bring about his defeat. The candidate may try to explain his conduct, but to many of the voters his record will speak louder than his words.

In 1912, when State Senator Franklin D. Roosevelt ran for reelection, he could not escape from the record he had made as a freshman senator. While some people disagreed with several of the things which he did during his first term, and others felt that his record on social legislation was not progressive enough, in general the verdict was that he had distinguished himself. At least he had attracted a great deal of attention. A politician who is not noticed is usually one who is on the way out. No one could say that of Senator Roosevelt.

Contrary to the usual practice, Senator Roosevelt decided to regard lawmaking as a full-time job. To that end the Roosevelts rented a house in Albany and moved their entire family there. As indicated earlier, this was the first time that his wife established a home entirely independent of her mother-in-law. Roosevelt was never so happy in his work.

The session started out quietly enough, and no more attention was

paid to the new senator than to any of the other new legislators who came to Albany that January following the Democratic landslide in the state. A contemporary description of his coming follows:

> Those who looked closely at the lawmaker behind Desk 26 saw a young man with the finely chiseled face of a Roman patrician, only with a ruddier glow of health on it. Nature has left much unfinished in modeling the face of the Roosevelt of greater fame. On the face of this Roosevelt, younger in years and in public service, she has lavished all her refining processes until much of the elementary strength has been lost in the sculpturing.
>
> Senator Roosevelt is less than 30. He is tall and lithe. With his handsome face and his form of supple strength he could make a fortune on the stage and set the matinee girl's heart throbbing with subtle and happy emotion. But no one would suspect behind that highly polished exterior the quiet force and determination that now are sending cold shivers down the spine of Tammany's striped mascot.[1]

In 1911 United States senators were chosen by a majority of members elected to both houses of the state Legislatures. From time to time the New York State Legislature had been deadlocked in the choice of a United States senator. Among the famous contests was that of 1881, when Senators Roscoe Conkling and Thomas C. Platt resigned and sought reelection to vindicate themselves on a patronage issue. They both lost in this attempt. The term of Republican Senator Chauncey Depew expired in 1911, and the Democrats had a sufficient number of votes to elect Depew's successor. At the time they had 29 of the 51 senators and 85 of the 150 assemblymen, making a total of 114, or 13 more than the 101 votes needed to choose a United States senator. The Democratic leaders did not anticipate any difficulty in selecting a United States senator. State Senator Robert F. Wagner had just been elected president pro tem of the senate, and Assemblyman Daniel D. Frisbie had been elected speaker of the Assembly. Prominent among the assemblymen was Alfred E. Smith, Democratic floor leader, who was to be chosen speaker of the Assembly in 1913.

Among the candidates mentioned for election to the United States Senate was William Sheehan of New York and Buffalo, former lieuten-

[1] New York *Times*, Jan. 22, 1911.

ant governor, in 1911 a law partner of Alton B. Parker, Democratic candidate for President in 1904. His chief opponent was Edward M. Shepard, a New York lawyer, unsuccessful candidate for mayor of New York in 1901, who was backed by Democrats from Brooklyn and certain upstate counties. Mr. Sheehan, "Blue-eyed Billy" as he was called, had the support of a large number of organization Democrats, including Charles F. Murphy, the leader of Tammany Hall in New York City. The Democratic leaders felt sure that they could control enough votes in the Democratic caucus to obtain a majority for Sheehan. All members of the party attending the caucus would be bound by the majority. The only way in which a member could be free to oppose a choice by the party caucus was to stay away from the caucus.

The new senator had to choose which candidate he would support in the forthcoming election. His background indicated that he would line up with the Shepard forces. The example of his uncle-in-law set a pattern of defiance of the "bosses." FDR had campaigned on the issue of "bossism." He was under no obligation to Mr. Sheehan for campaign funds, as were many of the other new Democratic legislators. Sheehan was clearly identified with the party "machine." When he lived in Buffalo he was responsible for some "ripper" legislation which aroused great indignation among independent elements in the city. As a lawyer in New York he was counsel for large utilities, including transit companies. Editorial opinion throughout the state was generally agreed that Sheehan was an unsatisfactory candidate for the United States Senate.

Roosevelt and a few others determined not to appear at the caucus. When the caucus was finally convened, Sheehan had a majority, but only 91 Democrats were present, 10 short of the number needed to elect a senator. Senator Roosevelt and 18 Democratic assemblymen issued a manifesto declaring that "they believed the votes of those who represented the people should not be smothered in the caucus; and that the people should know just how their representatives voted untrammeled by any caucus action; and that any majority secured for any candidate should be credited to the representatives in the Legislature and not some one outside the body." [2]

During the contest Roosevelt explained his attitude to W. A. Warn of

[2] Ernest K. Lindley, *Franklin D. Roosevelt,* pp. 82–83.

the New York *Times* as follows: "So you see, what we are doing here now is merely a continuation of the fight I carried on prior to my election and a discharge of my promises to the people." He added: "We are merely a group of men who are taking a rational view of a situation that is not very difficult to size up, and acting in accordance with that view. How could we afford to enter the caucus and be bound by its action when we were firmly and unalterably convinced that the election of Mr. Sheehan would mean disaster to the Democratic party, not only in the state, but the nation?" [3]

The freshman senator became the leader of the insurgents. He had a house where they could hold their planning sessions. While there were older and more experienced legislators in the group than Roosevelt, all eighteeen looked to him for encouragement and guidance. If half of them had become lukewarm in their cause, Sheehan might have been elected. But they held fast in spite of all the pressures that a powerful political machine could bring to bear upon them. Democratic leaders from Roosevelt's district sought to dissuade him from his insurgency, but he was under no special obligation to them. He lost the position of clerk from the committee of which he was chairman. Some of his fellow insurgents were vulnerable, and they suffered severe financial deprivations, such as the loss of advertising, unanticipated loan calls, and business boycotts.

Senator Roosevelt was modest about his leadership. On this point Mr. Warn wrote:

> The Senator was asked how he—one of the youngest of the little insurgent band—happened to become its leader.
>
> "Leader?" he said. "I should not claim that title; there really is no leader. There is no need of any. We are just determined to stay out. We need lay no deep and dark plans to confound the enemy. We are waiting for public sentiment to perform that function."
>
> "I will betray one secret," said Senator Roosevelt as he hastened to join his insurgent comrades. "There is very little business done at our councils of war. We just sit around and swap stories, like soldiers at the bivouac of fire." [4]

For three months the little band held up all legislative business.

[3] Jan. 22, 1911. [4] *Ibid.*

In retrospect Floor Leader Alfred E. Smith was not very happy about the deadlock. He wrote in his autobiography:

The session of 1911 was prolonged. Much bad feeling was generated among the Democrats by the fight over the election of a United States senator. The amendment to the Constitution providing for direct election had not yet been adopted at that time, and the legislature had to elect the successor to Chauncey M. Depew. The Republicans renominated him. The Democrats, in caucus, voted to support William F. Sheehan, former lieutenant governor and hitherto a resident of Erie County, but at that time connected with a New York law firm. Upward of twenty Democratic legislators bolted the caucus and refused to support Sheehan, and thereafter followed two and a half months of wrangling. The Sheehan men held steadfast and the so-called insurgents stood by their guns.

The leader of the insurgent group was the present governor of New York, Franklin D. Roosevelt. . . .

After two and a half months of wrangling, Senator Wagner and I succeeded in bringing the insurgents back into the caucus when the name of Justice James A. O'Gorman of the Supreme Court was suggested in the caucus and agreed upon, the long-drawn-out fight was ended.[5]

Other accounts of the selection of Judge O'Gorman as the compromise candidate feature Charles F. Murphy as the mediator. Judge O'Gorman had been Tammany Grand Sachem and was said to have been suggested by Boss Murphy.

Senator Roosevelt was confronted with the question whether Judge O'Gorman was an acceptable candidate. The judge had worked up the political ladder the hard way, starting as the elected chairman of the regular or Tammany Hall Committee of his election district at the age of twenty-one. After graduating from the College of the City of New York and the Law Department of New York University, he engaged in the general practice of law. In 1893 he was elected Civil Court Judge in his district and in 1899 Judge of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial District. The Bar Association of New York said about him, "The reputation earned by James A. O'Gorman in a minor judicial position and his practice at the bar shows him a fit candidate for the election to the Supreme Court." [6]

[5] *Up to Now: An Autobiography* (New York, Viking Press, 1929), pp. 101–102.
[6] Edgar L. Murlin, *The New York Red Book*, 1911 (Albany, 1911), pp. 34–35.

Roosevelt and his little band agreed to support Judge O'Gorman for the United States Senate, and the deadlock was over.

As state senator, Roosevelt supported the direct election of United States senators and extension of the merit system, and he opposed legislation which favored the utility interests.

In the summer of 1912 Roosevelt had to decide whether or not to run again for the state Senate. The decision was in the affirmative, and his first task was to win the support of the District Democratic Senatorial Committee, which in those days controlled the nomination. In spite of the attention which he had attracted as a freshman senator, he could not take that support for granted, since he had aroused antagonisms in certain quarters in his own district and the Tammany Hall faction of his party was putting forth strenuous efforts to defeat the insurgents who had participated in the fight against Sheehan. How he campaigned for the nomination is described in the following letter to his wife:

HYDE PARK, N.Y.
July 12, 1912
Saturday

DEAREST BABBIE—

I am just back from a long day in which I have covered 150 miles in the machine. I have seen all the "henchmen" in Claverack, Hillsdale, Copake, Ancram, Pine Plains, Bengall, Stanfordville, Clinton, and Salt Point! I ran straight up to Columbia County, then turned East, came down the Harlem Valley and thence home. The day was perfect, the machine went well, and I can truthfully say that it was really very pleasant—a change from the day before, which I spent in Poughkeepsie. It appears that Tammany and the "Interests" are really making an effort to prevent my renomination. This is being done by several agents who are trying to stir up the old Sheehan business and are taking advantage of the starting of the Empire State Democracy to howl about "Discord" etc. Of course the trouble is that Perkins has no spine, but he knows now that if he listens to orders from 14th St. he will have a perfectly delightful little fight on his hands that will not stop easily or quickly. Columbia's machine is against me because of patronage troubles. Putnam is for me, so Dutchess must decide. The Enterprise, Eagle and two Fishkill papers have come out for me editorially, and none have dared to oppose me openly.[7]

[7] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928,* ed. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 193.

The words used in this letter are highly significant. His renomination still in doubt, Roosevelt referred to the "henchmen" that he had to see, to the "Interests" which were trying to prevent his renomination, and to the county "machine" which was against him. These were words which in 1912 were highly charged with emotional values. It was, of course, a joke that he should have "henchmen." Those who opposed him belonged to the forces of evil.

The Empire State Democracy to which the letter referred was a group of some seventy, including Roosevelt, who banded together to carry on Woodrow Wilson's presidential campaign in New York and to prevent Tammany Hall from controlling the state organization of the party. According to a report by the New York *Times* of a July 29 meeting of this organization, "Murphy was called 'an ignorant, stupid, arrogant leader,' under whom the Democratic Party of the city had steadily lost votes, and the prediction was made that if he was allowed to control the party in the State there would be an even worse state of affairs." [8]

A local newspaper sized up the situation as follows:

It seems hardly possible that the local Democratic bosses can be in earnest in their efforts to turn down Senator Franklin D. Roosevelt. The *Eagle* is, of course, not in sympathy with many of Senator Roosevelt's ideas, but it is only fair to say that his record has been an extraordinarily good one for a young man in his first term. He took the lead of the anti-Tammany men in the State Senate almost from the start and he fought the Tammany men to a standstill. To be sure, the fight on the senatorship did not come out quite as many people expected. It resulted in the defeat of William F. Sheehan only to elect another Tammany man, Senator O'Gorman, but Senator Roosevelt's record did not stop there. He was the champion of practically all of the good legislation passed, so far as we know, and an opponent of most of the bad legislation. Certainly he was nobody's man and was not even bossed by Ed Perkins. If the local Democrats are going to try to turn him down, he will certainly be justified in making the strongest kind of a fight in the primaries for renomination and even in putting up an independent ticket, should the bosses be able to defeat him in the primary.[9]

On August 24, 1912, the Democratic Senatorial Committee met in Poughkeepsie and renominated Roosevelt for the state Senate. In his

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 194.
[9] Poughkeepsie *Daily Eagle*, July 19, 1912.

speech of acceptance Senator Roosevelt said that he realized that Democrats disagreed over some steps he had taken but that in everything he tried to represent the majority of his constituents.[10] The vote for him in the committee was unanimous. Thus future events were foreshadowed. When he ran for renominations in the years to come, no party committee, no political convention ever had the courage to turn him down.

In his second political campaign Roosevelt ran against a Republican candidate named Jacob G. Southard and a Progressive candidate named George A. Vossler. Southard was a much older man than Roosevelt, thirty-three years his senior, and was referred to as "one of the best known men in Putnam County." He was president of the National Bank of Cold Spring, and president of the Cold Spring Light, Heat and Power Company.[11] One local newspaper indicated that he was in favor of direct primaries and, with some qualifications, the referendum. He was characterized as a progressive businessman who favored the supervision of large corporations for the protection of small stockholders. Another said:

> Jacob G. Southard, who has been designated by the Republicans of this Senatorial district as the regular candidate for the Republican Senatorial nomination, is a man of marked ability, of the highest integrity, and of that class of which is most desired in public life but which, for some reason, is so reluctant to enter. It is indeed good news when they become active and are willing to stand for office. Mr. Southard is no politician and does not pretend to be. He is a high-minded and successful business man and banker; a man whose honesty is so well known that he has been made trustee of many estates and his advice and cooperation is eagerly sought.[12]

It was in this period that Franklin Delano Roosevelt met Louis McHenry Howe, and a firm, lifelong friendship was formed between the two men and their families. The contrast between the two men was striking. Howe was a short, gnarled, gnome-like, hard-bitten newspaper man who represented the New York *Herald* in Albany. He had lived in Albany with his wife and daughter, but his home for years had been in Saratoga Springs, where the famous race tracks were located. Perhaps it was his familiarity with the gambling game which led him to size up the young Roosevelt and say to himself: "Here is a man with destiny

[10] *His Personal Letters,* p. 196. [11] Poughkeepsie *Daily Eagle,* Aug. 27, 1912.
[12] *Ibid.,* Aug. 30, 1912, citing the *Hudson Republican.*

written on his face. He is a sure winner." To say these words in 1911 required vision. Twenty years later it was not so hard. But Howe by his actions showed that he believed so in 1911 and 1912. He hitched his wagon to a star some time during the Sheehan fight, and he never lost faith in the star, no matter how dark the night may have seemed at times during the intervening years.

Shortly after the nomination Roosevelt fell ill with typhoid fever, and he was flat on his back until after the election. Here was a predicament which required careful handling. He must run on his record and on a secondary presentation of his record. Louis Howe was the man who was chosen to turn the trick. Roosevelt's son, Elliott, describes how Howe went about his task:

> In order to sell a man who could not make public appearances Howe was forced to use political methods never before experienced by the residents of the Hudson Valley. Full-page advertisements urging F.D.R.'s election soon appeared in the local newspapers, and posters, pamphlets, and letters also carried F.D.R.'s pledge to continue the fight for progressive legislation throughout the district. Such was Louis McHenry Howe's first job for F.D.R.[13]

When the election returns came in, it was clear that Roosevelt had won a personal victory, not an overwhelming one but a victory. Because of his record and the efforts of Louis Howe and others, he polled 48 per cent of the total vote. This was enough to win in 1912, since there were three candidates in the field. The Progressive candidate ran a poor third. Of the major party vote, Roosevelt received 53 per cent. The margin was not large, but it was comfortable.

A comparison of Roosevelt's vote with that of his running mates makes his victory look more impressive. He ran ahead of the Democratic candidates for President, governor, and state assemblymen in the three counties of Columbia, Dutchess, and Putnam.

He was a political figure to be reckoned with. How much more of a margin he would have won if he had been well enough to campaign will never be known. That he would have won had there been no Progressive party split seems likely, since the Republicans could not claim title to all the Progressive votes.

[13] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928*, p. 197.

VI

ENTRANCE INTO NATIONAL POLITICS

A merry heart maketh a cheerful countenance.
—Proverbs, 15:13

In June, 1912, Roosevelt went to Baltimore to witness the Democratic National Convention, and to do what he could to promote the nomination of Woodrow Wilson for President. Wilson's success in the convention and later in the election paved the way for FDR's entrance into national politics.

Senator Roosevelt was attracted by the political career of Governor Woodrow Wilson in the neighboring state of New Jersey. The governor stood for some of the things in his state which the senator advocated in New York. The senator first met the governor late in 1911. Both had gained during that year some attention in the news by reason of their conspicuous political activities. Both favored the reform of party nominating methods, the regulation of business abuses, and the conservation of natural resources. Senator Roosevelt's efforts to win support in New York for the nomination of Wilson for President by the Democratic National Convention, which met in Baltimore in 1912, indicate that he was very favorably impressed by his first meeting with the governor.

Eleanor Roosevelt mentions the trip to Baltimore which she made with her husband. At the time she was not greatly interested. She was just the inconspicuous wife of a young politician who was not even a delegate. In *This Is My Story* she wrote:

This was an eventful month in more ways than one, and we jumped from personal interests to public affairs that same month. The latter part of the month, June 1912, my husband took me to my first political convention. I was very much excited. We had taken a house in Baltimore with Mr. and Mrs. Montgomery Hare and Mr. and Mrs. James Byrnes. . . .

That convention was an exciting one. In front of me in the convention hall sat Mrs. August Belmont, who registered righteous indignation and said she would go out and fight the party when Mr. Bryan practically read her husband out of the party.

I understood nothing of what was going on, but I watched with keen interest the demonstration for Champ Clark, and was appalled when his daughter was carried around the room. Such things simply did not happen to ladies, in my code! The demonstration all seemed rather senseless to me, and my opinion of conventions changed very little, I fear, for a number of years.[1]

One of the men FDR met at Baltimore was Josephus Daniels, editor of the Raleigh, North Carolina, *News and Observer,* who became President Wilson's Secretary of the Navy. In his *The Wilson Era—Years of Peace,* Daniels said:

The first time I saw Franklin Roosevelt was in the Baltimore convention when Wilson was nominated for President. I had charge of the distribution of tickets for editors, and Roosevelt came to my room with some up-State editors who wished seats in the press section. He was in a gay humor and I thought he was as handsome a figure of an attractive young man as I had ever seen.[2]

During the presidential campaign of 1912, Daniels was Chairman of Publicity. This took Daniels to New York, where FDR had an opportunity to see him again. Of this second encounter Daniels wrote:

Shortly after I was in harness in New York, Franklin Roosevelt dropped in to renew the Baltimore acquaintance and talk over the situation. . . . I was even more attracted by his personality than when I first met him at Baltimore. I did not see him again until after Wilson was elected, for he was soon stricken with fever and Louis Howe carried on his campaign for election successfully.[3]

[1] Pp. 187–188.
[2] (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 124.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 69.

Mr. Daniel's next reference to FDR was in his chapter entitled "Love at First Sight—FDR and JD." At the occasion of Wilson's inauguration, he encountered Franklin Roosevelt "bubbling over with enthusiasm at the incoming Democratic administration and keen as a boy to take in the inauguration ceremonies." Reconstructing this encounter, Daniels said of FDR:

He greeted me cordially and said, "Your appointment as Secretary of the Navy made me happy. I congratulate you and the President and the country." I responded by asking him, "How would you like to come to Washington as Assistant Secretary of the Navy?" His face beamed his pleasure. "How would I like it? I'd like it bully well. It would please me better than anything in the world." [4]

President Wilson agreed to Roosevelt's nomination for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and FDR's career in national politics was launched. After resigning from the New York State Senate, Roosevelt was sworn in as Assistant Secretary on March 17, 1913.

FDR's seven and a half years as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Secretary Daniels were the best training conceivable for his later years as war President. An Assistant Secretary in those days was equivalent to an Undersecretary today. He was second in command of the Navy Department, and when the Secretary was away he was Acting Secretary and attended Cabinet meetings in that capacity. In other words, the thirty-year-old Franklin was catapulted by America's entrance into World War I into an important role in world events. As Secretary Daniels wrote to "Dear Franklin" on August 7, 1920, on the occasion of Roosevelt's resignation to run for Vice President:

And so, with mutual regard and mutual consecration, we have spent seven and a half years in the service of our country. We little thought then of the great responsibility we were assuming, but we were not of the type of men who run from work or seek to escape responsibility. I am happy that we were given the great job in the World War, and it will always be a matter of congratulation that the team work of naval direction resulted in such efficient contribution to victory.[5]

[4] *The Wilson Era,* p. 124.

[5] *Roosevelt and Daniels,* ed. by Carroll Kilpatrick (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1952), pp. 68–69.

Secretary Daniels continued, "I always counted on your zeal, your enthusiasm, your devoted patriotism and efficient and able service, and always found you equal to the big job in hand."

There is nothing in this letter which reveals any resentment at some of the early acts of young Franklin which bordered on insubordination. As has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, Franklin was not used to strong paternalistic authority being exercised over him. At first he did not appreciate the wisdom of the country editor who was his superior. He was impatient at Daniels's pacifism and his indifference toward the fine points of naval etiquette. Franklin prided himself on his knowledge of naval history and naval customs. Daniels's homespun quality and dislike of military protocol seemed at first to be almost unbearable to the young patrician.[6]

But young Franklin lived to learn better and to appreciate the sterling qualities of his chief. An important function of a Secretary is to be a buffer for the Department between the technical service and the public. Funds cannot be obtained from Congress in times of peace by issuing military orders. Daniels, with all his pacifism, was a master in dealing with Congress, especially with a Democratic Congress. Young Franklin probably learned as much from Daniels about executive-legislative relations as he did from any other of his political mentors.

Roosevelt's letter of resignation addressed to Secretary Daniels has a genuine ring about it:

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON
August 6, 1920

MY DEAR CHIEF:

This is not goodbye—that will always be impossible after these years of the closest association—and no words I write will make you know better than you know now how much our association has meant. All my life I shall look back—not only on the *work* of the place—but mostly on the wonderful way in which you and I have gone through these nearly eight years *together*. You have taught me so wisely and kept my feet on the ground when I was

[6] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1982*, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 232, 238, 243–244, 363, 364–367.

about to skyrocket—and in it all there has never been a real dispute or antagonism or distrust.

Hence, in part, at least, I will share in the reward for which you *will* get true credit in history. I am very proud—but more than that I am very happy to have been able to help.

We will I know keep up this association in the years to come—and please let me keep on coming to you to get your fine inspiration of real idealism and right living and good Americanism.

So *au revoir* for a little while. You have always the

Affectionate regards of
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT [7]

Well might Roosevelt say in 1920 that there never had been a "real dispute." Looking back at the differences of their early years together, FDR saw these differences in a better perspective, and they did not look as real as they did at the time.

Roosevelt was grateful for a job which had been most challenging. He had learned how a big Federal department was run in time of crisis, how a great President used his Cabinet in wartime, how the United States worked with its allies in the pursuit of common objectives, and how democracy could be reconciled with the military needs that arise in fighting a global war. These were lessons which he did not forget in later years.

As Acting Secretary or as the official representative of the Department abroad, Roosevelt had to deal with President Wilson, Wilson's Cabinet members, King George V of Great Britain, Prime Minister Lloyd George, Premier Clemenceau, and the top brass of the American, British, French, and Italian navies. This was a big assignment for a young man in his thirties. That Franklin found the job rewarding is abundantly evident from his letters. From time to time during this period he wrote to his wife or his mother: "I will have to work like a new turbine to master this job," "I am Acting Secretary and up to my ears," "I have my hands full," "I have been having such a strenuous time that I haven't had a minute even to write a line," "my work has continued absorbing," "The hearings before the Naval Committee are over—really great fun

[7] *Roosevelt and Daniels,* pp. 67–68.

and not so much of a strain," "I am inexpressibly busy," and "very full of health." [8]

Roosevelt achieved a record of being an able administrator. The tasks assigned to him were accomplished with a minimum of effort and with dispatch. He was responsible for the Departmental budget, civil service procedures, the purchase of supplies, and the legal intricacies of governmental accounting. He knew how to cut red tape and how to get his subordinates working together as a team. In fact, the top naval officers found that they could rely upon him to get things done. They could count on him to back them up. In the field of procurement of scarce materials, he was so proficient that President Wilson had to restrain him in order to provide for the needs of the other services.

Another job that was well performed was the administration of labor relations in the Navy yards. Roosevelt learned how to avoid strikes and how to keep up labor morale. Years later, in a letter to Mrs. Samuel Gompers, he described his experience in the field of labor relations.

> When I first went to Washington in 1913 I constantly found myself in charge of the annual wage schedules for all the Navy Yards, and knew, of course, there would be much pulling and hauling by the various groups and trades among themselves, but also an attitude of great officialdom on the part of Navy officers. I went to see Mr. Gompers for his frank advice and I shall never forget the very wonderful way in which he greeted me and treated me. It was in large part due to his advice that during the eight years I was in the Navy Department we never had any labor difficulties.[9]

FDR's position during the Wilson Administration gave him excellent opportunities to keep in the public eye. He was prominent in the struggle for large naval appropriations, in the hearings on naval preparedness, in the conversations with the British regarding ways of meeting the German submarine menace, in the North Sea antisubmarine mining project, in the inspection of American naval installations abroad, in the Paris peace conference, in the demobilization following the war, in the controversy with Admiral Sims, and in hundreds of other important events. For the young man the days which he served with Brother Daniels in the Wilson Administration were full, happy, and fruitful days.

[8] *Ibid., passim.*

[9] Private correspondence, Box 66, FDR to Mrs. Samuel Gompers, Aug. 23, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

VII

FIRST ELECTORAL SETBACK

What is defeat?—Nothing but education; nothing but the first step to something better.

—WENDELL PHILLIPS

As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt was expected to keep an interest in politics. When President Wilson wanted advice on New York appointments, he turned first to William Gibbs McAdoo and then to Roosevelt. These two men were counted upon by the President to keep alive the opposition to Tammany control of the New York Democratic organization.

Roosevelt was urged by his friends to become candidate for governor early in 1914.[1] He declared that he would not entertain the idea unless he also received the Progressive nomination and that if his uncle-in-law, former President Theodore Roosevelt, was a candidate he would not run against him.[2]

In a telegram to those assembled at the Tilden Centenary Dinner, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt said:

The Democratic leaders of our State can find no better example to follow today than that of Samuel J. Tilden, the man who was big enough to realize that there can be no compromise with criminals nor alliance with grafters, and that the politician who works first for his own interest and his own pocket is always a parasite and can never be an ally or an asset to a party.

[1] New York *Times,* Jan. 23, 1914.
[2] *Ibid.,* May 17, 1914.

What we need now are leaders broad enough to realize the truth of this and brave enough to act on their convictions.[3]

The idea of the governorship was not given up until late in July, when it was announced that Roosevelt would not run for that office.[4] Then, a month later, Roosevelt declared that he would run for the Democratic nomination for United States senator in the coming state-wide primaries.[5]

Writing to Montgomery Hare, member of a New York law firm, Roosevelt said on August 31:

A month ago there was not a sign of action on the political line of march. Then suddenly things came to a head and some quick decisions had to be arrived at. I had no more idea or desire of offering myself as a "white hope" than I had of attempting to succeed Kaiser Wilhelm. After three or four days of conferences it became apparent that TR would not play with our crowd. He was in the middle of the Hinman fiasco, did not realize that he was in a bad place and had not yet decided to swim out. Therefore, it became necessary to decide at once on Hennessy's move. This was especially necessary, as the tactical advantage of coming out first on an anti-Murphy platform was great, thus forcing Glynn into the position of being on the other, and therefore the Murphy side. There was much discussion as to whether I should run for the Governorship and Hennessy for the Senatorship, or the other way around, but everybody decided that Hennessy's ammunition against Glynn's administration ought to be fired at that administration directly. Also, there was a strong feeling that my connection with the Washington Administration was necessary for the whole plan. I protested, but finally agreed to be the goat. Now I am going into the fight as hard as I can and at least the ticket will cause a pretty distinct line-up and give the voters their first opportunity to express themselves throughout the state.[6]

Without resigning his position as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt took six weeks off to campaign for the nomination. He made a hurried decision to do this, and upon his defeat by Ambassador James W. Gerard he returned to his duties in Washington.

On the surface this appeared to be an impulsive foolish venture and the setback seemed deserved. Surely he had delusions of grandeur if he

[3] *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1914. [4] *Ibid.*, July 24, 1914. [5] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1914.

[6] Letter from FDR to Montgomery Hare, of Rush and Hare, Attorneys, Aug. 31, 1914, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

thought that he could defeat Boss Murphy and the Tammany machine in a primary battle just three years after the stinging blow he had administered to the Boss on the Sheehan matter. But these were the days of Progressivism, and the new direct-primary law seemed to invite defiance of the bosses. The David who killed the Sheehan candidacy might upset the machine again.

The young Roosevelt put his hat in the ring on August 14, 1914.[7] He spent a busy three weeks traveling about the state. An upstate Democrat, he probably realized that his main hope lay in piling up a vote outside New York City.

At the time Roosevelt was reported as saying that he entered the race because he believed that it was important that the next senator from New York should be "free from Murphy or Barnes domination" and that he would continue to fight against Murphy's control of the Democratic party.[8] His announcement ran in part as follows:

> The issues in New York State this Fall are broader than mere individualities. For the first time in a State-wide election the voters will have a chance to choose their candidates in a primary. For this reason, and fortified by unsolicited and spontaneous requests from people in every county of the State I have decided to submit my name as candidate for the U.S. Senate in the Democratic primaries. I am not a Delmonico Conference or any other kind of a conference candidate. I stand on my own feet and my own record.
>
> I have consistently fought against the control of the Democratic Party by Charles F. Murphy and his lieutenants. I shall continue so to fight, and I believe it is just as important that the next Senator from this State should be free from Murphy or Barnes domination as it is essential that the next Governor and other State Officers should represent the people of the State, not a handful of grafting bosses.[9]

This announcement is a typical David manifesto. The young Roosevelt wanted to try the new instrument of the Lord, the direct primary. His vocabulary was still narrowly political. He represented political righteousness and was willing to take on the other forces of evil. There is nothing in this announcement regarding the policies he stood for at

[7] New York *Times*, Aug. 14, 1914. [8] *Ibid.*, Aug. 17, 1914.

[9] *Ibid.* In 1884 the Republican candidate, James G. Blaine, was vigorously attacked for dining with millionaires at Delmonico's in New York.

the time. He did not explain his views on foreign relations, world affairs, or national affairs.

A local newspaper, the Poughkeepsie *Eagle,* stated that Mr. Roosevelt had been in close touch with the President and other administrative officials and had been consulted on many New York political matters. It did not believe that the President would announce himself in favor of Roosevelt's primary campaign.[10]

The *Eagle* had sized up the situation correctly. When the candidacy of James Gerard was announced, President Wilson was placed in a difficult position.

If the President interferred in the state primary, he would have had to choose between two of his own appointees. The President could have suggested privately to one of the candidates that he withdraw, or the President might have made a public stand in favor of one of the candidates. As American political parties are organized, presidential interference in state primaries would have been a dangerous course. We know that President Wilson did not do this in 1914. National Chairman William F. McCombs urged the President to keep neutral in the primary contest.[11] Secretary McAdoo sent the following letter:

August 15, 1914

My dear Mr. Roosevelt:

I have tried to reach you twice on the telephone today to tell you how pleased I am to hear of your candidacy for the Democratic nomination for Senator from New York. I wish you success and shall be glad to do anything in my power to help you.

Faithfully yours,
W. G. McAdoo

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Assistant Secretary of the Navy [12]

Secretary McAdoo's chief lieutenant in New York State was Dudley Field Malone, Collector of the Port of New York. The collectorship was the chief Federal plum in the state, for it controlled many choice jobs. Malone and his appointees were active in the campaign, but their num-

[10] Aug. 14, 1914, cited in *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928,* ed. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 250.

[11] New York *Times,* Sept. 16, 1914.

[12] Group 11, Political Correspondence, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

bers were small as compared with the local Tammany jobholders. FDR was himself to find out in 1938 how difficult it was for a President to control the primaries of his party in the states.

Boss Murphy showed great shrewdness in backing Ambassador Gerard as a candidate for the nomination for United States senator in the Democratic primary. It was announced that "friends" planned to bring Gerard's name into the primaries and that he had not taken unkindly to the move.[13] At first Ambassador Gerard denied the report and said that his trip back to the United States was a vacation trip.[14] After he returned to Berlin, his candidacy was announced.[15] The Ambassador was a prominent Wilson man who was ten years older than Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, and he had had a more distinguished record at the bar. Before accepting the ambassadorship to Berlin, Gerard had risen to the top of his profession and had served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of New York. While he had been a practicing lawyer and judge in New York City, his ancestral roots were in an upstate county in the bailiwick of his probable Republican opponent, James Wadsworth, Jr. A liberal contributor to party campaign funds, he did not have to worry about primary-election campaign expenses.

Some groups played up Roosevelt's youth as a disqualification. A local Republican newspaper came to his defense. It said:

> If it be true that the old guard Democrats of Poughkeepsie and Dutchess County, in conference assembled, have turned down the candidacy of Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt for the United States Senate, it seems to the Eagle that the action was both unkind and discourteous—contrary to all the best principles of political etiquette. Mr. Roosevelt may be conceded to be young, but he is not too young to be eligible under the constitution to a seat in the United States Senate. In fact he has a considerable margin to his credit above the required thirty years. Besides that he has served with distinction in the Senate of the State of New York and is now the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a position of great responsibility in which all authorities agree he is making good.[16]

Ambassador Gerard decided not to leave his post in Berlin in order to conduct an active campaign. This enabled the Murphy cohorts to

[13] New York *Times*, June 14, 1914.
[14] *Ibid.*, June 16, 1914.
[15] *Ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1914.
[16] Poughkeepsie *Daily Eagle*, Aug. 24, 1914.

treat the new direct-primary law with contempt. The organization could win without an effort on the part of the candidate.[17]

A third candidate, James S. McDonough, also put his hat in the ring. Roosevelt challenged McDonough to repudiate the support of Charles F. Murphy. In a statement to the press he asked: "I should very much appreciate it if you would let me know where you stand in regard to Murphy's leadership. If nominated and elected, will you support Murphy's control, or will you maintain a diplomatic neutrality, or will you seek to obtain a leadership of higher ideals?" [18]

Roosevelt put in a strenuous six weeks campaigning throughout the state. Outstanding among his addresses was his speech at Buffalo:

> I have come here to preach revolution and to preach harmony and successful peace—revolution because it is the only successful way of getting rid of tyrants—harmony because after the Democrats of this state are set free our party will move on to a united front and an inevitable victory. Tonight I am firing the first gun of my campaign. . . . I have only one possible opponent, an opponent who works in the dark underground passages of the crookedest political by-ways, an opponent who with a few trustworthy lieutenants, has for years used the Democratic voters of this state solely to furnish his own selfish ends. I refer to Charles F. Murphy.
>
> First of all, I want to state most emphatically that I am an organization Democrat, a National Democrat, and a New York State Democrat. . . .
>
> As a Democrat of this kind I feel I have a right to go before the Democratic voters and let them know who I am and what I stand for. This is the first year of state-wide primaries, and if they are honestly conducted they will give a chance to the voters to choose between the old fashioned kind of hand-picked candidate and other candidates who have come forward of their own accord, and in response to a demand of their friends. For no matter how much it may be denied the ticket in the Democratic primaries which was announced at the Saratoga conference is just as much of a hand-picked ticket of the old kind as ever existed. Way down deep in our hearts you and I know the ticket was finally selected by and with consent and advice of Murphy, and that same Murphy who has made the Democratic party of New York State, to their shame and our shame be it said, a by-word in the nation. . . .
>
> And the experience of these years covers a multitude of subjects and prob-

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] New York *Times*, Sept. 21, 1914.

lems. It has been an inspiration after the pettiness and the servility and the brutality of a Murphyized Albany to be transferred to the clean and efficient air of Wilsonized Washington, to come in contact with a national Democracy and to understand its ideals.[19]

The primary election was held on September 28, 1914. Only those voters who had enrolled as Democrats could participate in the Democratic primary. This was a situation which played into the hands of the organization leaders. Roosevelt did not begin his battle until too late. To win a primary fight in a large metropolitan area in the United States, it is necessary to start building an organization years in advance.[20]

Under the circumstances Roosevelt made a very creditable showing. He polled about one-third of the votes. As was expected, he ran furthest behind in New York, where he received only one-fifth of the votes. He ran twice as well in the rural areas and small cities as in New York. He carried twenty-two out of the sixty-one counties, including those containing the cities of Rochester, Auburn, and Oswego.

Upon his defeat Roosevelt sent a telegram to Ambassador Gerard in Berlin stating, "Will make active campaign for you if you declare unalterable opposition to Murphy's leadership and all he stands for." [21] Here was clearly an unreasonable ultimatum which Ambassador Gerard could not be expected to answer. No answer was received. Roosevelt supported Gerard because he regarded Wadsworth, the Republican nominee, by sympathy and record a reactionary of the worst type.

While Josephus Daniels said that the defeat "hurt Roosevelt," the local newspapers quoted Roosevelt as having "cheerily" remarked, "Never mind; we paved the way." [22]

That Roosevelt learned some lessons from this campaign there can be no doubt. He learned that in a primary, direct or indirect, it takes longer than six weeks to defeat a strong organization such as Tammany Hall. He learned that it took more than Federal patronage to beat a well entrenched local machine. He learned how to make a state-wide

[19] Olean *Herald,* Sept. 12, 1914.

[20] See the author's chapter "You Can't Lick a Ward Boss" in his *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1937).

[21] New York *Times,* Sept. 30, 1914. The vote was 68,879 for Roosevelt and 133,815 for Gerard.

[22] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928,* p. 256.

campaign, conserving voice and energy. He also learned how to take defeat. His absorbing tasks in Washington left him no time to brood over his setback. As his wife, who was having another baby at the time, put it:

> I do not think that my husband ever had any idea that he was going to win out, and I have often heard him say that he did not think himself suited to serve in the United States Senate; and, therefore, it was probably a great relief to find himself back at his desk in the Navy Department.[23]

The defeat taught FDR a lesson that he never forgot. It was the last time that he openly defied the Tammany organization. Tammany Hall was opposed to him on several later occasions, but he never campaigned again on the issue of antibossism. He perceived that party organization was essential to electoral successes and that he must make his peace with the party leaders if he wanted them to support his candidacy and his policies.

[23] *This Is My Story*, p. 217.

VIII

UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT

Once there were two brothers. One ran away to sea, the other was elected Vice President, and nothing was ever heard of either of them again.

—THOMAS R. MARSHALL, *Recollections*

WORLD WAR I intervened between Roosevelt's attempt to win a senatorial nomination and his next test before the voters. During these years he had been in a conspicuous position in Washington and he had acquired an excellent reputation as an administrator, as congressional relations officer, and as an ardent advocate of the doctrines of President Wilson.

The following quotations from the press indicate the picture of an outstanding public servant that was being built up in the minds of the American people:

Roosevelt has a bearing that even William Faversham might envy. His face is long, firmly shaped and set with marks of confidence. There are faint wrinkles on a high straight forehead. Intensely blue eyes rest in light shadow. A firm thin mouth breaks quickly into a laugh, openly and freely. His voice is pitched well, goes forward without tripping. He doesn't disdain shedding his coat on a hot afternoon; shows an active quality in the way he jumps from his chair to reach the cigarettes in his coat. He is a young man, a young man with energy and definite ideas, as well as a definite objective, who can be generous and fair, but firm to his own cause. He recalls Conrad's

description of the young Malay "war Comrade" in *Lord Jim,* "Unobscured vision, tenacity of purpose." In the mocking humor of the Capitol, he is called a he-man.

He deserved it before the phrase was coined. . . .

He isn't hidden nor inconspicuous. But he is a man whose obvious powers are such as to make you wonder how a democracy of opportunity can afford to leave him subordinated now, when the need is not so much for measures—of which there have been, Heaven knows, enough—but for men.[1]

In the presidential campaign of 1916 Roosevelt played a minor part, for he was Acting Secretary of the Navy while Secretary Daniels was out making speeches. In a speech at Kittery, Maine, Roosevelt said:

Republican leaders admit that the course of the President in international affairs is going to give him thousands of votes of thinking Republicans—that is true; but it is also a fact that the record of the Administration in giving to the country for four years an honest government and an impartial government will swing and has already swung countless other thousands to his support.

I am sorry for Mr. Hughes, not because he is going to be defeated but because he has already fallen into the hands of a lot of untrustworthy men —the same as Taft did. He was told that two Republicans had been forced out when Democrats came in, and now it turns out that one of them admits he resigned voluntarily and the other was replaced by a better man from the point of view of good business methods. . . .

We consulted with business men. We canvassed thoroughly what this yard could or could not do. We found that for certain purposes the yard was ideally adapted and today the empty buildings are filled with machinery and with men, the cry from the industrial manager being for more accommodations on account of the press of work in hand. There were 1,410 men employed at Kittery on the first of this month.[2]

During the congressional elections of 1918, Roosevelt was preoccupied with his duties at the Navy Department. Certain political events, however, did show the increase in his political stature. According to Lindley, Roosevelt was approached early in June by a representative of Tammany Hall who sounded him out on a campaign for governor. Roosevelt turned

[1] Ralph Block in the New York *Tribune,* cited by Ernest K. Lindley in *Franklin D. Roosevelt,* pp. 147–148.

[2] New York *Times,* Aug. 27, 1916.

down the offer, for he was planning to go on active duty in the Navy, but he recommended Al Smith, then president of the Board of Aldermen, as the best qualified man for the office. Roosevelt had graduated from the school of the antis, and he saw in Al Smith a means for healing the breach in the Democratic party.

As the Democratic National Convention assembled in San Francisco in 1920, the war had been over for a year and six months. The Navy had been rapidly demobilized. President Wilson's health had been broken and his League of Nations defeated a second time in the United States Senate. The Republicans were in control of both houses of Congress, and the by-elections since November, 1918, had gone against the Democrats. The circumstances were hardly favorable to the continuation of the Democratic party in control of the Presidency.

The Democratic nomination in 1920 was not the prize that it had been in 1912. McAdoo recognized this and refused at first to be considered as a candidate, but as the most prominent of Wilson's lieutenants he finally entered the lists. The Democratic organization leaders, sensing a repudiation or a disillusionment regarding Wilsonism, sought a candidate who had no connection with the national Administration.

The leaders of the big city organizations wanted to get a "wet" candidate, and they settled upon Governor James M. Cox of Ohio, who, although not an outspoken wet, was more flexible on this issue than McAdoo.

For forty-three ballots the convention at San Francisco was deadlocked, with McAdoo, Palmer, and Cox as the leading contenders. On the forty-fourth ballot Cox was nominated.

Roosevelt had gone to the convention as a delegate, and in that capacity he had opposed strongly the unit rule for actions of the New York delegation. In a convention fist fight he had torn the state standard from the reluctant hands of Tammany men in order to participate in the demonstration for President Wilson, and he had made a speech seconding the nomination of Alfred E. Smith for the Presidency.[3]

Charles Michelson in his dispatch to the New York *World* said:

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, took the platform amid another storm of cheering to second the nomination of Al Smith. He

[3] New York *Times*, May 6 and June 29, 1920.

got a crash of applause when he told the delegates that their nominee will not be selected at 2 A.M. in a hotel room.[4]

It can hardly be said that Roosevelt was an active candidate for the Vice Presidential nomination. During the spring he had expressed the view that he did not think it looked like a Democratic year. Some people had approached him regarding a second try for the nomination as the Democratic candidate for United States senator. In March he made a statement that he was not a candidate at the time.[5] On the question of the Vice Presidency he wrote to Langdon P. Marvin: "I am wondering who started this fool Vice-Presidential boom. I have seen nothing about it in the papers and I am not at all sure that I care for it." [6]

The convention leaders wanted to "balance" the ticket with an avowed Wilson man. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a natural for their purposes. Popular with the delegates of all factions, a supporter of Governor Smith and yet friendly with McAdoo, young, handsome, with a distinguished record as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he was clearly available as a balancing element on the ticket.

The account of the nomination of a Democratic candidate for Vice President has been told by Governor Cox. He wrote that his convention manager, Edmond H. Moore, asked him over the telephone who his preference was for Vice President:

I told him I had given the matter some thought and that my choice would be Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York. Moore inquired, "Do you know him?" I did not. In fact, so far as I knew, I had never seen him, but I explained to Mr. Moore that he met the geographical requirement, that he was recognized as an Independent and that Roosevelt was a well-known name. I knew that his relations with the organization in his state were not friendly. With a small anti-Tammany group, he, as State Senator, had voted against the Democratic caucus nominee for United States Senator, William F. Sheehan. This made it necessary for Mr. Moore to consult Charles Murphy, head of New York's organization, explaining to him what had moved me to this selection, but saying that if it were offensive, we would abandon the idea and go to Edward T. Meredith of Iowa. Murphy had gone to bed but Moore delivered the message. I can quote Murphy's exact words.

[4] July 1, 1920.

[5] New York *Times*, March 11, 1920.

[6] Box 138, 1913–1920, Papers as Assistant Secretary of Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

"I don't like Roosevelt. He is not well-known in the country, but, Ed, this is the first time a Democratic nominee for the presidency has shown me courtesy. That's why I would vote for the devil himself if Cox wanted me to. Tell him we will nominate Roosevelt on the first ballot as soon as we assemble." [7]

Senator Cox went on to say that Roosevelt knew nothing of this. Roosevelt had been approached by a representative of Tammany Hall in connection with the gubernatorial nomination in 1918, so he may have guessed that the Hall was willing to forgive his earlier irregularities if he would play ball with the organization.

The fact that Governor Al Smith seconded the nomination of Roosevelt for Vice President indicated that Tammany Hall was not too opposed to Roosevelt. Smith was the logical choice for the Democratic nomination for governor again, and he undoubtedly thought that Roosevelt would help the ticket. Roosevelt was nominated by acclamation in the convention.

Cox and Roosevelt put on a valiant but losing battle. By any standards Cox was better qualified than Warren Gamaliel Harding for the Presidency, but 1920 was not a Democratic year.

Roosevelt made an extensive campaign tour on which his wife accompanied him for part of the way. FDR and his team acquired experience which was to be invaluable later. On the tour he took with him Louis Howe, Marvin McIntyre, Tom Lynch, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, and others.

In a charming passage in *This Is My Story,* Mrs. Roosevelt describes how she became better acquainted on the trip with Louis Howe and what he did to tutor her in the ways of politics and journalism. As she put it, "Largely because of Louis Howe's early interpretation of the standards and ethics of the newspaper business, I came to look with interest and confidence on the writing fraternity and gained a liking for it which I have never lost." [8]

Mrs. Roosevelt's political education was also given a head start. She wrote:

[7] James M. Cox, *The Journey Through My Years* (New York, Simon and Shuster, 1946), p. 232.

[8] P. 315.

Louis Howe began to break down my antagonism by occasionally knocking at my stateroom door and asking if he might discuss a speech with me. I was flattered and before long I found myself discussing a wide range of subjects. I began to be able to understand some of our newspaper brethren, and to look upon them as friends instead of enemies.[9]

Roosevelt's speeches in 1920 took on more of the character that his speeches were to have in later campaigns. He had become thoroughly imbued with the Wilsonian liberalism which at home included improvement of Federal administration, the regulation of banking, the setting up of standards of fair competition, and the recognition of some of the demands of organized labor, and abroad included the giving up of a small portion of national sovereignty to the League of Nations.

His acceptance speech delivered from the front porch of the Roosevelt home in Hyde Park was prophetic in many ways. It laid down the general lines that he was to follow in later years. Some parts of the speech were vague and failed to give a definite course of action, but the spirit of the address was clearly Rooseveltian.

Roosevelt's optimism, his faith in America's future, his belief in a new world order, his confidence in the ability of government to improve the lot of the common man, and his conviction that the system of free enterprise needs governmental regulation may all be found in this speech. It was not a bitterly partisan speech, but one which pitched its appeal at a high level. The Republican party was mentioned only by implication.

In appearing before the National Committee in July, Roosevelt made what Governor Cox called a very happy talk. After some compliments to the head of the ticket, and a prediction that the Democracy in the campaign would prove to be a "happy ship," he concluded by saying:

> Yes, we have all our cards on the table concerning campaign funds. I hope that the other great party will see not the wisdom but the good American spirit in not hiding its light under a bushel. I take it we might mix a quotation from the Bible by suggesting to our adversaries that "he who hides his campaign chest under a bushel shall have it returned to him after many days in ways least expected." And so the spirit of this meeting is going to be the spirit of smaller gatherings in states and cities and counties all over the nation

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 316.

in the next few months and we as candidates look forward with absolute assurance to the same kind of spirit throughout the country, north, south, east, and west, with the conviction, the knowledge, that the people of the United States are not going to be willing in November to slide down hill but are going forward with all of us in the march of progress up the heights.[10]

This speech was more prophetic than Roosevelt realized. It is an example of a shrewd Roosevelt guess. He could not have known any of the sordid deals that lay back of Harding's nomination and campaign which eventually led to the sentencing to jail of Albert Fall, Harding's Secretary of the Interior, the resignation of Harding's Attorney General, and the compromising of the Republican National Committee. But he felt that the finances of the Republican party were subject to attack.

During the 1920 campaign Roosevelt made over a thousand speeches. He wanted to outdo Uncle Ted. Eleanor went along, and Louis Howe took advantage of this situation to continue her political education.

A novice making his first national campaign speaking tour is liable to make mistakes. The blunders of a Vice Presidential candidate are usually overlooked. Roosevelt, however, made a blunder of such magnitude that it was seized upon by the opposition and given national coverage in the press. At Butte, Montana, answering the argument that the United States would be outvoted by the combined British Commonwealth in the League of Nation's Assembly, he said: "It is just the other way . . . the United States has about twelve votes in the Assembly." As he explained it, many Latin American countries looked to the United States as "a guardian and big brother" and would vote our way. He went on to say:

Until last week I had (votes) myself, and now Secretary Daniels has them. You know I had something to do with the running of a couple of little republics. The facts are that I wrote Haiti's Constitution myself, and, if I do say it, I think it a pretty good Constitution.[11]

Here was a "boner" of large proportions, and it plagued him for the rest of his political career. Like Uncle Ted's phrase, "I took Panama," it belonged to the school of *realpolitik*. The future founder of the good neighbor policy should never had made such a bald statement in public.

[10] Cox, *op. cit.*, pp. 239–240.

[11] *Outlook*, Sept. 15, 1920.

It sounded like a schoolboy bragging about his exploits. The statement had obviously not been cleared by the Department of State. It represented an off-the-cuff remark of a young man who should have known better after nearly eight years in Washington. He was improvising, playing by ear, and trying to answer his hecklers. It is obvious that he did not dream that his offhand remarks would cause such a stir. When he made them, he was thinking about the heckler in front of him, not about the Haitians, the other Latin Americans and foreigners who might be concerned about the nature of American foreign policy. He also was oblivious of what capital a critical press might make of such a remark.

The incident led to a quarrel with the newspaper men. Stunned by the overwhelming condemnation which his remarks received, the young candidate tried to extricate himself and repair some of the damage done to the party. This is a delicate business, and a candidate may make things worse in his efforts to correct what was obviously a campaign error. Roosevelt did not improve his reputation with the newspaper fraternity by his statement.

The Butte incident taught FDR a hard lesson. Thereafter he was more cautious in his campaign utterances, and usually spoke from a manuscript or according to a well tried formula. When he did make extempore remarks, he usually followed the precaution of warning that he was not to be quoted directly.

Roosevelt's intensive campaign was not in vain. He and his wife acquired invaluable experience on how to behave on a presidential campaign tour. They also made contacts with many Democratic politicians all over the country. When FDR ran at the head of the ticket in 1932, he did not make the mistakes that Willkie made in 1940. Willkie tired himself out and lost a great deal of his effectiveness during his campaign tour. Some writers have criticized Roosevelt for running for Vice President, particularly in 1920. As an astute politician, he should have known that 1920 was not a Democratic year. Why go down to defeat running for an unimportant office? Roosevelt accepted the nomination because to the Roosevelts the Vice Presidency is an important office and every election is important to the future of the party. Franklin wanted to follow in his cousin's footsteps. Did not cousin Theodore run for Vice President and become our youngest President? Franklin Roose-

velt was a loyal party man and he believed in Wilsonian democracy. He was in favor of the League of Nations and he wanted to do what he could to promote the cause. If he could help the party in the long run by putting his shoulder to the wheel in a bad year, he might be remembered in a good year. Running for the Vice Presidency in 1920 was good politics. It paid off in 1928, 1930, and 1932. Roosevelt's defeats were turned into victories. He was young in 1914 and 1920. Perhaps he overreached himself in the senatorial contest. Luck was not with the party in 1920; but he took his defeats in his stride, and they left no trace of bitterness or frustration.[12]

[12] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928*, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 514.

IX

VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH

The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.
—FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, *First Inaugural, March 4, 1933.*

IN American history not many unsuccessful candidates for Vice President have been saved from political oblivion. Who remembers now the Republican candidates for Vice President who ran against Garner, Wallace, and Truman? It happens that one of them, Frank Knox, was later a wartime Secretary of the Navy, but he was saved from political obscurity by FDR, not by his own efforts. Who remembers that Senator McNary was Willkie's running mate in 1940 and that Governor Bricker was Dewey's in 1944?

FDR was not downhearted. He was young, thirty-eight to be exact. He had made many friends in politics. He went back to the practice of law, but not as a law clerk. The law firm of Roosevelt and O'Connor was formed, and FDR also assumed a number of business responsibilities, including the vice presidency of a banking business. Holding public office had been a financial drain upon his resources, and he welcomed the opportunity to earn money to meet the ever increasing expenses of his family. As for politics, he could wait until there was a more favorable turn in the political cycle.

Retiring from public life enabled FDR to spend more time on golf, boating, tennis, and playing with his family. He could lead a more normal family life and have time for the things which he liked to do. Politics was fascinating, but it was also confining.

Then, out of a clear sky, the blow fell. At the age of thirty-nine, in the prime of his life, he was stricken with infantile paralysis. Many different writers point out that for a while it was doubtful whether he would ever sit up again, to say nothing of standing or walking. The shadow of death hung low over him. The mental hazards he faced were as great as the physical. Despair threatened to change the sunny temperament, the radiant smile, the ever present optimism. His faith in himself and in mankind was subjected to a test such as it had never faced before.

World history has not been kind to men who cannot walk. Of the great figures of world history, Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuit order, stands out as one who rose to great heights even though he was crippled in his legs. At the age of thirty, Loyola, an active soldier and a man of the world, lost the use of his legs in battle. He turned to religion and meditation, became a priest, traveled extensively, and formed the Society of Jesus. Before Roosevelt there was no outstanding case of a man in political life who conquered this handicap.

In meeting the crisis, FDR was greatly assisted by his wife and by Louis Howe. They saw that everything must be done to keep up his morale. Franklin's mother wanted to revert to the days of his early infancy when he was flat on his back, but Eleanor and Louis were firm. Following the doctor's orders, they maintained steadfastly that he must not be treated as an invalid. He must be looked upon as the same Franklin he had always been, joyous, full of life, hopeful, confident that everything would turn out all right.

FDR's wife actually nursed him through the darkest days of his sickness, since no professional nurse was available at Campobello. As she put it modestly:

> After Doctor Lovett's visit, we finally got a nurse from New York, called Miss Rockey, but Doctor Lovett had been so flattering as to certain aspects of my husband's care, not knowing that I had been the only nurse on the case, that it was decided that I should continue a certain amount of the nursing. This I did until we were finally able to move him back to New York.[1]

Regarding Mr. Howe's role, she wrote:

[1] *This Is My Story*, p. 332.

Mr. Howe had made up his mind to give up all idea of taking the position which was open to him and to come back to his old boss, because he saw quite plainly that his help was going to be needed. From that time on he put his whole heart into working for my husband's future. The handling of his mail and the newspapers all fell entirely into Louis' hands.[2]

Eleanor and Louis did everything possible to treat Franklin as though he were the same as he had always been. He was the same, yet he was different too. Franklin, the all-round athlete, was gone. Golf was a word which was not even mentioned in the household. The time he had once spent on golf, dancing, and other pastimes, he could now spend on thinking. Like other people, he now had had his share of pain, frustration, despair, and rage. But the Fates would not keep him down. He would rise and smite the enemies' disease and hopelessness. There was a new determination in him, a new set to the jaws, a glint in the eyes, and steel in the backbone as well as in the braces on his legs. Long before 1933 he lived the words, "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The only thing that he had to fear in 1921 and in the dark years following was that fear would creep into his heart and paralyze his ambition, his zest for life, as well as his legs.

FDR was stricken on August 10, 1921. He was unable to perform work for a year. He returned to his law practice in the fall of 1922, when he was able to get around on crutches. He later took a few steps leaning on the arm of a companion and aided by steel braces on his legs.

Was FDR through as a politician? What was the future of a defeated candidate for Vice President who could not walk? To anyone but the trio, Franklin, Eleanor, and Louis, the future looked dark indeed.

Eleanor decided that she must do everything to keep alive Franklin's interest in politics. In order to do so she became more active in politics herself. She edited and managed a paper for the women's division of the Democratic State Committee. She brought some of her political friends to see her husband, women trade-union leaders, social workers, and persons like herself, moderately well-to-do women who took an interest in the Democratic party.

Louis helped Franklin continue his legal and business interests. In the

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

early part of 1921, before Franklin fell ill, Mr. Van Lear Black had arranged for Roosevelt's appointment as Vice President of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland. Mr. Black held the position open after Roosevelt was stricken. With the aid of Louis Howe, FDR was able to handle the correspondence and make the contacts necessary to continue this business connection. As a matter of fact, the company prospered during the period that FDR served it.

FDR had been sick for about a year when the question of who should be nominated for governor of New York on the Democratic ticket arose. Al Smith had been defeated for reelection for governor in the Republican landslide of 1920, but he had run a million votes ahead of Cox and Roosevelt in New York State. As the Democrats were about to file petitions for delegates to the state convention, Roosevelt sent the following open letter to former Governor Smith:

HYDE PARK, DUTCHESS COUNTY
NEW YORK
August 13, 1922

HON. ALFRED E. SMITH
25 Oliver Street
New York City
DEAR AL:

Over a month ago I wrote to the conference of Democrats in Syracuse, urging that the Democratic Party of this state must put its best foot foremost in the selection of candidates this year. It appeared to me then that the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of Democrats was for your nomination again for the office of governor.

Today, a week before the filing of designating petitions for delegates to the state convention, I am of the same opinion. I have been in touch with men and women voters from almost every upstate county and there is no question that the rank and file of Democrats want you to run.

Many candidates for office are strong by virtue of promises of what they will some day do. You are strong by virtue of what you have done. People everywhere know that in 1920, while you lost by a narrow margin in the landslide, you received a million more votes in this state than the presidential ticket.

More than that, your support came not only from Democrats but literally hundreds of thousands of Republicans and independent men and women

who knew that you had given to this State an honest, clean and economical government, and had consistently opposed the privilege seekers and the reactionaries.

These voters are not satisfied with the present conduct of affairs by Republican leaders in Washington and Albany. To them will be added many more who are now sorry that they voted the Republican ticket in 1920. You represent the hope of what may be called "the average citizen."

Something must be done, and done now. In every county the chief topic of political conversation is: "Will Al Smith accept if he is nominated?" Already unauthorized agents are saying that you will not accept, and many are being deceived and beginning to lose interest as a result. It would surprise you to know what enthusiasm would spring up overnight if we knew you would accept the nomination.

Frankly, I don't want to see things go by default in this most hopeful year, and that is why I am writing you before the primary petitions are filed. I am taking it upon myself to appeal to you in the name of countless citizens of upstate New York, Democrats, Republicans, Independents, men and women, to ask you to say now, not later, that if nominated for governor, you will accept.

We realize that years of public service make it most desirable that you think now for a while of your family's needs. I am in the same boat myself —yet this call to further service must come first. Some day your children will be even prouder of you for making this sacrifice than they are now.

You represent the type of citizen the voters of this state want to vote for for governor, and you can be elected. The decision must be made now, as I have tried to point out. That is why—reluctantly to be sure, for I know what unselfishness it will call for on your part—I am asking you personally and publicly to accede to the wishes of so many of your fellow citizens.

Very truly yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT [3]

This letter warrants close examination: FDR undoubtedly had Louis Howe's help in composing it, and Louis undoubtedly did everything possible to see that it got attention in the press. While there are twenty-five references in the letter to Al Smith, there are about half that number of references to Roosevelt himself. Who made a bedridden cripple the spokesman for the voters of New York? How did he know that voters from every upstate county were clamoring for Al Smith to run again?

[3] Alfred E. Smith, *Up to Now: An Autobiography*, pp. 230–231.

Franklin said that he was in the same boat as Al Smith, that he had to earn money for his family. It was not entirely clear then to what extent he would assume active business responsibilities. It was clear, however, that the partly disabled man was not out for office for himself at this time. In 1922 he was disinterested.

Smith was nominated for governor in the famous Democratic State Convention that met in Rochester, New York. It was at this convention that Smith had his revenge upon William Randolph Hearst for the attack which the Hearst papers in New York had made upon him in 1919, charging that he was responsible for the extraordinary rise in the price of milk. Smith never forgave Hearst for this attack. Although Charles F. Murphy was backing Hearst, Smith blocked Hearst's ambition to run for governor by running for the office himself, and later he prevented Hearst's nomination for United States senator by refusing to run on the same ticket with him.[4] The convention chose Royal S. Copeland as the Democratic candidate for United States senator, a nominee acceptable to the Tammany Hall organization. In these battles Roosevelt fought effectively for the Smith forces.[5]

Smith defeated Governor Miller in the election and began a continuous six-year period as governor of New York. His plurality over Miller in 1922 was 387,000. Regarding the election Roosevelt wrote the following on November 18, 1922:

> We can all congratulate ourselves on the fine result of election day. I had quite a tussle in New York to keep our friend Hearst off the ticket and to get Al to run, but the thing went through in fine shape and I am glad to say that the Democratic organization is in better condition than any time since 1912.[6]

Smith's victory in the race for governorship in 1922 made him a presidential possibility. Who could be a better manager of his preconvention battle in 1924 than FDR, who was friendly with the politicians of all

[4] Alfred E. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

[5] Group 11, Political Correspondence, FDR to Major James W. Fleming of Troy, N.Y., Nov. 11, 1922, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. FDR emphasized the importance of building Democratic strength upstate.

[6] Group 11, Pol. Corr., FDR to Joseph A. Davies, Nov. 18, 1922, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

factions. On the subject of presidential nominations, Roosevelt wrote at the time:

> Isn't it curious that everyone is after the Presidency. Personal candidacies are so rarely developed into anything tangible. In our own party for the last fifty or sixty years the nomination for the President has been nearly every time a matter of luck, or some eleventh hour opportunity boldly seized upon.[7]

FDR was Governor Smith's preconvention manager for the knock-down-and-drag-out Democratic National Convention of 1924. How did it happen that FDR was for Smith rather than for McAdoo? In national affairs Roosevelt was closer to McAdoo's ideas. Both men had been appointees of President Wilson. Governor Smith's views on national and international questions had hardly been formulated. Roosevelt's choice was not related to his illness, for he had been for Smith in 1920. An obvious explanation is that FDR saw in Al Smith a man of destiny. They had liked each other in the state Legislature. Roosevelt, the patrician, had been drawn to Smith, the self-made statesman. He did not regard Smith's religion, humble beginnings, and East Side accent as disqualifying him for a presidential nomination.[8]

Governor Smith was also a good judge of character, and he saw what a fine job FDR might do for him. Without the use of his legs, FDR could go places that Smith could not go; and as for his charming wife, there could not be a better organizer of women's votes than she.

FDR found it great fun. He was back in the swim as a President-maker, if not as a presidential candidate. The meetings, the telephone calls, the letters to read and answer, and the visitors to see kept his mind off himself.

In 1924 the Smith forces were not strong enough to win the nomination, but they paved the way for 1928. A high-light of the convention proceedings was the speech FDR delivered placing Smith's name in nomination, which became famous for the phrase, "Happy Warrior."

He had conquered fear, and everybody could see that he had won his personal battle. When he entered the Democratic Convention Hall in

[7] Group 11, Pol. Corr., FDR to Byron Newton, L.I., Dec. 20, 1922, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[8] *Ibid.*, Pol. Corr., FDR to Edna T. Rockey, May 17, 1924.

New York in 1924 on crutches and delivered a magnificent speech nominating his friend and former colleague Alfred E. Smith for President, it was apparent that he was no invalid in spirit. This is the impression he made at the time.

No matter whether Governor Smith wins or loses, Franklin D. Roosevelt stands out as the real hero of the Democratic Convention of 1924.

Adversity has lifted him above the bickering, the religious bigotry, conflicting personal ambitions, and petty sectional prejudices. It has made him the one leader commanding the respect and admiration of delegations from all sections of the land. . . . Roosevelt might be pathetic, a tragic figure but for the fine courage that flashes in his smile. It holds observers enchained.[9]

Governor Smith was grateful for the gallant fight against prejudice and narrow thinking that Franklin Roosevelt made at the convention. Al Smith was a native East Side New Yorker, a Catholic, a self-educated man, and Roosevelt could talk to the rural, Protestant, and college-bred elements in the Democratic party regarding the fine qualities of the New York governor, his humanitarian ideas, his skill in handling people, his knowledge of governmental affairs, his superb abilities as an administrator. In those days Smith and Roosevelt were great friends.

Following the 1924 Democratic National Convention, FDR was asked if he would run for governor, but he announced that he would not seek public office until he could dispense with his crutches.

Al Smith was persuaded to run for a third term for governor of New York. His opponent was Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the son of former President Roosevelt. FDR did not take an active part in the campaign, for in October, 1924, he began his curative treatments at Warm Springs, Georgia. His wife, however, was busy during the campaign, and in *This I Remember* she was apologetic about a "rough stunt" which she and Louis Howe perpetrated on her cousin.[10] Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Harding Administration, and was therefore vulnerable to charges of negligence regarding the oil scandals, the most famous of which was the Teapot Dome scandal. The Democratic campaign stunt was to send an automobile dressed up

[9] New York *World*, July 7, 1924.
[10] Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember*, pp. 31–32.



BY FRUEH IN NEW YORK WORLD, 1924.

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as a huge teapot to follow the Republican candidate for governor wherever he went.

Smith's defeat of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., in a year when the Republican candidate for President, Calvin Coolidge, carried the state by nearly 900,000 votes renewed interest in Smith's candidacy for the presidential nomination in 1928. FDR and his wife continued to promote Governor Smith's political interests in the four years that followed. In this period FDR found time to devote to politics even though his business affairs and his efforts to regain the use of his legs took priority. He was particularly interested in attracting the liberal vote.[11] Whether he was in New York or Warm Springs, Georgia, he kept in touch with political friends and associates.

In December, 1924, FDR wrote to more than three thousand Democratic leaders throughout the country, including the delegates to the national convention, urging that the national committee of the party be put on a more businesslike basis and that the party function more actively in publicity and policy-forming matters between presidential elections. Essentially he was trying to heal the breach in the ranks of the party caused by the prolonged deadlock and bitter wrangling at the 1924 convention. To the same end he sent an open letter to Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana in March, 1925, suggesting that a conference of representative Democrats from every state be called.

While Roosevelt's efforts to call a general harmony conference were unsuccessful, he planted seeds which were later to take root. The agitation for a publicity staff for the national committee was acted upon by John J. Raskob when he became the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee.[12] The plea that he made for closer cooperation between the Senate and House Democratic leaders brought more immediate results. After a conference at Senator Walsh's home attended by Senate and House leaders, FDR said he was "particularly pleased with the growing conviction that close cooperation between the Democrats in the two houses is needed and that clear understandings as to politics should be reached by frequent conference." [13]

[11] Group 11, Pol. Corr., FDR to Senator Alva B. Adams of Pueblo, Colo., Nov. 12, 1924, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[12] See below, pp. 117–18. [13] Ernest K. Lindley, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, p. 226.

In 1926 the political spotlight was again turned on FDR, but he refused to step out of his role as party mediator. He was asked if he would consider running as the Democratic candidate to oppose Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr. He answered in the negative and supported the candidacy of Robert F. Wagner for that position. At the Democratic State Convention he delivered the keynote address, praising Governor Smith's record and denouncing the record of the Republican Legislature.

Governor Smith was renominated, and he defeated Ogden Mills, the Republican candidate for governor, by a plurality of 247,000. Smith's chances for the Democratic nomination for President in 1928 were improved by this victory, and Roosevelt continued to associate himself with Smith's fortunes. How he viewed those fortunes in 1927 is shown by a letter he wrote to Daniels explaining why he did not regard himself a presidential possibility at that time:

> Furthermore, there is no blinking the fact that Smith has such a blind, hero-worshipping, personal following made up not alone of Catholics but of many Protestants, not alone of Democrats, but of many Republicans that the failure to nominate him would alienate from the party for a long time a tremendous vote in the eastern and middle western states.
>
> . . . Strictly between ourselves, I am very doubtful whether any Democrat can win in 1928. It will depend somewhat on whether the present undoubted prosperity of the country continues.[14]

In the seven years following 1921, FDR had been gradually building up political prestige. His "Happy Warrior" speech had won considerable attention. He was still not ready to run for elective office himself, and Louis Howe agreed with this stand. FDR was making progress in conquering his illness, and he did not want to interrupt that progress.

Nevertheless, his illness need not be a political handicap when the proper time came. Regarding the new Franklin, his wife wrote:

> Franklin's illness was another turning point, and proved a blessing in disguise; for it gave him strength and courage he had not had before. He had to think out the fundamentals of living and learn the greatest of all lessons—infinite patience and never-ending persistence.[15]

[14] Gen. Pol. Corr., FDR to Josephus Daniels, June 23, 1927, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[15] *This I Remember*, p. 25.

Roosevelt's determination to conquer his illness gave him a tremendous will to power. He would show the world that he was still in there fighting. He would not be counted out. If his physical mobility was impaired, people could come to him and he would tell them what to do. His exuberance, his zest for living, his tremendous nervous energy, his obvious joyousness, and his newly gained patience would more than compensate for any physical defect.

X

ELECTED GOVERNOR

They shall bear thee up in their hands.
—Psalms, 91:12

In January, 1928, it did not look as though the time had arrived for FDR to become an active candidate again for elective office. Louis Howe thought that the political opportunities would be better in four to eight years. Roosevelt was making progress toward regaining the use of his legs, and he was determined not to interrupt that progress by tying himself down to the routine of public office.

The political fortunes of Governor Smith were in the ascendant, and FDR thought that he could wait for a more propitious time to reenter the political arena. In New York State and nationally the Democratic party did not seem to be on too firm a foundation. The party had just suffered two disastrous defeats for the Presidency, and the national organization needed to be rebuilt. In the state, Governor Smith had won some spectacular victories, but the margin had not been large in 1924 when the Coolidge presidential electors swept the state. In 1926 Wagner had not beaten Wadsworth by very many votes for the seat in the United States Senate. New York was a doubtful state, and a slight shift could throw it in one direction or another.

The Franklin Roosevelts continued their support of Governor Smith's candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President. As early as May, 1927, FDR had announced that he thought the South would stand by Smith and that Smith, "of all the Democratic candidates, would have

the smallest number of electoral votes to make up to obtain the two hundred and sixty-six required for election." [1]

Governor Smith's chances for the nomination improved steadily. The withdrawal of William Gibbs McAdoo in 1927 left the Protestant dry forces with no available candidate. William Jennings Bryan had passed away, and there was no one to take his place in Democratic conventions. Governor Smith had a highly favorable press.

Franklin Roosevelt was again chosen to place Smith's name before the Democratic National Convention. This time he walked without the aid of crutches, leaning on the arm of his son James. The following editorial appeared in the New York *Times* for June 28, 1928, under the title "A High-Bred Speech":

> Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his speech last night nominating Governor Smith, proceeded like a gentleman speaking to gentlemen. There was nothing strained or fantastic or extravagant in what he said. It was the address of a fair-minded and cultivated man, avoiding the usual perils of national convention oratory, and discussing in an intelligent way the qualifications which should be sought for in the President of the United States and the ability of Alfred Smith to meet every fair test of capacity. Mr. Roosevelt went further than that. He declared that many men could be found with sufficient mental and moral equipment to be a reasonably satisfactory President. But if the country wishes to have a great President it must inquire for something more.

The editorial went on to quote the passage from the speech in which he referred to Smith's sympathetic understanding of the human heart.

That FDR was pleased with the reception given to the speech is clear from a letter he wrote to his mother. "The nominating speech," he wrote, "went much better than I had anticipated and seems to have been approved by both Democratic and Republican papers, and there have been a lot of really nice editorials, and flocks of letters and telegrams." [2]

The speech that Roosevelt made nominating Al Smith for President reads extremely well today, and it made a tremendous impression at the time. Delivered with his mellow voice, flashing smile, and magnificent presence, its effect was electrifying.

[1] Ernest K. Lindley, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, p. 227.
[2] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928*, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 640.

While the speech contained 67 references to Governor Smith that paid genuine tribute to him, it also contained 26 first-person pronouns and twenty-three editorial *We's*. FDR appeared to possess some of the qualities which he ascribed to Smith. The nominator, as well as the nominee, was articulate, virile, vibrant, many-sided, sympathetic, and understanding. The speech indicated that FDR had great personal appeal and would be a fine candidate himself in the not too distant future for an office which was suitable.

The story of the Democratic State Convention which met in Rochester, New York, early in October, 1928, and nominated Franklin Delano Roosevelt for governor has been told many times. Before the convention met, Franklin wrote to his mother, "I have had a difficult time turning down the Governorship, letters and telegrams by the dozen begging me to save the situation by running, but I have been perfectly firm. I only hope they don't try to stampede the Convention tomorrow and nominate me and then adjourn!" [3] He wrote from Warm Springs, Georgia, where he was trying to regain the use of his legs. Smith, Thomas Lynch, one of his early Poughkeepsie supporters, and Herbert H. Lehman continued to exert pressure. They persisted until FDR's resistance was worn down. The important thing to remember is that the Democratic leaders regarded Roosevelt as the best available candidate, the one who would do the Democratic ticket in New York the most good. After the nomination, Roosevelt wrote to his uncle, "Without his (FDR's) acceptance Smith felt defeat was imminent, not only for the State, but in all probability for the national ticket in New York." He told Smith, "If, in the final analysis the convention insisted on nominating me, I should feel under definite obligation to accept the nomination." [4]

Eleanor Roosevelt did not urge Franklin to run, but she helped Al Smith to reach him by telephone, which would have been impossible without her aid since he had left strict orders not to be disturbed. Roosevelt's daughter Anna urged him to say Yes to the entreaties. The fatherly reply he sent to this was, "You ought to be spanked." [5]

Louis Howe was greatly concerned, for he feared that if Governor

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 645.

[4] 1928 Campaign Correspondence, FDR to F. A. Delano, Oct. 8, 1928, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Roosevelt repeated to his uncle what he had said to Smith.

[5] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1905–1928*, p. 645.

Smith lost nationally it might not be possible for Franklin to carry the state for the governorship, which in turn might spoil any chance he had for future political office. Mrs. Roosevelt, however, reassured Howe that one could not plan every move in this world and that one had to accept circumstances as they developed.[6]

The Republican opposition accused the Democrats of compelling Roosevelt to make a cruel choice. Governor Smith felt called upon to defend himself for his part in drafting Roosevelt for the Democratic nomination for governor. At his press conference following the convention, he said:

> The real fact is this: Frank Roosevelt to-day is mentally as good as he ever was in his life. Physically he is as good as he ever was in his life. His whole trouble is his lack of muscular control of his lower limbs. But the answer to that is that a Governor does not have to be an acrobat. We do not elect him for his ability to do a double-back flip or a handspring. The work of the Governorship is brainwork. Ninety-five per cent of it is accomplished sitting at a desk. There is no doubt about his ability to do it.[7]

In spite of this, Republican newspapers kept harping on Roosevelt's physical condition and on the unfairness of Smith's insisting that he run. Roosevelt issued the following statement:

> I am amazed to hear that efforts are being made to make it appear that I have been "sacrificed" by Governor Smith to further his own election and that my friends should vote against me to prevent such "sacrifice."
>
> Let me set this matter straight at once. I was not dragooned into running for governor. On the contrary, he fully appreciated the reasons for my reluctance and was willing to give up such advantage as he felt my candidacy might bring him in deference to my wishes. I was drafted because all the party leaders when they assembled insisted that my often-expressed belief in the policies of Governor Smith made my nomination the best assurance to the voters that these policies would be continued.
>
> It was because they felt and I feel that the whole splendid structure of State Government built up by Governor Smith and all the high ideals of service to the people which he had established were in peril that caused me to accept the nomination. New York must not lose its proud position as the state which

[6] Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember*, p. 46.
[7] Lindley, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

leads in efficiency and democracy. That is something too important to let personal considerations weigh in the slightest. I am in this fight not to win personal honor but for the carrying forward of the policies of Governor Smith.[8]

Roosevelt himself felt that his physical condition put him on the defensive, so he took the offensive in his campaign and made speeches in twenty-four of the sixty-two New York counties. He covered all the most populous counties and made many side trips to smaller cities and rural areas. He prided himself in his vigorous schedule of speechmaking. At Troy, New York, on October 26, 1928, he said, among other things:

Mr. Van Santvoord, my friends of Troy:

Well, I am glad to get back to the Hudson River. You know, I have been a little bit amused during the last three weeks. I understand that after the Rochester Convention took the action that it did, there was a good deal of what might be called sob stuff among Republican editorial writers in the State of New York. They said, "Isn't it too bad that that unfortunate man has had to be drafted for the Governorship? Isn't it too bad that his health won't stand it?"

We started off nearly two weeks ago from the City of New York, consisting of a caravan—a whole flock of people, candidates, the press, the stenographic force, etc. We started in in Orange County and we went on through Sullivan, Delaware, Broome, Steuben, and so forth, out through the Southern Tier, all the way to Jamestown. One day we covered 190 miles by automobile and made seven speeches. . . .

And then, for good measure, we just dropped into Schenectady and spoke there earlier in the evening, and now here we are in Troy. Too bad about this unfortunate sick man, isn't it? [9]

That it was difficult for a cripple to make an extended campaign tour cannot be denied. Madame Perkins has given a vivid picture of the problems involved:

I stood in the wings backstage, being among the fifty-odd people who were to sit upon the platform that night. I realized with sudden horror that the

[8] Statement to the press, New York *Times*, Oct. 5, 1928.

[9] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1928–1932* (New York, Random House, 1938), pp. 53–54. See also Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952).

only way he [Roosevelt] could get over that fire escape was in the arms of strong men. That was how he arrived.

Those of us who saw this incident, with our hands on our throats to hold down our emotion, realized that this man had accepted the ultimate humility which comes from being helped physically. He had accepted it smiling. He came up over that perilous, uncomfortable, and humiliating "entrance," and his manner was pleasant, courteous, enthusiastic. He got up on his braces, adjusted them, straightened himself, smoothed his hair, linked his arm in his son Jim's, and walked out on the platform as if this were nothing unusual.

Then he launched into his speech. I don't recall the speech at all. For me and the others who saw that episode his speech was less important than his courage. That was creative.[10]

In this campaign, as in later campaigns, he carefully avoided giving his opponent any more publicity than necessary. He scarcely mentioned the Republican candidate, Alfred Ottinger, and campaigned on issues of his own choosing.

Ottinger was also a lawyer practicing in New York City. At the time of the campaign he was attorney general of the state, having been elected to that position in 1924, when Smith carried the state for governor. He was popular in New York City, where he had many coreligionists, and he was also strong upstate, where the Republican party was traditionally the party in power. Under the Harding Administration, he had been United States district attorney, and earlier he had served in the state Senate. During the years when Roosevelt was laid low with illness, Ottinger had been much in the public eye. Significantly, he had won in a state-wide election, something which Roosevelt had not done.

Ottinger's chances looked good as the campaign got under way. A Republican President was in the White House, and the Republican nominee to succeed him, Herbert Hoover, appeared to be a strong candidate. Prosperous economic conditions favored the continuation of the Republicans in power in Washington. Ottinger had the support of Hoover's New York leaders.[11] Without their experienced governor as a candidate, the Democrats in New York had an uphill fight to retain the governorship.

[10] Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York, Viking Press, 1946), pp. 44–45.
[11] New York *Times*, June 18, 1928.

But Roosevelt was not dismayed by the uncertain prospects. He was an experienced campaigner, for he had stumped the state in 1914 and he had covered the country in 1920. He had addressed party conventions in 1924, 1926, and 1928. In Howe he had a loyal adviser who had devoted all his energies and ingenuity to forwarding the Roosevelt political fortunes. FDR entered the campaign with gusto, and everywhere he went he was enthusiastically received. His enthusiasm was infectious.

Roosevelt's speeches in his first campaign for governor were not of the caliber of his presidential campaign speeches later on. He was still developing his style of oratory. Usually he began with a friendly reference to the locality and the people he knew in it. His speeches placed great emphasis upon Governor Smith's splendid record in the state, and he frankly stated that he would try to carry on to the best of his abilities the great work that Smith had begun. In fact, his advisers urged him to talk more about himself and his program and less about Smith. At this time Roosevelt was content to bask in the reflected glory of the party's national leader.

Roosevelt had not yet organized a "brain trust" to help him write speeches. Louis Howe, of course, was on hand to give advice and to produce drafts, but Howe was not an expert on the complex political and social questions which faced the governor of the largest state in the Union. Public finance, agricultural economics, and conservation were not Howe's specialties.

The man who was selected to assist Roosevelt in drafting speeches for this and later campaigns had been a member of the New York Legislature for five years and of the Bill Drafting Commission for three. Samuel I. Rosenman was recommended for this assignment by Maurice Bloch, Roosevelt's campaign manager, and Mrs. Belle Moskowitz, who was one of Governor Smith's advisers.

Roosevelt's speeches in the 1928 campaign covered such topics as progressive government, water power, the administration of justice, farm relief, improvement in local government, reorganization of government, religious bigotry in the national campaign, Republican neglect of the farmers, land use, labor legislation, Republican opposition to labor legislation, human functions of government, education, child welfare, aid to widowed mothers, old-age assistance, the labels "socialist" and "radical,"

Prohibition and state enforcement, state-parks program, collective bargaining during his Navy days, fluctuations in employment, prison reform, modernization of criminal law procedure, rugged individualism, democracy versus intellectual aristocracy in government, and "Is Hoover human?" [12] On agricultural matters, conservation, and on legal reform questions he was ahead of Smith. On labor and welfare issues he was trying to carry on the Smith tradition.

Especially interesting was Roosevelt's statement on "Why I Am a Democrat" which appeared in the New York *Times* on October 14, 1928. In this statement he expressed a belief in "the composite judgment of the whole people," criticized the Republican party for its emphasis upon materialism, and said, "I believe that our Government should be guided by some principle of unselfishness, of sympathy, of intolerance of oppression, of willingness to help others as was shown in the lives of those really great Americans in the past who are best remembered and most loved by our countrymen today." He referred to the "icy blooded Calvin Coolidge" and denounced the Republican leaders for choosing Warren G. Harding with a full knowledge of his weaknesses. He accused selfish business interests of having "purchased the control of the Republican party." This statement did not sharply define Roosevelt's objectives, but it indicated something about his orientation. He was humanitarian in his views and did not worship financial success.

Roosevelt's opponent did not prove to be a formidable campaigner. Ottinger's choice of issues and his method of presenting his views did not set the state on fire. He was steeped in traditional conservative Republicanism, and went down the line for a high tariff, private enterprise with a minimum of public interference, a war on crime and graft, the abolition of the personal income tax, and the continuation of "Republican" prosperity. He was denounced by Governor Smith for his lack of constructive policies. On the Prohibition issue he failed to please either the drys or the wets. He had no special program for the farmers and he was on the defensive as far as his labor views were concerned. His personal appeal was far less than that of some of his illustrious Republican

[12] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1928–1932.* See also Rosenman, *op. cit.*

predecessors, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Charles Evans Hughes.

The election was extraordinarily close. After the polls closed, it looked throughout the night as though Roosevelt had lost, because Smith had failed to carry the state for President. On the next day it became clear that FDR was ahead in the governorship race by the small margin of 25,000 votes, or three-fifths of 1 per cent of the total. In other words, a change of three votes out of every thousand would have elected Ottinger. For Roosevelt this was a close call, for a defeat at this time would have been a major setback to his political career.

How did it happen that Roosevelt carried the state for governor when Smith lost it to Hoover in the presidential race? Smith had carried the state for governor in 1924 when Coolidge defeated Davis, but he found that it was harder for him to win votes in his home state as a candidate for President than it had been as a candidate for governor.

It was the voters who split their tickets who carried the day for Roosevelt. Who were these independent voters who marked their ballots for Hoover for President and for Roosevelt for governor? Were they Republicans who did not like Ottinger? Were they Democrats who did not care for Smith for President? Were they people who were not attracted by either of the major parties and voted for candidates they thought were best? Did Ottinger lose because some of those who voted for Hoover failed to vote for him? Was the Democratic party discipline greater than the Republican, thereby insuring that those who voted for Smith generally voted for Roosevelt also? It is not possible to answer all of these questions, but we can make some inferences on the basis of the available election statistics.

While there were 4,283,207 votes cast for President in the state, there were almost 50,000 fewer votes cast for governor. In the state as a whole Roosevelt received 40,000 more votes than Smith, but it was still possible that some who voted for Smith failed to vote for governor at all, since in New York City Smith ran 33,000 votes ahead of Roosevelt. It is more likely that some Republican voters marked their ballots for President and failed to do so for governor, since Hoover ran 89,000 votes ahead of Ottinger. We may conclude, then, that the Democratic voters were better disciplined than the Republican in that a higher ratio supported both the

party candidate for President and the party candidate for governor. Warren Moscow, in his *Politics of the Empire State,* also listed Hamilton Ward, Republican candidate for attorney general, as a factor.[13]

The figures show clearly that at least 73,000 voted for Hoover and Roosevelt, since Roosevelt received that many votes more than Smith in the upstate counties. It is probable that Roosevelt's speaking tour had something to do with this. In the medium-sized upstate counties his superiority was clearest. It was here that Roosevelt's advantage in percentage points over Smith was greater in the counties where he made speeches than in counties where he made no speeches.[14] It is also possible that some upstate Protestant Republican voters preferred to vote for a coreligionist for governor. In other words, some of these voters may have failed to vote for Ottinger because he was a Jew.

Roosevelt was elected by a combination of his own popularity and the unpopularity of his opponent. Catholics voted for Roosevelt because of his valiant defense of Governor Smith and his denunciation of religious intolerance. Jews supported him because they saw that he trusted their leaders and sought their advice. The Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor, Herbert Lehman, proved to be a tower of strength. Protestants favored Roosevelt because he was a prominent Episcopalian noted for his leadership in the financial drive for the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. Farmers voted for him because he seemed to understand their problems. Urban laborers supported him because he and his wife were sympathetic toward their aspirations. Roosevelt recognized where the votes were and demonstrated his ability to attract them. In 1928 he was a gallant and appealing figure who had not yet stirred up the critics who were later to denounce him so bitterly.

[13] New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.

[14] Calculations based upon official returns given in *New York Legislative Manual, 1929.*

XI

MY CUP RUNNETH OVER

THE 1928 returns were no sooner in than Franklin, Eleanor, and Louis began planning the next move. Franklin would soon be governor, but his margin of victory had not been impressive. The Lord had been with him was about all that could be said. Lady Luck had given him the crucial three-tenths of 1 per cent. The 1928 victory was clearly not good enough. One could not be sure of squeezing through with so small a margin again. Franklin had to demonstrate that he could win elections more handily than that. In America the spectators like a knock-out punch in politics as well as in boxing. Franklin began his training for the 1930 bout the minute that he knew he was elected governor on the morning after election day.

In spite of Al Smith's overwhelming defeat in the electoral college, Roosevelt had won a remarkable victory in New York. In other words, FDR, not Smith, was now the champion vote getter.

Actually, Smith's defeat was not overwhelming as far as the popular vote was concerned. The peculiar characteristics of the American electoral system merely made it look so. Smith had made a valiant fight and had paved the way for later party successes. His popular vote showed that he was a better candidate than Parker in 1904, Cox in 1920, and Davis in 1924.[1] The Democratic party was on the upgrade. It is true that Smith lost some of the states of the Solid South, but in the North, particularly in the northern cities, he did better than any Democratic candidate had

[1] Of the major party vote, Parker received 40.0 per cent, Cox, 36.1 per cent, Davis 34.8 per cent, and Smith 41.2 per cent.

done in the twentieth century. A new Democratic party was taking shape.

Roosevelt's success and Smith's failure advanced Howe's timetable as a President maker by four years. Nineteen thirty-two was the year to shoot at now, and the next step was to convince the voters of New York and other states that FDR was a great governor and a champion vote getter. Coming after Al Smith, this would be a difficult task. Had not Roosevelt himself said that Smith was the greatest governor that New York had ever had?

If Smith had been elected President, Roosevelt could have kept up the fiction that he was trying to follow in the footsteps of his great predecessor. But with Smith a defeated and frustrated candidate, nursing his wounded pride, hating to let go of the reins of state government, Roosevelt had to be careful. It would never do for Franklin to appear as a pale reflection of the great Al. He could not afford to let the people think that Smith was still pulling the strings of the state government. He had to stand on his own feet. As Eleanor Roosevelt put it, "One of Franklin's main qualities, which Governor Smith was apparently unaware of, was that he never assumed any responsibility that he did not intend to carry through." [2]

Thus it was inevitable that Smith and Roosevelt would drift apart. One of the first differences was over the position of Mrs. Belle Moskowitz in the new administration. She was a very capable woman and had been one of Governor Smith's closest advisers on matters relating to social legislation. Smith urged that she be appointed secretary to the governor. With her knowledge of state affairs and her dominating personality, this would have given Smith ready access to the new administration. Roosevelt refused to appoint her, and told Smith on the eve of the inauguration about his decision to select a man for the job. FDR wanted a man who could help him physically as well as administratively; he did not want a strong-willed woman whose loyalty had been devoted for ten years to Smith.[3]

At the inaugural the spotlight was still on Al Smith, who gave his valedictory as governor. Roosevelt in his address for the occasion referred

[2] *This I Remember*, p. 51.
[3] Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew*, pp. 52–53.

in glowing terms to his predecessor and expressed the hope that he would not fail the citizens in the critical period they faced. His reference to a "critical period" seemed almost clairvoyant.

In his inaugural speech he outlined a press policy which he was soon to put into effect:

I want to call particularly on the public press of this State in whose high standards I have the greatest confidence, to devote more space to the explanation and consideration of such legislation as may come up this year, for no matter how willing the individual citizen may be to support wise and progressive measures, it is only through the press, and I mean not only our great dailies but their smaller sisters in the rural districts, that our electorate can learn and understand what is going on.[4]

The new governor also outlined the wily public-relations policy he planned to follow. Realizing that he faced a Republican Legislature, as had Smith, he knew that he had to secure Republican cooperation in order to carry out his campaign promises. He said:

There is a period in our history known in all our school books as the "Era of Good Feeling." It is my hope that we stand on the threshold of another such era in this State. For my part, I pledge that the business of the State will not be allowed to become involved in partisan politics and that I shall not attempt to claim unfair advantage for my party or for myself, for the accomplishment of those things on which we are all agreed.[5]

The new governor's era of good feeling never materialized. He very soon had a head-on clash with the Republicans in the Legislature on the question of the interpretation of the new constitutional amendment regarding the executive budget. The amendment gave to the governor the power to prepare the budget estimates and left to the Legislature the power to approve or disapprove those estimates or to add items of their own which were then subject to the governor's veto. The Republicans in the Legislature decided to test the new procedure and the new governor. They deliberately butchered the governor's budget proposals and amended them so as to make the budget a legislative rather than an executive budget. They assumed that they still had the administrative power

[4] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1928–1932*, p. 77.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

to segregate items. This was a clear challenge to the governor's powers under the Constitution, but the question was so entangled that the public was confused. Governor Roosevelt wanted harmony, but not at the price of the newly won powers of the governor. The Republican legislators soon discovered that the new governor, who appeared so amiable, was also a fighter with a devastating punch. It took his opponents a long time to learn to keep out of the way of that punch.

Governor Roosevelt sent a message to the Legislature warning that he regarded the actions of the body as unconstitutional, and the legislators responded in a tone that was to be familiar later on. They said:

> The very foundation of the state is in danger with this message of avarice, usurpation and presumption. . . . It is our duty to say that the rights of the people must be preserved from the arrogance and presumption of an overzealous executive . . . audacity and insult . . . sinister.[6]

The legislators ignored the governor's warning and passed the budget bill in the form that he felt was unconstitutional. Governor Roosevelt thereupon vetoed the $56,000,000 in lump sums on which the controversy turned. At the same time he went on the air in the first of a long series of radio "reports to the people." His opponents came to fear and respect those "reports." In simple language he made clear to the voters his side of the dispute. Here was the beginning of what later became the famous fireside chats.

When the Legislature repassed the controversial items in the same objectionable form, he took the issue to the courts. There he won a sweeping victory on all counts.[7] It took time to do so, but by the end of 1929 it was clear that Roosevelt was a governor who would fight for his prerogatives and whom it would be risky to challenge on points of constitutional law.

Aside from the executive budget issue there were no dramatic battles between the governor and his Republican opposition during the first year of his administration. This does not mean that the governor lost any opportunities to publicize his policies and his personality. In accordance

[6] Ernest K. Lindley, *Franklin D. Roosevelt,* p. 246.

[7] A. E. Buck, "The Budget Fight in New York State" (1929), *National Municipal Review,* XVIII, 352–354 (May).

with his inaugural address he established a news bureau which served the country weeklies as well as the metropolitan dailies. When prison riots brought to the attention of the public the unsatisfactory condition of state institutions, he undertook an extensive tour of these institutions, using the states' inland waterways. On these "non-partisan" tours of inspection his wife accompanied him, and by his questions he taught her what to look for in a detailed inspection of grounds which his own disability made it difficult for him to make.[8] The governor himself lost no opportunity to make a speech or extend a friendly greeting. In these tours he set a record for travel and local appearances. He was demonstrating the falsity of the health issue which had been raised against him in 1928.

In his messages to the Legislature, his press conferences, his radio talks, and in his speeches, the governor emphasized the need for relief for the farmer. A gentleman farmer himself, he appreciated the problems facing American farmers in the so-called "prosperous twenties." After World War I farm prices dropped, and the farmers did not generally share in the economic prosperity which came to the city dwellers. With increasing tax burdens and higher transportation and distribution costs, the farmers were losing out in the battle for a higher standard of living. Governor Roosevelt urged legislation which would lighten the tax burden placed upon the farmers, and the Republican legislators did not dare oppose such a move. The governor, then, appeared as the champion of the farmers.

During his second year as governor, Roosevelt attracted attention as the advocate of cheap electricity for the consumer, more stringent regulation of utilities on behalf of the consumer, laws safeguarding the interests of organized labor, the reform of the administration of criminal justice, and more adequate methods for the relief of unemployment. The stock-market crash of November, 1929, brought a new series of problems to American state and national governments. New York, the home of Wall Street, was affected first. While the state governments lacked the financial resources to meet the demands which the depression imposed upon them, they could go part way, and Governor Roosevelt took the lead in urging his state to assume its share of the burdens

[8] *This I Remember*, pp. 55–56.

imposed upon the public authorities by the widespread suffering which accompanied the depression. Elected in 1928 on an economy platform, he indicated that he would not economize at the expense of human misery. The state budget for public works was increased in 1930, and steps were taken to expedite the expenditures in order to furnish employment.

As the 1930 gubernatorial campaign approached, it became apparent that the Republicans were not going to make water power, farm relief, unemployment relief, or the state administration the issues, but were going to concentrate on Prohibition and Tammany Hall corruption, which loomed important even though the economic crisis was deepening. The Republican leaders made what was for them an unfortunate choice of issues, since the stand they took was not calculated to get out the maximum Republican vote upstate or to cause the defection of many Democrats in the urban centers. While there was a state enforcement act, Prohibition was largely a national and a local issue, not a state issue. With its large urban population, New York State was opposed to the Prohibition Amendment, but the upstate Republican strongholds were dry. With regard to corruption in the city governments, any Democratic governor would be concerned, but he could hardly be held responsible; and the Democratic city organizations under fire could hardly afford to desert a Democratic candidate for governor no matter how independent he might be.

United States Attorney Charles Tuttle was the leading contender for the Republican nomination for governor, and he concentrated on the Prohibition and corruption issues. Flattered by the attention which he received in the metropolitan press by his stand, he put on a strenuous preconvention campaign and won the nomination. He disappointed the drys, and the convention threw a sop to these elements in the nomination for lieutenant governor.

While the wet sentiment in New York State was strong, it had not been powerful enough to carry the state for Smith in 1928. In presidential years the upstate dry vote came out in full force. In nonpresidential elections the dry vote was harder to bring to the polls. Ignoring this characteristic of the Republican vote, Tuttle came out firmly for the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment. There was a growing wet faction in the Republican party, and he hoped to swell this element. He had

BY PEASE IN NEWARK *EVENING NEWS*, JAN. 2, 1934.

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perhaps been misled by the splendid reception his opposition to Mrs. Willebrandt's high-handed methods of enforcement had been given in the New York press. Typical of the upstate dry Republican press, however, was the following from the Watertown *Daily Times:*

> We cannot see how he can hope to be elected after his statement. He has taken the bait which Mr. Roosevelt and the Democratic politicians handed out to him when they planned the Roosevelt statement. He has gone with the Wet Democratic party, when he must appeal to the dry upstate to elect him.[9]

Governor Roosevelt had supported the Democratic platform of 1928, pledged to the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment, but he had not gone out of his way to offend the drys. His wife, a member of the Democratic State Committee, was a known dry, and the Roosevelt household had a reputation for conforming to the Eighteenth Amendment.[10] Roosevelt was thus not too objectionable to the drys.

On September 10, 1930, Governor Roosevelt set forth his views on Prohibition in an open letter to United States Senator Robert F. Wagner, advocating the substitution of a new Amendment to the Constitution, restoring "control over intoxicants to the several states." [11] This stand was heartily endorsed by prominent Democrats, including National Chairman John J. Raskob and Alfred E. Smith. The statement made Tuttle's efforts to attract the wet vote seem feeble.

The corruption issue put Governor Roosevelt in a difficult position, but it did not gain many votes for the Republicans. As the leader of the Democratic party in the state, Roosevelt had to get along with the Democratic organization leaders in New York City, where nearly two-thirds of the Democratic voters in the state were located. On the other hand, as governor he could not countenance corruption no matter where it was found, and under the state Constitution he could remove local officials for cause. If Roosevelt wanted to be renominated for governor, he had to win the votes of the delegates from Greater New York, and

[9] Richard W. Lawrence, Jr., *The New York State Gubernatorial Campaign of 1930* (New York, privately printed, 1932), p. 10.

[10] Don Wharton, ed., *The Roosevelt Omnibus* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1934), p. 134.

[11] Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

if he wished to be reelected he had to show the upstate voters that he was independent of Tammany Hall. In other words, the governor had to balance on a fence. If he leaned too far in one direction or the other, he might fall off.

The stock-market crash was a factor in bringing to light corruption among New York City officials. Bankruptcy proceedings brought the affairs of defunct concerns to the attention of the United States district attorney and the state attorney general, both of whom were Republicans. The revelations regarding graft in the magistrates' courts began in a Federal investigation of a suspected stock-swindling scheme. The failure of the Tammany district attorney to act in the case made it necessary for Governor Roosevelt to request the Republican attorney general to intervene.

In still another way the economic crisis increased the moral deterioration of Tammany Hall. The terrific competition for jobs as unemployment increased heightened the pressure on the patronage distribution system. This was accompanied by a weakening of the central leadership of Tammany Hall. Since the death of Charles F. Murphy in 1924, no Tammany leader had arisen who could exercise the same control over the organization. As a result, some of the district leaders auctioned off prize political plums to the highest bidder.

In the investigations of corruption, the New York Democratic organization dragged its feet and thus left a bad impression. The leader of Tammany Hall, John F. Curry, was called before the Grand Jury in one of the magistrates' cases and he refused to waive immunity preliminary to being asked to testify. After this example all the Manhattan district leaders, the majority of whom held city offices, followed suit. The metropolitan press soon pointed out that this stand was an enormous blunder.

These events gave Governor Roosevelt the opening that he was looking for. In a letter to Mayor Walker Governor Roosevelt demanded "That the pleading of immunity by public officers in regard to public acts shall cease." [12] Apparently this letter had been discussed with the Democratic leaders, for Mr. Curry put the pressure on them to support the entire state ticket, including Roosevelt, for renomination. Public officeholders

[12] Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

had to sign the waivers of immunity indicated. It is to be noted that the governor did not demand that these public officials sign waivers of immunity with reference to all acts that they might have committed. The immunity waiver was restricted to public acts. Thus the governor found a formula which permitted him to come out on top of a difficult situation. He appeared as the advocate of the investigations of corruption and at the same time held the support of the Tammany organization.

Long before the Democratic State Convention, Governor Roosevelt wrote to Lieutenant Governor Lehman about accepting renomination:

> You and I both have the same kind of sense of obligation about going through with a task once undertaken and, frankly, the only reason either of us would run again is that sense of obligation to a great many million people who may insist that we shall try to carry on the work for another two years.
>
> And in the long run I am inclined to think that you and I would be more useful for the next two years in our present positions than if we were to return to our own private interests and private life.[13]

Governor Roosevelt and the Democratic state incumbents were all renominated by the Democratic State Convention. For the post of attorney general, which was currently held by a Republican, the convention nominated John J. Bennett, former state head of the American Legion and a political protégé of John W. McCooey, leader of the Brooklyn Democratic organization.

The chairman of the convention was John W. Davis, the Democratic nominee for President in 1924. In a vigorous speech he taunted the Republicans regarding their former claims as the bearers of prosperity: "What is it that has come over the spirit of these once boastful warriors? What is it but the base desertion of an ally who more than once in a pinch has come to their unexpected relief. 'The Full Dinner Pail,' 'Stand Pat,' 'Let Well Enough Alone,' these and similar catch words have served our Republican friends in lieu of an argument in more than one desperate emergency." [14]

Senator Wagner, the keynote speaker, condemned as inadequate the

[13] Private Correspondence, Box 102, FDR to Herbert Lehman, May 14, 1930, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[14] Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

measures taken by the Hoover Administration to meet the problems of the depression.

The climax of the convention was the nomination speech by former Governor Smith. While Al and Franklin had been drifting apart, Al was still proud of his successor in the office of governor. Franklin was his choice, and the young man was making good. Of course, Frank would be doing better if he had relied more heavily upon Al's advice, but he was doing pretty well by himself.

The former governor was in good form. At will, he could produce laughter or applause from the delighted delegates and spectators. He denounced as false and misleading the various charges which the Republicans were making against the Democrats in the state. In conclusion, he said:

> In all my experience, no man has accomplished more in the office he occupied than has Franklin D. Roosevelt. He has a clear brain and a big heart. For humanity, the love and devotion he has shown the poor, the sick and the afflicted, Almighty God has showered down on his head the choicest graces and His choicest blessings.[15]

After the Democratic convention the journalists expressed the opinion that Governor Roosevelt faced a hard fight. Some Democratic organization leaders were quoted as saying that the graft investigations in New York would reduce the normal Democratic plurality in that area. Governor Roosevelt, they thought, would not win by as wide a margin as had Al Smith in nonpresidential election years. Other Democratic leaders were more optimistic. They pointed out that Tammany Hall would be fighting against the wall and that the Tiger would be vicious. The Hall would get out a big vote in order to avoid the catastrophe of a Republican gubernatorial victory at this juncture. John F. Curry, the Boss of Tammany Hall, was quoted as estimating that the governor would be reelected by at least a 100,000 plurality.

But Lady Luck was with the governor, and the Boss of Tammany Hall proved to be a bad predictor. A split occurred in the Republican ranks upstate on the wet and dry issue. Tuttle, in his flirting with the New

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

York City wets, had alienated the fanatical upstate drys. These drys, banding together in indignation, put up an independent candidate of their own, Professor Robert P. Carroll, of Syracuse. Tuttle's goose was cooked. It was fine for Tuttle to swell with pride when he read the praise of the metropolitan press about his liberal stand on Prohibition, but those editorials would not do him any good upstate with the Protestant, rural, or small-town drys whose zeal against Demon Rum was whipped up by such organizations as the Anti-Saloon League, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, The New York Civic League, the Women's Committee for Law Enforcement, the Prohibition Education League, and the many local Protestant churches. The most extreme drys would vote for Carroll or stay at home.

Tuttle and the Republican leaders were alarmed at the revolt, and determined to do all they could to counteract it. Tuttle made a strenuous speaking tour upstate, endeavoring to hold as many of the drys as possible, but his efforts were of little avail. The drys were never satisfied with explanations. They wanted fanatical and wholehearted support of their position. There could be no compromises with the Devil.

The development of the graft investigations put the governor in an uncomfortable position and seemed to furnish the Republicans with excellent campaign material. If the governor alienated Tammany's support and failed to be reelected, his political future would be dark indeed. But if he seemed to be subservient to Tammany and won by the grace of Tammany's support, he would lose potential strength as a national figure. It would be idle to deny that Louis Howe and the governor were looking ahead toward the Democratic National Convention of 1932. Howe's every waking moment was concentrated on reaching the goal in 1932.

The campaign developed into a match of wits. Tuttle hammered away at Tammany corruption and charged Governor Roosevelt with having failed to take the proper steps to bring the culprits to justice. He also charged Roosevelt with delaying the public works spending in a time of unemployment and with the responsibility for the conditions which led to the prison riots. The governor made no reply at first, but later he showed dramatically that Tuttle had been misinformed regarding public works spending and the prison conditions. As for the corruption issue, Tuttle was not able to make all the charges stick, and many upstate voters

became bored with the hackneyed story regarding Tammany's wickedness. Roosevelt, on his part, goaded Tuttle into repeating his Prohibition position. Every time Tuttle discussed the issue upstate, he lost votes.

A contemporary account indicated that as a campaigner Tuttle was no match for Roosevelt. His manner was not calculated to stir an audience to a high pitch of enthusiasm. His seeming ignorance of state affairs showed a lack of proper campaign staff work.

Registration of voters in the state was held on varying dates and was complete by the middle of October. The figures showed a greater falling off of the number of voters upstate than in New York City. This was an ominous sign for the Republicans. Tammany Hall had its normal number of voters on the books for a nonpresidential year, but the Republicans upstate did not.

The Democratic leaders at once became more confident. The election would not be close. Roosevelt would win by a landslide, not perhaps by a margin as large as Al Smith used to win, but nevertheless by a good comfortable margin, perhaps 200,000 votes.

The governor, who until this time had limited himself to a few "nonpolitical" radio addresses, reports to the people, press conferences, and the making of a Movietone short on the duties of the governor, now went into action. When the big guns from the Roosevelt ship went into action, Tuttle did not know what had hit him. The governor had the facts, and he knew how to use ridicule, humor, pathos, righteous indignation, and a natural friendliness in his battle to win votes. During the first part of the campaign, he ignored Tuttle's charges and waged the campaign on ground of his own choosing. Water power, labor legislation, prisons, hospitals, farm relief, power and utility regulations were the state issues that he selected to discuss. What did the Republicans have to offer on these questions?

In this campaign FDR was aided by Al Smith. With a New York City crowd, Al had no equal. He was one of the boys who had made good. The new governor was fine, but after all he was not one of the crowd. Hyde Park, the social élite of New York, the Wilson crowd in the nation at large, and foreign notables were all right for window dressing and for picking up votes in rural, small-town, Protestant upstate New York, but for the East Side and the West Side the gentleman with the brown

derby and the Manhattan accent had no equal. The combination of Al and Franklin in the State of New York was a hard one to beat when it came to a gubernatorial election.

Tuttle was game until the end, but he must have felt groggy after Al and Frank began to work him over. He appealed to Washington for help, and the Republican national leaders sent him Secretary of State Stimson, Secretary of War Hurley, and Undersecretary of the Treasury Ogden L. Mills. President Hoover, in accordance with the traditions of American politics, kept silent, but looking ahead to 1932 he must have longed to do something to eliminate or retard the growth of the new political figure looming in New York.

Toward the end of the campaign, Governor Roosevelt came to New York City and deigned to answer the charges that he had been lax in pushing the investigations of corruption. His pledge to act forcefully, without regard to party, whenever evidence of corruption was presented to him, was warmly received:

> Their campaign, on the other hand, has been based, first, last and all the time, on a falsification of the record and on attacks instigated not by any desire for good government or for progressive legislation or administration, but solely on ambition for office. . . .
>
> If there are corrupt judges still sitting in our courts they shall be removed. They shall be removed by constitutional means, not by inquisition; not by trial in the press, but by trial as provided by law. . . .
>
> Now we have come to the close of the campaign. I ask the electorate of the State of New York for their support. I ask this as a rebuke to those Republican national and State leaders who, substituting false charges and deliberate misrepresentation, have had the cowardice to ignore the great problems and issues before the whole State.
>
> I ask this as an expression of confidence in my administration, as an expression of confidence in the record of these past two years, and of the need, during the next two years, for a continuance of forward-looking, human and honest administration of the affairs of our State.[16]

Hopelessly split, outgunned, outmaneuvered, the Republicans in New York State went down to defeat. The election forecasters were put to

[16] State of New York, *Public Papers of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1930*, pp. 831, 837.

shame. Governor Roosevelt's plurality was, not 25,000, not 100,000, not 200,000, but 700,000, or twice as much as the great Al had ever obtained. The cripple who had squeaked through the battle of 1928 with only a tiny margin to spare had shown that he had a harder punch than his distinguished predecessor. Louis Howe must have rubbed his hands with glee, for the dream that he had been having for twenty years was coming true.

Imagine the emotion of Howe when he picked up his New York *Times* for November 5, 1930, and read the following editorial:

TRUSTY AND WELL APPROVED

Several causes concurred in bringing about the election of Governor Roosevelt by so overwhelming a majority. The hard times must have helped them in the voting, as they did other Democratic candidates. Then, there was a split in the Republican Party, with its drys either rallying under a separate banner, or refusing to vote at all. The feeling in the air, as it were, that this was a Democratic year, must also have aided the most outstanding of Democratic governors. But, beyond and above all these influences stood the character and record of Franklin D. Roosevelt himself. The election was a tribute to the intelligence and discrimination of the electors of the State of New York. Show them a real man and they will rise to him! [17]

How had the governor done it? Expert timing, a well oiled organization in the small towns and rural areas as well as in the metropolitan centers, a competent campaign information bureau, a well developed strategy—all these elements played their part. Roosevelt ran well ahead of the Democratic vote for assembly upstate. His cultivation of the rural areas brought results. His team of advisers, Howe and Rosenman, demonstrated its worth.

A plurality is based on four factors: (1) bringing the maximum number of loyal supporters to the polls (activation); (2) winning new or undecided voters (attraction); (3) causing the defection of opposition voters (conversion); and (4) keeping opposition voters at home (reduction). The Roosevelt campaign was calculated to make the most of each of these ways of building a plurality.

The Republican split on the Prohibition issue furnished a wonderful opportunity to cause the defection of Republican wets and to dishearten

[17] Reprinted in Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

the Republican drys. Professor Carroll obtained nearly 200,000 votes. In addition, Roosevelt's plurality was swelled by the ardent drys who stayed at home. The Republican vote upstate was smaller than it had been in years.

The corruption issue was dealt with skillfully by the governor. Fraught with danger, it was used to activate loyal Democrats. Roosevelt may have seemed overanxious to protect the legal rights of fellow Democrats who were under fire, but he could hardly be expected to behave like a Republican in these matters. From a lawyer's point of view, he had been correct. Charges must be proved. Tammany politicians in trouble could expect a fair deal in accordance with Anglo-Saxon rules of justice. If it could be proved that they were guilty of wrongdoing, the governor would not save them. He had to think of his reputation outside New York City. Under any circumstances the governor was a better bet for the New York City Democrats than any Republican would be. Tammany Hall had every reason to bring out the full Democratic vote.

Upstate the governor did better than Al had ever done. His cultivation of the farm vote, the upstate labor vote, and the small-town vote paid off. He carried counties which no Democratic candidate for governor had won since the Civil War. The citizens of New York State looked at the record and they found it inspiring. They were proud of the gallant native son who, consigned to political oblivion as a hopeless invalid, made good as governor.

XII

THE 1932 CHICAGO CONVENTION

They can conquer who believe they can.
—DRYDEN

THROUGHOUT the United States the press proclaimed Governor Roosevelt as the most probable Democratic candidate for President in 1932. This was a hindrance as well as a help in securing the nomination, since it attracted the fire of the opposition. Roosevelt became the man that all other aspirants had to beat.

Every day the Democratic chances of winning the Presidency seemed improved, and this made the nomination more and more desirable. Economic conditions worsened, and the Hoover Administration appeared more and more incompetent to deal with the problems involved. In addition Hoover faced a divided Congress, for the election which had given Governor Roosevelt his tremendous plurality had produced a Democratic House of Representatives. The unemployed, the farmers facing foreclosures or other hardships, the small businessmen facing financial ruin, and the unfortunates everywhere looked for new leadership.

The Roosevelt forces lost no time starting their campaign for the control of the Democratic National Convention which would meet in 1932. The governor's interests were in the hands of a small group which included Louis Howe, Edward J. Flynn, James Farley, Samuel Rosenman, and Raymond Moley. Since all of these men devoted considerable thought, time, and energy to the preconvention campaign, the role of each will be considered briefly.

It was to be expected that Howe would be hovering around his star. The chances of Howe's becoming a President maker, which looked pretty slim in the twenties, were becoming brighter every day.

Edward J. Flynn was Roosevelt's link with the Democratic organization in New York City. Flynn was the leader of the Bronx, and he had a reputation for running one of the cleanest party organizations in the city. Once in a while one of his henchmen would get into trouble, but in general his organization came through the various investigations with flying colors. As Secretary of State of New York, Flynn was in a position to give Roosevelt advice on political matters. The duties of the office were such that he had time for political and advisory activities. Over the years Flynn did well in choosing winning candidates. He was one of the group that chose Jimmy Walker to replace Hylan as mayor, and he stuck by Roosevelt in the spring of 1932, when that was not the popular thing for an organization leader to do in New York City.

James Farley, born and reared at Grassy Point, a small town in Rockland County on the west bank of the Hudson not far from Greater New York, was discovered and used by Governor Smith at the famous Democratic party convention of 1922 in Rochester. The governor found him to be an able, affable, and diligent party organizer and convention negotiator. After Roosevelt became governor and Smith retired to private life, Big Jim Farley made his talents available to the new governor. Upon serving as secretary of the Democratic State Committee for two years, he was made chairman in September, 1930. In this capacity, and as an Exalted Ruler of the Order of Elks, he held conversations with Democratic leaders all over the United States. He reported that everywhere the name of Roosevelt worked like magic.

While Flynn and Farley worked on party organizational matters, Sam Rosenman, counsel to the governor since 1929, advised on policy matters and worked on the various drafts of the governor's speeches. Rosenman proved to be the most lasting of all Roosevelt's advisers. Howe died in 1936. Moley fell from grace early in the New Deal. Farley broke with Roosevelt in 1940. While Moley made the bald assertion that the faithful Sam was of greatest assistance in state business but that he did not know much about national affairs, it was Rosenman who in 1945 was still advising Roosevelt about national administration, political affairs

and complicated international relations.[1] "Sammy, the Rose," was the architect of more of FDR's speeches and public papers than anyone else, and it was natural for the Boss to delegate to him the editing of his papers.

It was not until 1932 that Professor Raymond Moley of Columbia University became an important member of the Roosevelt entourage. Moley was a political scientist who had specialized on the subject of politics and administration, with particular reference to the administration of criminal justice. The governor called upon him to make a survey of criminal justice in New York, and was pleased with what Moley did. As Moley proudly relates, he made his peace both with Howe and with Rosenman, and when the governor asked him to form a small policy research group he jumped at the chance. In this way the famous "brain trust" was formed. Originally prominent in the somewhat fluid group were Rosenman, Hugh S. Johnson, and Professors Adolf Berle and Rexford Tugwell. The last two were colleagues of Moley at Columbia University. This group, to which experts would be added as the occasion arose, assisted Roosevelt in the preparation of his campaign speeches and policy statements throughout 1932.

The governor himself was of course the master mind of the group. He had had more political experience than any of them, and he had developed a fine sense of political timing. He might want help in fact finding for a speech or on a rough first draft, but the final draft he made his own. FDR had to make a record as governor which would attract votes. He could not seem to neglect his gubernatorial duties in his struggle to win a greater political prize. The Seabury investigation of corruption in the city of New York continued to raise problems, as it had during the 1930 gubernatorial election, but now these problems were more acute. Roosevelt might need Tammany Hall support for the Democratic nomination. In trying to get that support he could not appear to favor Tammany or he would lose support outside the state. In meeting this difficult situation, he showed great political finesse. Mayor Walker was given a fair hearing on the charges brought against him, and after putting up a fight resigned on September 1, 1932.

Between November, 1930, and July 2, 1932, when he was nominated

[1] Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years*, p. 6.

for President by the Democrats, FDR made about sixty public addresses. While most of these were in his own state, others were given in such widely scattered states as Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, Virginia, Minnesota, Ohio, and Indiana. Many of his addresses were broadcast over the radio and reached large audiences in other states. He touched upon unemployment, monopolies, the power trust, the limitation of farm production, and banking reform.

In order to win the nomination, Roosevelt and his friends had to secure the support of two-thirds of the delegates to the Democratic National Convention to be held in June in Chicago. The delegates would be chosen directly or indirectly by the Democratic voters, depending upon the primary law of the state.

The presidential preference primary system in operation in 1932 depended upon state laws, and it did not provide for a testing of the strength of the different candidates on a national basis.[2] In general, a candidate would enter a primary race only in those states where he thought he had a good chance of winning the delegation. It was good policy for a national candidate to keep out of states where favorite sons had strong organization backing.

From the beginning of 1931 the Roosevelt forces did everything in their power to convince Democratic organization leaders throughout the country that Roosevelt was the leading contender for the Democratic nomination for President in 1932. First in the field, they seized every opportunity to build up the myth that Roosevelt "had it in the bag." In this they were aided by the Straus polls, which showed FDR far ahead of any other aspirant.[3] Jesse I. Straus conducted a mail canvass of leadership opinion, polling the delegates and alternates to the 1928 Democratic Convention and then polling selected groups listed in *Who's Who in America*. These and other polls so impressed one congressman that he said, "Nine out of ten men in nine out of ten states are for Roosevelt, and he will be the Democratic choice." [4]

Of the various rivals for the nomination, the Roosevelt forces had most

[2] C. E. Merriam and L. Overacker, *Primary Elections* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1928).

[3] Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, *The 1932 Campaign: An Analysis* (New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1935), p. 60.

[4] Representative Edgar Howard, Nebraska, *Congressional Record,* Jan. 4, 1932.

to fear from Al Smith. Al still had a wide following in the northeastern cities of the United States; in addition he had an important grip on the Democratic National Committee, for its chairman was still John J. Raskob, his personal appointee. If Smith sought the nomination for himself, he would probably win most of the New York delegates and he would be strong in the nearby states. If the Smith forces obtained a third of the delegates, they could block Roosevelt's nomination as they had McAdoo's in 1924. Furthermore, if Smith entered the race he would encourage favorite sons to file in the primaries and, together with Smith, they might stop the Roosevelt boom.

It has already been pointed out that immediately following the 1928 election the friendship between Al and Franklin began to cool off. During the 1930 campaign Al had been a good soldier, but after November, 1930, the atmosphere between the two men became chillier and chillier. It was bad enough for Frank to surpass Al by a small margin in 1928, but in 1930 he smashed all of Al's records and made a new one for himself upstate. Al could not help feeling eclipsed.

On June 2, 1931, Governor Roosevelt made a speech on farm problems under the title "Acres Fit and Unfit" before the Governor's Conference at French Lick, Indiana, a popular resort for politicians. During the course of the speech he said:

> Two-and-a-half years ago the State Administration realizing that the maladjustment of the relationship between rural and city life had reached alarming proportions undertook a study of the agricultural situation with the immediate purpose of relieving impossible and unfair economic conditions on the farms of the State, but with the broader ultimate purpose of formulating a well thought out and scientific plan for developing a permanent agriculture.[5]

This passage contains an implied criticism of Al Smith. It says, in effect, that it was Roosevelt, not Smith, who realized the magnitude of the agricultural problem. It is easy to imagine that some friend of Al's commented on it and thus started a rumor that FDR had said that Al was a poor governor.[6]

Someone who wanted to stir up trouble between the two men could

[5] State of New York, *Public Papers of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1931*, p. 735.
[6] Peel and Donnelly, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

easily have taken the next step. The rumor was circulated that Smith had called Roosevelt a "crackpot."[7] Smith frequently used the word, and it would be easy for someone to say that he had pinned that label on FDR.

Another Smith-Roosevelt difference concerned the priority to be given Prohibition as an issue. Smith and his national chairman, John J. Raskob, attempted in March, 1931, to make Prohibition the paramount issue. The Roosevelt forces on the Democratic National Committee successfully opposed this, preferring to stress economic issues.

An open break came in October, 1931, when Smith opposed the Adirondack reforestation amendment sponsored by Governor Roosevelt. The governor gave an extended radio talk on the amendment urging the voters to support it. Reforestation was a theme in the French Lick speech.

The rivalry between Al and Frank became an open declaration of war in April, 1932. Governor Roosevelt had announced his candidacy on January 23, 1932, and Smith his on February 6. FDR made his famous "forgotten man" speech on April 7 over a national radio hookup in which he discussed the objectives of a national program of restoration.[8] At the Jefferson Day celebration Smith released the following to the press:

> I will take off my coat and vest and fight to the end any candidate who persists in any demagogic appeal to the masses of the working people of this country to destroy themselves by setting class against class and rich against poor.[9]

Imagine FDR's feelings when he read this statement. FDR, who had done all that was humanly possible for him to do in helping Al win the Democratic nomination for President in 1928, now found himself the butt of the kind of attack which Smith was once so eloquent in denouncing. His old friend, who clearly had no chance of winning the nomination for himself, was out to avenge some imagined slight. That was gratitude for you. If Franklin was resentful, he never showed it publicly. His conquest of disease had brought him great patience and long-suffering.

Smith's statement was self-revealing. As Unofficial Observer re-

[7] Peel and Donnelly, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
[8] State of New York, *Public Papers of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1932*, p. 572.
[9] Peel and Donnelly, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

marked: "The truth is that Al never had any quarrel with Big Business. He was a humanitarian but a conservative." [10] At one time Smith used language just as far to the left as Roosevelt's.[11] There was a time when Smith bitterly resented being called a "Socialist." The implications of what Smith said about Roosevelt were most unfair. FDR in his long political career never preached class welfare, and he had not done so on April 7.

The challenge had been issued. The duel was on. "Hit him again, Al," said a Republican Representative from Kansas. The two men indicated that they would run in those presidential preference primaries where they thought such action would help them win delegates.

In only seven states that spring did the forces of the two leading contenders meet in open battle: New Hampshire, Wisconsin, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, California, and Alabama. Favorite sons appeared in the following six states: Oklahoma, Missouri, Maryland, Illinois, Ohio, and Texas. Only in Texas was there a serious contender. Speaker John Nance Garner of Texas was sponsored by the Hearst papers and by Senator McAdoo in California. The Roosevelt forces conceded to Smith in just two states, New Jersey and Connecticut. The Smith forces, on the other hand, conceded the thirty-three remaining states to Roosevelt. This action on the part of the Smith leaders made it quite clear that their campaign was a "Stop Roosevelt Campaign," not a "Nominate Smith campaign."

The first round came in the New Hampshire primary of March 6. Roosevelt won easily and gave the Smith forces a severe jolt. FDR ran particularly well in the small towns and rural areas. For the state as a whole he won 60 per cent of the total Democratic primary vote, which was light in that Republican stronghold.

Round two of April 5th had to be fought in the Wisconsin and New York primaries, which were held on the same day. The Wisconsin battle clearly went to Roosevelt, but the result was mixed in New York. Tammany Hall still regarded Al Smith as its leader. Governor Roosevelt won only a third of the delegates, all of whom were from upstate except the

[10] Unofficial Observer, *The New Dealers*, p. 372. See also Walter Lippmann, *Men of Destiny* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927).

[11] Oswald Garrison Villard, *Prophets: True and False* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 10.

Bronx delegation led by Secretary of State Edward Flynn. It was a bitter blow not to control his own state delegation, but in the end it worked out for the best. *No one could accuse Roosevelt of trying to appease Tammany.* As for Boss Curry and his Tammany braves, they were cutting their own political throats. They lived to rue the day they followed Smith when they could have belonged to the Roosevelt-before-Chicago club.

The third round was staged for April 24th in Massachusetts. Roosevelt's managers made a serious mistake in entering their candidate in this primary. The Smith forces had the support of the dominant state Democratic organization. Just as in 1914, Roosevelt found that the defeat of a powerful organization in a primary election required heroic efforts. Running the state government and a campaign in forty-seven other states did not leave FDR the time or energy he needed to put into an uphill fight in Massachusetts. Smith won the delegates by a three to one vote, and the Roosevelt campaign was given a severe setback. If Roosevelt had not entered the fight at all in Massachusetts, he would have been much better off.

Two days later the two rivals tested their strength in Pennsylvania. This round went to Roosevelt. The margin, however, was not as large as he had expected. Smith did well in the urban wet areas of the state. Roosevelt won the preference vote and nearly all the delegates at large. Smith obtained almost two-fifths of the delegates.

The next round was staged in California and Alabama on May 3rd. While Roosevelt did better than Smith in both of these primaries, Speaker Garner won in California, with Roosevelt second and Smith third. Roosevelt won the Alabama delegations with ease.

Thus out of the seven state presidential primary contests where the two men were pitted against each other, Roosevelt clearly won four—New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Alabama. Smith won two—New York and Massachusetts. Roosevelt outran Smith in California, but both of them were behind Garner. Roosevelt's victories were widely scattered and showed strength all over the United States. Smith's support was concentrated near his home bailiwick and showed clearly that Smith himself had no chance for the nomination in 1932.

Elsewhere in the United States the Roosevelt preconvention campaign was proceeding according to schedule. Senator Alben Barkley, who had

been contemplating running as a favorite son in his home state of Kentucky, withdrew his candidacy and the state came out for Roosevelt. Altogether FDR won thirty-four states and six territories. The territories, with no voice in the final election, are bound to reflect bandwagon sentiment. In Louisiana and Minnesota there were contested delegations. In Minnesota clashes between Roosevelt and Smith supporters split the Democratic State Convention, and as a result divided delegations were sent to the national convention. In Louisiana there were Long and anti-Long delegates. Senator Huey Long was in the process of consolidating his power, and the Long delegates were up for the highest bidder. The favorite sons still might make trouble. Roosevelt had kept out of these states, and Farley was engaged in continuous negotiations with the favorite sons and their managers. By the time that the primaries were over, the Roosevelt forces had a clear majority but not a two-thirds' majority.

The desperate struggle for the nomination continued. Some of the most strenuous infighting was yet to come. "There is many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip." Did not Champ Clark have a majority in the early balloting in 1912? Did not McAdoo nearly get a majority in 1924 and still fail to win the nomination? The Roosevelt and the anti-Roosevelt forces prepared for the battle which must result in victory for one and defeat for the other.

To the saying "All is fair in love and war" should be added "and in an American national nominating convention." Between the contending political factions it was war. It was a contest for high stakes with no holds barred.

The Smith supporters had tons of good black ink with which they tried to belittle Roosevelt's reputation. Boss Hague of Jersey City declared publicly on June 23rd that the New York governor was the weakest of all the Democratic candidates and was certain of defeat in November if nominated. Of a more subtle sort were the devastating conclusions arrived at by Hamilton A. Long in his propaganda pamphlet *Roosevelt or Smith:*

Summarizing Governor Roosevelt's assets and liabilities as a potential nominee, it would seem that his principal assets are (1) his name; (2) his long political experience; (3) his valuable experience as Governor of New York; (4) his progressive tendency; (5) his charming personality and his

desire to please; (6) his skilful handling of an opposition-controlled legislature; and, (7) his record as a vote-getter; while his liabilities are (1) the fact that his vote-getting record would probably not hold good in New York, if he be the nominee, since it depends largely upon his choice of Tammany leaders, who would almost surely knife him at the polls; (2) the fact that business people have no confidence in his ability or willingness to fight for sound business principles in government and that they fear the effects, in these perilous times, of his disappointing weakness of character as a public leader; (3) the fact that he is in high disfavor with the politically all-important wet states and has recently alienated the drys; (4) his record of having surrendered completely to the worst elements in Tammany—those new leaders whom he helped into power when he became Governor and of having debauched his leadership of the party in New York State by condoning corruption and protecting Tammany from investigation as long as possible and of deliberately playing their game during his entire career as Governor; (5) his record, while Governor, of having played politics with every issue, thereby displaying an utter lack of real conviction or of regard for principle, on any subject; and (6) the fact that during his years as Governor he has established a character, as a public official and political leader, which is devoid of courage and either ignorant of or hostile to sound principles of good government and public morals.[12]

This pamphlet is a classic. The main trouble with it is that the people who listened to Roosevelt's calm, mellow voice over the radio did not detect the weakness that Hamilton Long said he discovered.

Under the circumstances did the anti-Roosevelt group expect to be treated gently in the convention? Would the Governor pat them softly on the back? If they thought so, they were in for some disappointments, for misfortune had brought a steely quality to the soul of this outwardly affable country gentleman.

One of the most penetrating characterizations of Roosevelt at this period comes from the pen of Professor Moley, who wrote to his sister on April 12, 1932, as follows regarding the reception of the "Forgotten Man" speech:

DEAR NELL—

Thanks for writing me about the Gov.'s speech last wk. Your reaction is important in getting an idea of how it struck the country—especially since

[12] Copy of pamphlet in the New York Public Library, N.Y.C.

the speech got so much hell from the conservative papers—Republican and Democratic. The Governor is quite indifferent to these attacks—in fact, rather likes them because they show that he is being taken seriously—and he realizes that the alienation of some standpatters is necessary if the campaign is to seem to the rank and file . . . something other than the usual campaign futilitarianism.

You ask what he is like and that isn't easy to answer because I haven't had the chance to confirm a lot of fleeting impressions. One thing is sure—that the idea people get from his charming manner—that he is soft or flabby in disposition and character—is far from true. When he wants something a lot, he can be formidable—when crossed he is hard, stubborn, resourceful, relentless. I used to think on the basis of casual observation that his amiability was "lord-of-the-manor"-"good-to-the-peasants"-stuff. It isn't that at all. He seems quite naturally warm and friendly—less because he genuinely likes many of the people to whom he is pleasant (although he does like a lot of people of all sorts and varieties) than because he just enjoys the pleasant and engaging role, as a charming woman does.[13]

Roosevelt was accused of being cunning. In the New York graft investigations he was accused of trickery when he demanded that officeholders he asked to testify waive immunity as far as their official acts were concerned. Demands were made that they waive their immunity as far as their political acts were concerned also. Governor Roosevelt stuck to the letter of the law. Roosevelt could be expected to make narrow legalistic interpretations which favored his objectives.

In the preliminaries to the Democratic National Convention the opposing factions sparred in order to get into good fighting positions. The formal organization of the convention was always important under such circumstances. Was not Uncle Ted deprived of the Republican nomination in 1912 because the Taft forces had control of the key positions in the convention? One could not leave to chance, or be too polite about, the choice of the temporary chairman and the permanent chairman.

John J. Raskob, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was a Smith man, and he was using all the powers of his office to hinder Roosevelt. Raskob brought in as chairman of the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee Jouett Shouse of Kansas, a seasoned Midwestern politician. There is no question that Shouse did

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

a fine job during the Hoover Administration in building up the central headquarters staff of the party. He brought in staff persons who were highly skilled in organizational and publicity matters. The publicity activities of Charles Michelson are looked upon as a model of their kind. As for where Shouse stood, however, there was no question that he owed his position to Raskob and Smith.

One of the first maneuvers of the anti-Roosevelt forces was to try to change the convention procedures so as to increase the number of uninstructed delegates. To that end Shouse proposed a change in the rules which would have made it easier to do so. The Roosevelt supporters on the National Committee successfully prevented the change and at the same time noted that Shouse had to be watched.

The next move of the anti-Roosevelt contingent was to try to establish Shouse as permanent chairman of the convention. The Roosevelt crowd did not want to appear ungrateful to Shouse for what he had done for the party, and when Roosevelt was approached on the subject he said that he would *commend* Shouse for the position. He meant that he would praise what Shouse had done for the party. He did not *recommend* Shouse for the position. This may seem like a quibble. The business of lawyers and politicians is to quibble. When the Roosevelt supporters voted for Walsh for permanent chairman, the Shouse supporters were most unhappy and charged Roosevelt with breaking his word.

On the issue of the two-thirds rule the Roosevelt forces had to back down. It was Farley's bright idea that since they had a majority of the delegates they would change the two-thirds rule and eliminate the risk of a deadlock. This was fine in theory, but it failed to take into account that the Southern politicians regarded the veto power which the two-thirds rule gave them as an important protection of their regional interests. They could block the selection of any candidate who was objectionable to the South. Roosevelt had all of the Southern delegates, but he could not carry them along in any move to change the two-thirds rule, at least not until 1936. Some of the Southern politicians were very disagreeable about the proposal, and Howe was furious when he saw the trouble that had been stirred up. There was nothing for Roosevelt to do but to repudiate the stand which had been taken by Farley. He did this as gracefully as possible in a press release.

The next hurdle was presented by the contested delegations. Fortunately for Roosevelt there were only two major contests to decide—the Minnesota and the Louisiana contests. Contests are likely to leave bad feeling and can, as in 1912, lead to a schism in the party and to defeat at the polls. Huey Long was shrewd enough to jump on the bandwagon, and the Committee on Credentials seated his delegates. In the Minnesota contest the majority group at the Minnesota convention had passed a motion that the delegates be instructed for Roosevelt, and it was this group that was seated. In the battle for the contested delegations, the Roosevelt forces exercised their majority again and won easily. The loss of these two delegations would have been serious.

The convention opened in Chicago on June 27 with the outcome very much in doubt. The tense and feverish atmosphere of the Roosevelt camp has been described by Farley, Moley, Flynn, and others. Farley concentrated on the job of holding the Roosevelt delegates in line until the necessary one hundred or so votes could be won over from the favorite sons. Flynn has related that Senator Long was most useful in holding the Southern votes until the additional votes were obtained. Farley also conducted the negotiations with Sam Rayburn of Texas, Garner's preconvention manager, and through him was able to persuade Garner to agree to withdraw his candidacy after the third or fourth ballot in favor of Roosevelt's nomination. If everything went according to schedule, the battle was won. In conventions, however, nothing can be left to chance.

The Democratic platform adopted by the Chicago Convention proved to be an important document. Will Rogers's facetious comments that no one ever read a platform did not apply to this one. The Roosevelt forces were concerned that the job of drawing up the platform might divide their supporters, but everything went off smoothly. There were minority reports on Prohibition and other issues, but the debate on them created no split in the ranks. While the platform did not anticipate all the features of the New Deal, it outlined many of them. It contained some promises which were never fulfilled, but the Resolutions Committee could hardly be expected to foresee the events of the following four years. A party platform should not be a straitjacket. Certainly Roosevelt would be the last one to hold himself bound to prior estimates of a situa-

tion when those estimates proved to be wrong. The estimates appearing in the platform were farthest off on balancing the budget, reducing Federal expenditures, opposing cancellation of foreign debts, and maintaining a sound currency. They were best on repeal of Prohibition, aid to agriculture, regulation of the marketing of securities, Federal public works, relief to the unfortunate, reciprocal trade agreements, adherence to the World Court, independence for the Philippines, and antilobbying legislation. This was a better batting average than most party platforms.

The lines which Farley had spent a year and a half building held firm for the crucial first three ballots. Out of 1,154 votes cast in the first ballot, Roosevelt received 666, Smith 201, Garner 90, and the remainder were scattered for the most part among favorite sons.[14] FDR was about 100 votes short of the necessary two-thirds. By a prearranged scheme, the Roosevelt vote increased slightly with each ballot.[15]

It was William G. McAdoo who was given the task of announcing on the fourth ballot the switch of the California delegates from Garner to Roosevelt. What a bitter cup this was for the Smith followers! McAdoo was booed by the Smith delegates and gallery supporters. In fact, Mayor Cermak of Chicago had to appeal to the unruly crowd to show better courtesy as convention hosts.

Roosevelt was nominated on the fourth ballot with many votes to spare, even though the Smith delegates held fast during the roll call.

While Howe, Farley, Moley, Flynn, and others on the Roosevelt strategy board slept for days after the exhausting activities which led up to the eventful fourth ballot, FDR took the news calmly, as if he had never doubted the outcome. His supreme confidence had freed him from worry about the result.

The convention then proceeded without a hitch to nominate Garner for Vice President. The deal was clear to all. Garner had been persuaded to give up the speakership for the Vice Presidency. The arrangement was agreeable to Roosevelt, Hearst, and the delegates from Texas and California.

[14] Fifty-two for White of Ohio, 42 for Traylor of Illinois, 25 for Byrd of Virginia, 24 for Reed of Missouri, 23 for Murray of Oklahoma, 21 for Ritchie of Maryland, and 8 for Baker of Ohio. *Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention,* p. 289.

[15] James Farley, *Behind the Ballots* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1938), p. 142.

Roosevelt's decision to fly to Chicago from Albany to accept the nomination was announced at once. It had not been the custom for nominees to do this. In the past they were supposed to wait until a committee of the convention notified them of the action of the convention. This was not the first time that the new party leader was to break precedents.

The acceptance speech was the joint product of the candidate and his brain trust. Moley has related his anxiety about Howe's last-minute attempt to substitute a Howe version. Roosevelt brought with him from Albany the copy which he, Moley, Rosenman, and several others had agreed upon. On the way from the airport to the convention hall, Howe tried to get FDR to substitute his draft. Moley was on pins and needles. The bland Roosevelt took Howe's rewrite of the first sheet in order to please his loyal friend, and then proceeded with the agreed version. Moley's heart began to beat again after the first page.

It is estimated that ten million people turned on their radios to hear the historic address. When reread today the speech does not stand out as one of the best of Roosevelt's addresses. While it coined the phrase "the new deal," it certainly did not clearly anticipate many of the policies which were to make up what people came later to think of as the New Deal. What was there was the tone of confidence, the spirit of compassion for suffering, the willingness to try new remedies, a warm friendliness, and a facility at inventing new slogans. A few extracts follow:

> One word more: out of every crisis, every tribulation, every disaster, mankind rises with some share of greater knowledge, of higher decency, of purer purpose. Today we shall have come through a period of loose thinking, descending morals, an era of selfishness among individual men and women and among whole nations. Blame not governments alone for this. Blame ourselves in equal share. Let us be frank in acknowledgment of the truth that many amongst us have made obeisance to Mammon, that the profits of speculation, the easy road without toil, have lured us from the old barricades. To return to higher standards we must abandon the false prophets and seek new leaders of our own choosing. . . .
>
> I pledge you—I pledge myself to a new deal for the American people. (Applause and cheering.) Let us all here assembled constitute ourselves prophets of a new order of competence and of courage. This is more than a political campaign; it is a call to arms. Give me your help, not to win votes alone, but

to win in this crusade to restore America to its own people. (Applause and cheering, ending in an ovation.) [16]

Roosevelt had won the nomination for President in a year when the chances of his party looked bright. An important step had been taken to realize the dream that Howe had had for Roosevelt twenty years earlier. Roosevelt himself had triumphed in an eleven-year battle against a handicap. The going had been rough at times and the outcome uncertain, but his courage, optimism, and self-confidence had never faltered.

[16] *Official Proceedings,* pp. 382, 383.

XIII

THE 1932 CAMPAIGN

They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary; and they shall walk, and not faint.

—Isaiah 40:31

For twelve years a Democratic nomination for President had involved the recipient in a hopeless fight. In 1920, 1924, and 1928 the electorate had associated the Republican candidates with the economic well-being of the country. Roosevelt knew this all too well from his experience in 1920.

It was clear in 1930 that the Republican bubble of prosperity had burst. No longer would the voters believe that they had to support Republican candidates to continue the economic health of the country. Early in 1932 it was thought that the Democratic candidate would have better than an even chance in the fall.

Roosevelt had spent a long time learning how to win votes—twenty-two years to be exact. How to charm the electorate was constantly on his mind. As Moley put it, FDR was like a woman; he liked to exercise his charm on others.[1] Politics gave him a tremendous opportunity to exercise his talents.

President Hoover had been one of Franklin's close associates in Washington during the Wilson days. In 1920 their paths had parted when Hoover declared his adherence to the Republican party and went out after that nomination and Roosevelt accepted the Democratic nomina-

[1] Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years*, p. 10.

tion for Vice President. In the twenties their paths continued to diverge. The contrast between them in 1932 was striking. In spite of his physical handicap, FDR was buoyant, joyous, confident, calm, courageous, and charming, while the adversity that had been heaped on Hoover's head since 1929 made him depressed, sour, timid, uncertain, and distant in his social relationships. Hoover still could not believe that the economic system that he had known had fallen like a pack of cards. He still held to the old economic beliefs that had worked so well for him for years.

Roosevelt knew what it took to win elections. He knew that a candidate had to have an organization, money, volunteers, a policy research group, and had to be willing to put in a lot of toil himself. He had spent twelve years trying to build up a strong Democratic organization. Although times were hard, his wealthy friends came to his rescue with generous contributions. His personality was the magnet that attracted volunteers. He already had a tried and tested brain trust. The speech accepting the nomination had no sooner been delivered than he was ready to start on the next address.

The convention had left some bitter memories. Roosevelt had learned the lesson from the Bible: "Avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord." He also showed that he believed in Lincoln's great words, "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right." Some mean attacks had been made upon him during the first half of 1932. He was not going to be vindictive. Revenge might give personal satisfaction but it did not win votes. He was ready to forgive and forget what Al Smith, Boss Hague, and the other anti-Roosevelt leaders had done and said.

The organization must be united and energized to wage a successful campaign. Farley was just the person for the job. It was a foregone conclusion that Roosevelt would make him the new National Chairman. Jim's pleasing manner and remarkable memory for names and faces fitted him ideally for the post. He also enjoyed the reputation for being a square shooter. If he thought that he could not deliver on a proposition, he would say so. Organization leaders knew where they stood.

Farley took over most of the staff of the Democratic National Com-

mittee. He could not be expected to keep Shouse in his position, but Michelson stayed on as director of publicity.

Roosevelt was well aware of the disjointed nature of American political parties. The lines of authority from the top down were so loose that in most campaigns there was no follow-through. Literature sent to the states might never be redistributed. Roosevelt and Farley agreed that a direct distribution from national headquarters to the precinct worker would be better; thus the persons in actual touch with the voters would be supplied with party ammunition. Campaign literature was mailed directly to some one hundred thousand precinct captains.

A special effort was made to convince the state organizations that they had a vital part to play in the national campaign. All state chairmen were called to headquarters in groups of ten and twelve for three-day sessions to discuss with Farley and his associates their local conditions. The plan did wonders for the morale of the state chairmen.[2]

Raising a campaign fund in 1932 was not easy, and the Democrats had a considerable deficit when the election rolled around. Frank Walker, the treasurer of the Democratic National Committee, did the best he could under the circumstances. It has been estimated that the Democratic National Committee spent about $2,200,000, or $500,000 less than the Republicans. Roosevelt had some very generous supporters, among whom should be mentioned John J. Raskob, banker and automobile manufacturer; William Woodin, American Car and Foundry Company; Bernard Baruch, financier; Vincent Astor, Chase National Bank; William Randolph Hearst, newspaper publisher; R. W. Morrison, of San Antonio, Texas; M. L. Benedum, Pittsburgh oil and gas operator.[3]

During July and August, Roosevelt made some radio addresses from Albany and went on a few short trips. Moley was in charge of the policy group which helped with the speeches.

Should a more extensive campaign tour be made? Some of FDR's Eastern advisers were opposed to the idea. The risk was too great. Cali-

[2] Louis McHenry Howe, North American Newspaper Alliance article, December, 1932, cited in Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, *The 1932 Campaign: An Analysis*, pp. 113–116.

[3] Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in a Depression Year," *American Political Science Review*, XXVII, 778 (October, 1933).

fornia was especially dangerous territory. The politicians told Roosevelt that all he had to do was to sit tight and make no mistakes. He did not need to make a turn around the circle. Had not a campaign tour been disastrous to Hughes in 1916? Had not his great chief, Woodrow Wilson, used largely the front-porch technique of campaigning?

FDR would not listen to their warnings. He had not stayed at home in 1928. He had not remained in Albany in 1930. There would be a campaign tour. The old charge of his health would be used against him as never before. Besides, he liked to campaign. As Moley put it in his chapter "Gayly the Troubadour":

> To Roosevelt a good cause does not justify any trip: A good trip justifies any cause. Campaigning, for him, was unadulterated joy. It was broad rivers, green forests, waving corn, and undulating wheat; it was crowds of friends, from the half dozen who, seated on a baggage truck, waved to the cheery face at the speeding window to perspiring thousands at a race track or fairground; it was hands extended in welcome, voices warm with greeting, faces reflecting his smile along the interminable wayside. These are the things that ever and ever renew the life of a troubadour. What has "learning" to do with friendship and happiness? Travel is to make friends and influence people. And travel is in the blood of the *Reise*-Roosevelts.[4]

He was going on a campaign trip across the country, and California was his western destination. The misgivings of his advisers were ill founded. Everywhere the amiable Roosevelt made friends. In California he pleased the various Democratic factions and caused the defection of Senator Hiram Johnson, a remarkable feat indeed. The speech before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco was one of the high points of the entire campaign. It summarized the philosophy of the New Deal.

In all the arts of political communication, Roosevelt was definitely superior to his opponent. In speaking to large crowds, in meeting small groups, in talking to individuals, in writing letters, in preparing official documents, Roosevelt showed himself to be vastly superior to Hoover. He had cultivated the arts of charming others. Gifted with a pleasing voice and a ready tongue, he was trained from earliest childhood to act as a gentleman, and in adult life he developed a warm interest in other

[4] Moley, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

people. He had a genuine liking for people and he could communicate this liking to others. He was also more adroit in phrase making, slogan devising, and in appealing to American ideals. As Lindley has pointed out, he drew much inspiration from Thomas Jefferson:

> Of that group of men, Jefferson has always been his idol. The bond is much stronger than that of the ordinary born-and-bred Democrat for the founder of his party. Possibly it is the affinity of one country squire of democratic beliefs for another. As conditions have changed, it is useless to look for a literal expression of Jeffersonian political philosophy in the Roosevelt Revolution. The association is to be found rather in Mr. Roosevelt's belief in the good sense and rights of the average man and the elevation of the "larger good" above privilege. More specifically it appears in Mr. Roosevelt's leaning toward decentralization of industry and his strong emotional attachment to an economic system based on the small individual farmer.[5]

Roosevelt knew how to appeal to American traditions and idealism. Hoover talked about American individualism, but he was never an effective exponent of his ideas. In times of prosperity he was the great engineer, the great humanitarian. When times got bad, Hoover could not live up to his reputation. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was steeped from earliest youth in American history and American political theory. Thomas Jefferson was one of his ideals, and in his private as well as in his public life Roosevelt tried to exemplify the Jeffersonian way of life. He tried to be a country gentleman who believed in democratic institutions because he liked people and because he had a social obligation to help them. Public office he regarded as a sacred trust. American military traditions, particularly naval traditions, must be preserved and strengthened. The American tradition called for courage in facing the enemy—whether it was economic adversity or a formidable military foe. Roosevelt faced 1932 in true American style. Many Americans had been stricken by economic reverses, but the American spirit was undefeated. A way out of the economic morass would be found.

Roosevelt had clearly indicated his experimental approach to the tasks of government. Among the sayings used during the campaign was his famous statement on experimentation:

[5] Ernest K. Lindley, *The Roosevelt Revolution* (New York, The Viking Press, 1933), p. 8.

The country needs and . . . the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something. The millions who are in want will not stand by silently forever when the things to satisfy their needs are within easy reach.[6]

Roosevelt conducted a dignified campaign. He deplored his opponents appeals to fear and attempts to panic the voters into clinging to the battered Republican ship. This was not going to be his way of meeting the crisis. In his speech at Baltimore, he said:

We are approaching the end of this campaign—I am all here, except a small fraction of my voice—and I am determined now, as I have from the beginning, that the people of this country keep before them the fundamental issues of this campaign. To that end, I have refused to be diverted or confused by the misrepresentations of my opponents, the fears of the weak, the madness of the unreasoning. No amount of hysteria on the part of a bankrupt Republican leadership will divert the American people at the eleventh hour from the decision they have already reached.

I am waging a war in this campaign—a frontal attack—an onset—against the "Four Horsemen" of the present Republican leadership: "The Horsemen of Destruction, Delay, Deceit, Despair." [7]

Roosevelt's summary of his own campaign was given in a speech in New York later in the campaign:

At Topeka, I outlined a complete national plan for the restoration of agriculture to its proper relationship to the nation. At Salt Lake City, I outlined a definite program to give us a definite transportation policy, including the rehabilitation of the railroads of the nation. At Portland I set forth in definite terms a national policy for the conduct of utilities, and especially those engaged in manufacturing and distributing electric power. At Sioux City I proposed a tariff policy aimed to restore international trade and commerce not only with this nation but between all nations. At Boston I championed the principle that the national government has a positive duty to see that

[6] *Campaign Book of the Democratic Candidates and Issues, 1932,* p. 96. This statement came from his address, "Present Day Economic and Industrial Confusion as a Challenge to the College Man," at the Commencement Exercises of Oglethorpe University, Oglethorpe, Ga., May 22, 1932. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1928–1932,* p. 646.

[7] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1928–1932,* p. 832.

no citizen shall starve. At Columbus I proposed the protection of the investing public against the evils and the fraud perpetrated against them during the past ten years. At Pittsburgh I proposed an honest national budget policy.[8]

Of all the speeches made in the 1932 campaign, the one at Pittsburgh was to plague him most in afteryears. It was on fiscal policy and balancing the budget. Among the brain trusters, Hugh Johnson and Louis Howe were the most ardent advocates of that kind of speech. Moley asserts that Roosevelt was aware of the philosophy of pump priming by governmental expenditures and chose not to take that line in the Pittsburgh speech. As governor, Roosevelt had balanced the budget in New York. In October, 1932, it did not seem to him to be impossible to do it nationally. He did not foresee the deepening of the economic crisis and the inevitability of continued Federal deficits under the circumstances. From the standpoint of later campaigns, the speech was a mistake. It was bound to haunt him. From the standpoint of the 1932 campaign, the speech won votes. Later campaigns show that it was not a blunder fatal to his subsequent political career.[9]

Roosevelt was most adroit in appealing to every important group in the country. His record as governor appeared to give reasonable backing to his promises. He was effective in addressing such diverse groups as farmers, laborers, consumers, women, minority groups, middle income groups and lower income groups.

For the first time in many years a farmer was a candidate for President. It is true that he was a gentleman farmer and not a dirt farmer, but he was a farmer none the less, with farms in two states. In the days that he had spent at Hyde Park, New York, and Warm Springs, Georgia, he had learned about the problems of those who try to make a living from the soil. As governor of New York, he had demonstrated his knowledge of farm conditions and he had won over many of the upstate farmers. As candidate for President in 1932, he made several speeches appealing to the farm vote. The Topeka speech was the main forensic effort to attract the farm vote. Moley reports that twenty-five different

[8] State of New York, *Public Papers of Governor Roosevelt, 1932* (Albany, 1939), p. 664, speech in New York City, Nov. 4, 1932.

[9] In a delightful passage, Judge Rosenman said that he advised FDR to deny that he had ever made the speech when the subject came up in 1936. See Rosenman, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

people worked on it.[10] He implies that it was satisfactory to the leaders of the farm organizations and that it therefore anticipated the agricultural measures which were to become such a storm center later. A rereading of the speech today shows that it was prophetic in many aspects. On the other hand, one would not expect it to say that farm relief would be costly to the taxpayers and the consumers. He showed a greater willingness than Hoover did to cooperate with the leaders of the farm groups in developing a program which would solve some of the problems of the farmers. He was willing to try to do something about low prices of farm products, foreclosures on farms, high taxes on farm property, and hardships of farm life.

Roosevelt's labor policies were not anticipated by the Democratic platform nor by his campaign speeches. In the main, however, organized labor regarded his record and pronouncements as more favorable than those of Hoover. William Green's endorsement of 1930 still held good, and Dan Tobin of the Teamsters Union made a speech on the basis of it. A pamphlet was prepared on Roosevelt's labor record which was used widely during the campaign. Roosevelt made no major speech appealing to the labor vote as he did to the farm vote. Unemployed workers were assured that vigorous steps would be taken to provide self-sustaining public works and that no one would suffer starvation. Trade unionism was at a low ebb in the United States in 1932, and it apparently did not occur to Roosevelt and his advisers that major efforts were necessary to swing the labor vote.

The classic method of attracting the producer groups is to offer some governmental favor, such as a protective tariff, a special privilege, a right of way, a loan, or an outright subsidy. The Republican argument that prosperity depended upon a Republican tariff law had worn rather thin in 1932. The Democratic platform was for reciprocal trade arrangements, and the archdefender of this policy was a strong Roosevelt supporter, Senator Cordell Hull of Tennessee. Some of Roosevelt's remarks about tariffs must have made Hull squirm.[11] But Roosevelt was after votes, and he was apparently forgiven for his departures from strict economic doctrine on international trade matters. Producer interests cannot be ignored by the realistic politician. Roosevelt preached industrial harmony,

[10] Moley, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

the interdependence of capital, labor, producers, consumers, urban and rural workers. The Republican party had come to represent the large industrial producers in the seventy years following the Civil War. Roosevelt was more successful in winning over some of those industrialists than any other Democratic candidate had been.

As far as the consumers were concerned, Roosevelt had a strong attraction. In the spring of 1932 the National Popular Government League rated the various presidential prospects on their official acts, speeches, and position on power legislation. Roosevelt received the highest rating. During the campaign he made speeches on public utilities and development of hydroelectric power.[12]

The Democratic platform of 1932 did not anticipate the New Deal policies on race relations. In fact, it did not mention the subject, since the Democratic National Committee had turned down the plea of a Negro group for a plank on race relations. Until 1932 the Democrats had not hoped to attract the Negro vote except in a few spots such as New York's Harlem. In the Southern states Negroes had been deliberately disfranchised by Democratic politicians. The Democratic candidate for Vice President was "Cactus" Jack Garner, a typical Southern racist. The Negroes who had migrated to the North did not forget the disabilities under which they had suffered in the South. For a Democratic candidate to attract Negro votes was an uphill fight. Roosevelt was not daunted by the difficult nature of the task. It did not occur to him until later to go all out for the Negro vote. Farley was shrewd enough to see that times were changing and that the National Committee should put forth strenuous efforts to win the support of as many Negro voters as possible.

Roosevelt's handsome face and gallant fight against disability attracted the women voters. He had always been a consistent advocate of woman suffrage and women's rights. His wife was one of the best of women organizers, and she continued to cover a great deal of territory on behalf of her husband.

To the religious minorities in the United States, Roosevelt was an attractive figure. Had he not defended Al Smith against religious bigotry? Had he not supported Lehman for governor? Did he not have many Catholic and Jewish advisers? Surely here was a Protestant who

[12] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1928–1932*, p. 727.

would stand up for the rights of every religious minority. In 1932 he did not need to make speeches on religious toleration. His reputation was already well known. Many Catholics might have preferred Al Smith as a candidate, but they found Roosevelt vastly superior to Hoover.

How was it that the poor came to look at this aristocrat who had never known want as their friend? Hoover, who had experienced poverty in his youth, had no such attraction. As governor, Roosevelt had said: "No one wants government to assume new functions, but it is clear that government in this nation cannot let its people starve. Government in the United States must not allow its men, women and children to suffer excessive privation." [13] As a candidate in 1932, he reiterated this theme. He declared that reductions in governmental expenditures would not mean the neglect of those in need.[14]

Early in the campaign it was clear to seasoned observers that Roosevelt was going to win. John H. McCooey, the boss of Brooklyn, said immediately after the convention that Roosevelt would be the next President without campaigning.[15] The *Literary Digest* poll, which had an obvious bias in favor of Republican candidates, picked Roosevelt.[16] Jim Farley predicted that Roosevelt would carry forty-four states. Hard-boiled journalists rejected Farley's claim, but they had no doubts about Roosevelt's winning. All the Southern states would be back in the fold. Hoover would carry a few rock-ribbed Republican states but he could not salvage much else. Wall Street betting was heavily in favor of Roosevelt.

Farley missed by only two states. When adjusted for admitted previous voting behavior, the *Literary Digest* poll was mistaken only in Pennsylvania and Delaware. In addition to these states, Hoover carried only Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut. Roosevelt won 59 per cent of the popular vote. Who could now gainsay him as the champion vote getter? No Democratic candidate since the Civil War had come near to getting so large a share of the popular vote. It was an electoral upheaval of major proportions. Lindley called it the "Roosevelt revolution."

[13] *Campaign Book, 1932*, p. 96.

[14] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1928–1932*, p. 810.

[15] Peel and Donnelly, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 154–155. An analysis of how the voters said they voted in 1928 showed a much larger ratio for Hoover than he actually received in 1928.

A comparison of Roosevelt's vote with the vote for the House of Representatives show that Roosevelt won a personal victory.[17] If we eliminate the Southern states, where many House seats were not contested by Republicans, and if we eliminate New England, where political sentiment changes slowly and where the Roosevelt-Smith differences left their scars, Roosevelt's percentage exceeded that of the Democratic candidates for the House in four-fifths of the remaining states. Thus, in California Roosevelt received 58.4 per cent of the total vote and the Democratic candidates for the House only 45.3 per cent, or 13.1 per cent less.

If Al Smith had won the nomination in 1932, would he have done as well as Roosevelt did? The chances are against it, judging from the fact that Smith in 1928 ran behind the vote for the Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives in all but fourteen states, of which five were New England states. In other words, Smith ran ahead of the Democratic ticket only in a few spots, while Roosevelt did so almost everywhere. Putting it in other words, on the basis of how well each candidate ran in relation to the vote for Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives, Smith might have run as well as Roosevelt in only twelve states.[18] Running in 1932, Smith might have lost the same number or more of the Southern states. Democratic party leaders had no complaint about Franklin D. Roosevelt's drawing power in 1932.

Undoubtedly Roosevelt received his most assorted support in 1932. Unfortunately, the polls taken in that year failed to give the social and economic background of the respondents cooperating. It may be inferred, however, that the Roosevelt vote was not as highly stratified from the economic viewpoint in 1932 as it was in later years.[19] Trade unionism was at a low ebb in 1932, so there could not have been a large union vote. The rural-urban lines that were to appear in 1936 were not manifest, since Roosevelt did as well in some highly rural counties as he did in

[17] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Vote Cast in Presidential and Congressional Elections, 1928–1944* (Washington, D.C., 1946), pp. 11, 22.

[18] States where the difference between the per cent for Smith and the per cent for Democratic candidates for the House and the difference between the per cent for Roosevelt and the per cent for the Democratic candidates for the House were negligible in both cases or of a magnitude and sign favorable to Smith.

[19] If the Roosevelt constituency had been highly stratified in 1932, the *Literary Digest* poll would not have been as good as it was. For additional evidence see my *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* and *Grass Roots Politics* (Washington, D.C., American Council on Public Affairs, 1942).

the urban counties. In the great metropolitan centers Roosevelt held the lines that Smith had begun to build out of the wet, foreign-born, Catholic, and Jewish elements, and added recruits of his own. It was a motley crew that went to the polls in November, 1932, and chose Roosevelt in preference to Hoover. Never again was Roosevelt to have such a mixed constituency.

The 1932 election was won by the Democrats in large part because the depression brought great unrest among the voters. The Republican presidential candidate was rejected because his promises that prosperity was around the corner had not been realized. In American history economic adversity has tended to undermine the popularity of the political party in control of the Presidency. Roosevelt skillfully used this situation to win support for his own candidacy. He waged an aggressive campaign against Republican "leadership." What he lacked in party campaign funds he made up by the effective use of volunteers. His words, his voice, and his appearance held out hope to those in distress.

XIV

THE NEW DEAL AND RENOMINATION

Let it be from now on the task of our party to break foolish traditions.
—FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, *Acceptance Speech, July 2, 1932*

THE President-elect remained in the eyes of many an uncertain quantity. Had not Walter Lippmann said that Roosevelt was "an amiable man with many philanthropic impulses . . . who, without any important qualifications for the office, would very much like to be president." [1] Had not Paul Blanshard written, "Today, the verdict of most New York newspaper men is that if Roosevelt displays as much weakness in the White House as he has displayed in handling New York city corruption, the nation will be preyed upon as it was in the days of Harding." [2]

It was clear that FDR would be different from Hoover. The dour engineer in the White House was becoming more and more frustrated. FDR had a buoyancy, a gaiety, which would not be downed by the dire news which each new day brought in the time between the election and the inauguration.

In this period occurred the events which furnished the basis for the Republican charges that economic recovery began before the New Deal and that Roosevelt "precipitated" the March crisis by refusing to cooperate with President Hoover in taking the proper measures to prevent it. Given the events, it was inevitable that the Republicans would try to

[1] New York *Herald Tribune*, Jan. 8, 1932. *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1952) give Hoover's views of the events that occurred in the campaign and the early days of the New Deal.

[2] *Socialist Party Campaign Textbook, 1932.*

reconstruct the popular view of them so as to serve their purposes. As President-elect, Roosevelt did not want to commit himself to Hoover's policies. This applied to the problem of the international debts as well as to the banking crisis.

Roosevelt directed his energies toward choosing his Cabinet and formulating the program that he would recommend to Congress when he took office. In the selection of his Cabinet, Howe, Moley, McAdoo, Senator Johnson, and Farley were among those who were influential. FDR did not look to the authority and prestige of the Wilson Administration except in the case of McAdoo.

That Roosevelt used his appointing powers to reward his political friends and build up strength among the voters is idle to deny. American politics is run that way, and he did not choose to combat this particular tradition.

In the formation of his Cabinet political considerations were near the top. All principal geographic and factional elements had to be represented. The South had three posts, the West three, and the East four. A McAdoo Democrat, two Southern conservative Democrats, two progressive Republicans who had defected to the Democratic party, an Al Smith Democrat, an anti-Tammany Democrat, and a generous contributor were all included. Among the professions represented were law, farming, publishing, mining, business, social service, and building. It is interesting to note that none of those chosen had had Cabinet experience during the Wilson régime. No person who had exercised authority higher than Roosevelt's in 1913–1920 got a Cabinet post. Senator Glass was offered the Secretaryship of the Treasury but turned it down. The new Cabinet was composed of Roosevelt men who had their reputations to establish.

As Postmaster General, Big Jim Farley had the job of taking care of "deserving Democrats." Persons seeking jobs in Washington found that clearance from their local Democratic party committeemen was a great help. While not an absolute guarantee of a position, a clearance slip was the first step. Thus did Roosevelt support the local party organizations that were later to return such huge Democratic majorities. As a general rule he did not directly interfere in local politics. His neutrality in the New York mayoralty election of 1933 undoubtedly helped La Guardia

BY ORR IN CHICAGO *TRIBUNE*, FEB. 27, 1935.

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win. Considering the treatment he had received at the hands of Tammany, FDR could not be expected to come to the rescue of the "Tiger."

President Roosevelt took the oath of office under most unfavorable circumstances. The financial structure of American society was tottering. Six thousand banks had failed. Thirteen million persons were unemployed. Farm prices were at new lows. Despair was rampant in the land, and the future looked dark indeed. A less self-confident man would have been overwhelmed by the prospects. But FDR was not worried. He was at his best in times of crisis—cool, collected, exhilarated, and a complete master of the situation.

The inaugural address of March 4, 1933, has become a classic known around the world. The famous passage, "So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance," [3] has become one of the most quoted of Roosevelt's sayings. The speech was a great morale booster. Roosevelt promised immediate action, stating that if necessary he would ask for and would use all the war powers of the Executive to wage war against the emergency. He also called attention to the need for the reassertion of the moral values of American civilization and the need for a good neighbor policy in international relations.

Not quite a year later, on the occasion of the celebration of the President's birthday on January 30, 1934, Edwin C. Hill, radio commentator, described the effect of the inaugural as he saw it:

> That March the fourth . . . appeared from the closed packed throng in the great doorway of the East front of the Capitol in Washington, the tall, square-shouldered figure of Franklin D. Roosevelt, slowly making his way down the center of the inaugural stand . . . Roosevelt taking command of the storm-battered ship. . . . And in a scant five minutes . . . a hundred and fifty thousand heads up in new courage and fresh hope. At the first sight of the serene and gallant figure, at the first tones of his calm and confident voice . . . you could see the new spirit, the new determination creeping into the faces of those people. . . . Never was there a more kindling response to the call of a leader. . . . This man Roosevelt, standing there upon legs to which only his inflexible resolution and unconquerable courage had

[3] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933,* p. 11.

given the strength . . . this man who had lifted himself by sheer power of the spirit from the bed of invalidism, who had summoned from the depths of character the incredible patience to win his battle for health and make himself walk again among men . . . this man must have in him the true and authentic qualities of leadership.[4]

The history of the next one hundred days can hardly be told here. Our concern is with the effect of these events upon the reputation of FDR. A hard-boiled Washington correspondent put it in the following words:

A man who is able, without batting an eye, to launch NRA, AAA, a $3,000,000,000 public-works program, the Civilian Conservation Corps program, slam the banks shut, go off the gold standard, revalue the dollar, take on every sort of discretionary power instead of trying to shoulder off on Congress a share of the responsibility, was bound to register with a corps of newspapermen who were weary of trimmers, pussyfooters, and people who had not given them a new idea to write about since the World War.[5]

During the time that this epoch-making program was being enacted, President Roosevelt maintained the closest relations with the press. He instituted in Washington the famous press conference that had been characteristic of his Administration in Albany. He did away with the requirement of written questions submitted in advance and subjected himself to direct questioning by the correspondents. Rosten describes the first press conference after the inaugural:

Mr. Roosevelt was introduced to each correspondent. Many of them he already knew and greeted by name—first name. For each he had a handshake and the Roosevelt smile. When the questioning began, the full virtuosity of the new Chief Executive was demonstrated. Cigarette holder in mouth at a jaunty angle, he met the reporters on their own grounds. . . . He was thoroughly at ease. He made no effort to conceal his pleasure in the give and take of the situation.[6]

Regardless of how hostile the newspaper editors and proprietors were to some of the Roosevelt policies, their Washington correspondents could

[4] Cited in Rita Kleeman, *Gracious Lady*, p. 300.

[5] Cited by Leo Rosten, *The Washington Correspondents* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937), p. 51.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

not help being favorably impressed with the changed conditions of their work. While the bulk of the large metropolitan dailies were opposed to the New Deal, Roosevelt's explanations got a sympathetic hearing from the representatives of these papers.

President Roosevelt had another medium which he could use in reaching the public. At Albany he had demonstrated that he knew how to use the radio. In connection with the banking crisis he initiated his fireside chats. As the New York *Times* put it:

> Mr. Roosevelt, with his "all-American" voice, so-called because it has no drawl or twang that would stamp it sectional as was the voice of Calvin Coolidge, deftly handles aerial speech so that his personality "lives" on the air with every word. "He is a natural," whether addressing both visible and invisible audiences at the same time or in the quiet of his study during a "fire-side" chat.[7]

Postmaster General Farley testified to the effectiveness of the first fireside chat. He thought that the banking address would go down in history as one of the greatest utterances of an American President. He thought that no other talk in history ever called forth such a wave of spontaneous enthusiasm and cooperation.[8]

President Roosevelt became the best publicized President in our history. Not only the daily press and the radio kept him constantly before the public but the newsreels and magazines devoted considerable attention to him and his policies. No previous President had been such a good source of news. Gradually, the President's wife also became an important source of news. Any candidate who was to run against FDR from this point on would be up against a tremendous handicap. He could not possibly hope to become as well advertised. Some of Roosevelt's traits and actions repelled certain types of voters, but in the main they attracted support.

Roosevelt's first year in office has been called the honeymoon period. Congress and the public followed his leadership. Some legislation was passed in a matter of hours. In fact, so successful was he in leading Congress that he was charged by some with being a dictator.

President Roosevelt had his hardest time with Congress in trying to

[7] Nov. 8, 1936.

[8] *Behind the Ballots*, p. 210.



BY CARLISLE IN NEW YORK *HERALD TRIBUNE,* APRIL 28, 1934. Reproduced by permission.

carry out the promises of the Pittsburgh address regarding government economy and balancing the budget. His first director of the Bureau of the Budget, Lewis Douglas, he regarded as a "great find" because he backed the economy plan.[9] Later Roosevelt was to learn that on this question the views of Congress were to prevail. The drastic economies in numbers and salaries of Federal personnel he recognized as deflationary, but he persisted in pressing the Economy bill. A cynic might say that he may have wanted to purge the Republicans who had filled the civil service during the twenties.

The other accomplishments of the famous special session included the passage of the following legislation:

Emergency Banking Act
Agricultural Adjustment Act
National Industrial Recovery Act
Tennessee Valley Authority Act
Civilian Conservation Corps Act
Home Owners Loan Act
Glass–Steagall Banking Act
3.2 Per Cent Beer Act
$500,000,000 Emergency Relief Act
Securities Act
Wagner Employment Exchange Act
Gold Clause Resolution
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act

No one could accuse the Seventy-third Congress of being a do-nothing Congress. The One Hundred Days were the basis for FDR's four terms. Most of those who were helped did not forget.

Critics have pointed out that there were many inconsistencies in the original legislative program of the Roosevelt Administrations. The Economy bill and the closing of the banks were deflationary, while the CCC and the Emergency Relief Act were inflationary. The AAA and NRA were based on the theory of raising prices by restricting production, while TVA was based on the theory of raising standards of living by increasing productivity. During this period President Roosevelt's attention had been brought to the economic theories of the English economist

[9] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928–1945*, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 342.

THE LATEST EXPERIMENT

BY SHOEMAKER IN CHICAGO DAILY *NEWS*.

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John Maynard Keynes, and some of the members of the brain trust were followers of Keynes, but the President himself was not yet a supporter of the theory of curing the depression by a huge pump-priming spending program. The inconsistencies of the New Deal policies were to be ironed out by the Supreme Court, experience, and future sessions of Congress.

Roosevelt's first big adventure in the international field was not as successful as his domestic program. The message he sent to the London Economic Conference in June, 1933, barring American participation in currency stabilization, nearly broke up the conference. The failure of the conference to accomplish much was a setback to the cause of peace. The President was later to reverse himself on the stand which he took with the conference. The domestic repercussions of this fiasco were not serious. At the time FDR was more concerned with domestic than with international issues.

Within a year and a half after March, 1933, the honeymoon with the press and the business interests was over. Never again was Roosevelt to have such an era of good feeling. NRA had greatly stimulated the growth and demands of the trade unions. Employers were loud in their protests at this interference and the epidemic of strikes that it brought. AAA had raised the price of farm products to the consumer. The huge expenditures for the emergency relief program had increased the public debt, and doubts were being raised about the solvency of the nation. The Liberty League was founded in the summer of 1934 to combat the New Deal and discredit the President and his policies. Al Smith, who had denounced the "baloney" dollar, now took his walk out of the Democratic party into the ranks of the Liberty Leaguers. A number of conservative Democrats who had made contributions in 1932 to the party campaign funds went over to the opposition. And the newspaper correspondents who had welcomed the new President with such enthusiasm became once again their hard-bitten, disillusioned selves.[10]

The congressional campaign of 1934 indicated the nature of the opposition that the Democrats were to face. A Republican senator denounced the Administration's recovery measures as "un-American" and against the principles of American liberty. Ogden Mills, former Undersecretary of the Treasury and Roosevelt's Hyde Park neighbor, accused

[10] Rosten, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–60.

the New Dealers of "fostering revolution under the guise of recovery and reform." A Midwest superintendent of schools, putting an erroneous interpretation upon some Washington gossip he overheard, characterized the Roosevelt régime as "the Kerensky phase of a Communist upheaval."

President Roosevelt did not reply directly to these charges. General Hugh Johnson, head of NRA, assailed Ogden Mills and the Republican leaders as "nation-wreckers." Secretary Ickes defended the much maligned brain trust, saying that the opposition did not object to the use of brains as such, but "brains that are used for the benefit of the masses of people instead of for the privileged few." During the campaign the President made two fireside chats, one entitled "Are You Better Off Than You Were Last Year?" and the other entitled "We Are Moving Forward to Greater Freedom, to Greater Security for the Average Man." In these radio talks he praised Congress for its accomplishments, defended his emergency relief policies, pointed out the evidences of recovery, anticipated his social security program, denounced the labeling of the New Deal as "Fascism" or "Communism," defended the regulation of business and agriculture, and praised the machinery set up to regulate labor disputes.[11]

One of the generalizations that can be made regarding American politics is that a party which controls the Presidency is going to lose some seats in the congressional elections held in nonpresidential years.[12] According to this rule the Democratic party faced some reverses in the congressional elections of 1934. Those reverses did not occur. Instead, the party actually gained seats both in the House and in the Senate. Here was the first tribute that the voters could pay to the new President who had met the crisis of 1933 with such calmness and such willingness to act. As far as the great mass of voters was concerned, FDR had become a champion.

The results in certain states showed even more strongly the Democratic trend. Hoover had carried Pennsylvania in 1932, but in 1934 the Democrats carried the state for their candidates for governor and United States senator.

But the 1934 elections contained warnings as well as cheers for the

[11] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1934,* pp. 312, 413.

[12] See chart on p. 388 of C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, *The American Party System,* 4th ed. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949).

Roosevelt forces. While partial recovery had followed in the wake of the New Deal, unemployment, low standards of living, and economic insecurity had not been eliminated. Lindley referred to the New Deal as the Roosevelt revolution, but there were many who thought that the Democratic party had not moved fast enough and far enough to the left.

In Wisconsin the New Deal did not mean the organization of a strong Democratic party but rather the coming of a third party led by the La Follettes. In 1934 the split in the ranks of the Republican party led to the formation of the Progressive party. As a Progressive candidate, Senator Robert M. La Follette received a majority of all the votes cast in 1934. The Democratic candidate for senator, however, received only a quarter of the votes. How would this upheaval affect the Democratic presidential ticket in 1936?

In California, Upton Sinclair, writer and former Socialist, won the Democratic nomination for governor and campaigned on a platform of "End Poverty in California." Here the Democratic party was held by some to be moving too rapidly to the left. Sinclair really frightened the conservative elements in the state, and they went all out to defeat him. The Republican propagandists put on an anti-Sinclair campaign of unparalleled alarmist character and elected their conservative candidate governor. What effect would this have on the Democratic fortunes in the state in 1936?

Following the strengthening of the Democratic majority in Congress, President Roosevelt pushed through a new series of social reforms. It was hoped that these Acts would ward off the demagogues who were making more extreme demands. Congress enacted the Social Security Act, a stronger Banking Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Public Utility Holding Company bill, a tax bill, a work relief bill, and other far-reaching measures. This program was not put through without terrific opposition. The relatively smooth sailing of the One Hundred Days was no longer possible. As economic conditions improved, the opposition of the business and industrial groups to the Roosevelt policies grew more vocal.

Other developments early in 1935 presented a threat to Roosevelt's policies and to his chances for renomination and reelection in 1936.

Applying the Pressure

BY SYKES IN PHILADELPHIA *PUBLIC LEDGER,* MAY 1, 1935. Reproduced by permission.

Senator Huey Long was extending his power to adjoining states, and in the Senate he was proving to be a thorn in the flesh of the Roosevelt supporters. Particularly in the field of international relations, when he teamed up with Father Coughlin and other isolationist elements, was Senator Long able to do considerable damage. The failure of the resolution of adherence to the World Court was due to the isolationists. Farley reported that Long's threat to form an independent ticket was a real danger.[13] It was not until September, 1935, that the threat was removed by the assassination of the senator. National Chairman Farley and others high in the party command could then heave a sigh of relief.

Father Coughlin, the radio priest from Detroit, had been a Roosevelt supporter in 1932, but he opened an attack upon Roosevelt in 1935. Some of the bitter accusations made by the radio priest had to be retracted, but the attack continued. The New Deal was not going ahead fast enough. The resolution of adherence to the World Court, he contended, would jeopardize American standards of living and lead to war, and he appealed to his great listening audience for help "to keep America safe for Americans and not let it be the hunting ground of international plutocrats."

The period marked the forging ahead of one of Roosevelt's advisers who had been with him since 1931. Harry Hopkins became the head of Works Progress Administration, which had the largest share of the emergency relief funds. In Hopkins, President Roosevelt found an administrator after his own heart. Hopkins was attacked as a profligate spender and wasteful administrator, but his detractors failed to note that he was a master in achieving his objectives. The purpose of WPA was to put people to work. Cutting through red tape and going directly to his task, Hopkins put the money to work in record time.

The year 1935 marked the clear-cut beginning of the President's struggle with the Supreme Court, which was to have many popular repercussions. While the Supreme Court did not possess great prestige in the early days of our history, by the twentieth century it had acquired a sacrosanct character. The Court was the ark of the covenant, and let no man, however popular with the voters, lay his hands upon it. The Court issue gave the opposition the kind of handle which they had been search-

[13] C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, p. 250.

ing for desperately ever since the popularity of the President had begun to grow.

The Court was a body of nine old men, a majority of whom belonged to the nineteenth century. The New Deal was contrary to their economic predilections. Beginning in January with an oil case,[14] the Court began systematically to invalidate one New Deal measure after another.

Early in 1935 FDR prepared a speech he proposed to deliver if the Court invalidated the Gold Clause Resolution.[15] This he did not deliver when the Court upheld the Act by a 5 to 4 decision.[16] The Railroad Retirement Act, however, was declared unconstitutional.[17] Later, when the Court invalidated the code-making provisions of the National Recovery Act,[18] the President let loose. At his press conference he declared that the Court's decision was trying to take us back to the "horse and buggy" days of our national history:

> Since 1885 the Court in various decisions has enlarged on the definition of interstate commerce-railroad cases, coal cases and so forth and so on. It was clearly the opinion of the Congress before this decision and the opinion of various attorneys-general, regardless of party, that the words "Interstate commerce" applied not only to an actual shipment of goods but also to a great many other things that affected interstate commerce. . . .
>
> The whole tendency over these years has been to view the interstate commerce clause in the light of present-day civilization. The country was in the horse-and-buggy age when that clause was written. . . .
>
> And so it does bring us up rather squarely as to the big issue in the country and as to how we are going to solve it. The big issue is this: Does this decision mean that the United States Government has no control over any national economic problem?
>
> We are the only Nation in the world that has not solved that problem. We thought we were solving it, and now it has been thrown right straight in our faces. We have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce.[19]

This was the break that the opposition was looking for. The President

[14] Panama Refining Co. *v.* Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
[15] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928–1945,* ed. Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 456–460.
[16] Norman *v.* B. & O. R.R., 294 U.S. 240.
[17] R.R. Retirement Board *v.* Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
[18] Schechter Poultry Corp. *v.* U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
[19] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1935,* pp. 208, 209, 221.

was criticizing the sacred Court. It is true that President Jefferson had criticized the Court, so had Presidents Jackson and Lincoln. But no President since Lincoln had said anything like this. The President who had been concerned about the opposition from the left was now concerned about the opposition from the right.

By the beginning of 1936 the issues of the coming election campaign were pretty well drawn. FDR would be opposed by the conservatives of the American Liberty League and the so-called Jefferson Democrats. He would also be opposed by rabble-rousing extremists such as Father Coughlin, Gerald L. K. Smith, the Union Party, and the Communists.

In addition Roosevelt faced the 1936 convention and campaign without the services of his trusted Louis Howe, who had passed away on April 19, 1936. This meant that FDR and his wife personally had to take care of matters which Howe used to do. Here is an example:

F.D.R. TO JAMES A. FARLEY

THE WHITE HOUSE
March 26, 1936

Memorandum for the Postmaster General:

Here is a suggestion to prevent crossing of wires.

1. All speech material, replies through the daily press clip sheets, attacks on our opponents, direct answers to them, etc., to clear through Charlie Michelson.

2. All pamphlets—obtaining of authors' services, preparation and editing of manuscript, determination of format, plans for distribution, etc., to clear through Stanley High, it being understood, of course, that he will cooperate with Michelson and Halsey and keep them advised every two or three days of progress.

3. Radio policy—I suggest that this be put in the hands of a committee of three—Michelson, High and the head of the Speakers Bureau.

4. Plans for organizing business men—I suggest the Chairman arrange with Forbes Morgan, Michelson and High for names of the committee and preparation of statements and letters to go out.

I should like to glance personally at this publicity before it is decided on.

F.D.R.[20]

[20] Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Howe was gone, Moley no longer headed the brain trust, "Iron Pants" Johnson was with the opposition, and Al Smith had taken a walk, but Roosevelt was not dismayed. Big Jim Farley was there; Judge Rosenman was on call, and don't forget the "Missus" (Eleanor). She knew a thing or two about campaigning, and then Franklin himself had not forgotten what Howe had taught him and what he had learned from bitter experience.

Edward L. Roddan, International News Service correspondent, had joined the staff of the Democratic National Committee in January to assist Charlie Michelson. FDR told Roddan he was tired of defensive tactics. Michelson and Roddan went on the offensive against the Liberty League, and in no time they had effectively branded it as a "Millionaires' Union." [21] Senator Blaine had not been helped by his Delmonico dinner of "millionaires." The brand was deadly poison to a party.

Alfred M. Landon, governor of Kansas, became the chief contender for the Republican nomination early in 1936. Farley, in a speech on May 20th before the Michigan State Democratic convention, predicted that the Republican nominee would be "the governor of a typical prairie state." Congressman Dewey Short seized upon this reference to a "prairie state" as a reflection on the citizens of Missouri, Illinois, and Kansas. Landon, he said, was of humble but honest parents, even if he could not boast of an illustrious family or of being born with a silver spoon in his mouth. As a result of this incident Roosevelt sent the following advice on speechmaking to the Democratic National Chairman:

F.D.R. TO JAMES A. FARLEY

THE WHITE HOUSE
May 22, 1936

Memorandum for J.A.F.:

I thought we had decided any reference to Landon or any other Republican candidate was inadvisable.

Now that the water is over the dam, I told Michelson that possibly a somewhat facetious reference to Frank Knox, between now and June ninth, by you might soften the effect of the Landon reference. Another good rule which should be passed down the line to all who are concerned with speech material is that no section of the country should be spoken of as "typical,"

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 566. See above, p. 54, for explanation of the Delmonico incident.

but only with some laudatory adjective. If the sentence had read, "One of those splendid prairie States," no one could have picked us up on it, but the word "typical" coming from any New Yorker is meat for the opposition.

F.D.R.[22]

Roosevelt considered Landon the easiest Republican nominee to beat of those prominently considered before the Republican convention. Borah was the leading progressive Republican to seek the nomination. Conservative Republican leaders looked longingly at Hoover or Senator Vandenberg. Governor Landon had won his election for governor of Kansas in 1932 in a curious three-cornered race. There were not many Republican governors left. Roosevelt had Roddan prepare a pamphlet on Governor Landon's record before the Republican convention met and nominated the Kansas governor.

Alf Landon was five years younger than Roosevelt. He classed himself as a self-made middle-class independent oil producer. In 1912 and 1914 he bolted the Republican ticket along with several others who were tired of high tariff and no improvement projects.

The Democratic National Convention which convened in Philadelphia on June 23, 1936, was far different from the Chicago convention of 1932. There was no doubt as to who was in command at Philadelphia. The principal function of the body was to draw up a platform and give various party leaders a chance to defend the record of the party. Postmaster General Farley opened the convention and Senator Barkley gave the keynote address, during the course of which he defended President Roosevelt's critical attitude toward the Supreme Court. Senator Robinson, the Permanent Chairman, also defended the President's position on constitutional issues and attacked the Republican platform and candidate. Marking the changing character of the Democratic party was the address of the Democratic Negro congressman from Illinois, Arthur W. Mitchell, who paid tribute to President Roosevelt and the New Deal. The platform was drafted by the Resolutions Committee, but it showed the marks of the President's handiwork.

After a long series of nominating and seconding speeches, President Roosevelt was renominated by acclamation. Notable was the applause given to Governor Lehman when he rose to second the nomination.

[22] President's Secretary's File—1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Saving Him for the Last Quarter? - - - - -By Knott
RECOVERY DRIVE
SEND ME IN THERE, COACH, THEY CAN'T NEVER STOP ME!
BOY, THAT'S WHAT I'M AFRAID OF!
INFLATION
FDR

BY KNOTT IN DALLAS *MORNING NEWS*, NOV. 30, 1934.

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The demonstration was part of Roosevelt's strategy to draft Lehman for renomination for governor of New York. The renomination of John Nance Garner for Vice President was also by acclamation.

In his acceptance speech Roosevelt hit upon a religious note. He expanded upon the thirteenth verse of I Corinthians 13:

> Faith—in the soundness of democracy in the midst of dictatorship.
>
> Hope—renewed because we know as well the progress we have made.
>
> Charity—in the true spirit of that grand old word. For charity literally translated from the original means love, and love that understands, that does not merely share the wealth of the giver, but in true sympathy and wisdom helps men to help themselves.[23]

This speech will go down in history for the striking phrases, "rendezvous with destiny" and "economic royalists."

[23] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1936,* p. 235.

XV

THE 1936 CAMPAIGN

His enemies shall lick the dust.
—Psalms, 77:9

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT approached the 1936 campaign with confidence. As has been abundantly indicated in these pages, this was not a new or unexpected attitude for him to take. He kept repeating that 85 per cent of the press was against him, but that did not faze him. He would show the editors and publishers what he could do with 15 per cent of the press behind him.

Howe's death was a great loss. Who would step into the gap? Those who were left had to work a little harder, including the candidate's wife. At the request of the President, Mrs. Roosevelt held a conference with those in charge of the Democratic headquarters. In a memorandum of July 16, 1936, she raised a dozen questions regarding the coming campaign. She asked about the publicity steering committee, the analysis of news, the planning of a radio program, research on the New Deal and on Landon's record, relation of national state publicity organizations, the strategy for the whole campaign, plans for doubtful states, newsreels, campaign speeches, contacts with newspapers, and the speakers' bureau, including Negro speakers.[1]

Jim Farley required twenty pages to answer this memorandum from Mrs. Roosevelt.

During the first part of the summer, President Roosevelt coasted along.

[1] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928–1945,* ed. Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 598–600.

He made some "nonpolitical" speeches on his tour of the drought areas. Let the Republicans tire themselves out. Let them pass their peak. Let the Republican National Chairman, John Hamilton, continue to rant about the New Deal. The voters would get tired of his calamity howling. And so they did.

FDR's opponents did not agree that his July and August appearances were nonpolitical. The isolationists in particular pounced upon his Chautauqua address of August 14, entitled "I have seen war . . . I hate war." In the speech he warned his listeners that the international situation was disturbing. While he emphasized the peaceful aims of the United States, he stated that so long as war existed there would be some danger that even the nation which most ardently desired peace might be drawn into it.[2]

The President expressed the wish that American foreign policy issues would be above partisan politics, and he hoped that his opponent would agree with him on this stand. In this he was to be disappointed. Landon was backed by William Allen White, famous publisher of the Emporia *Gazette,* who was later to be a valiant fighter against isolationism, but in 1936 the isolationist sentiment in the ranks of the Republican party was too strong for White to buck.

The apparent strategy of the Republican campaign was to build on the conservative business interests that were anti-Roosevelt; to draw away those agricultural elements in the Midwest that were dissatisfied with the AAA; to win back the Progressive Republicans; to attract some of the labor vote, and to win over all of those who were fearful of one or more aspects of the New Deal. Landon was counseled to offend no one, neither William Randolph Hearst nor William Allen White.

John Hamilton, Republican National Chairman, fellow Kansan, led the Landon organization. In July he frankly said: "You can't win the coming campaign by being nice. Those Republicans who say we should talk on constructive issues don't know their politics. You beat men in office, you don't elect men. People vote their dislikes." He added:

What will the voter choose if he votes to support the Roosevelt Administration? . . . Will he vote for the revival of NRA, for a continuation of

[2] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928–1945,* p. 611, and *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1936,* p. 285.

BY HERBLOCK IN PORT ARTHUR *NEWS*, JAN. 3, 1934.
Reproduced by permission of NEA Service, Inc.

politics in relief, for increased and still increasing debt, for uncontrolled spending, for the complete cessation of Civil Service in Government, for the total loss of all foreign markets, for the still greater increase in importation of foreign foodstuffs, for Executive control over the value of money, and for complete control of the Government within the Federal Executive? These are the policies which make up the New Deal record.[3]

Since Hamilton did more speaking than Landon, Secretary Ickes referred sarcastically to Hamilton's first campaign for President. But Hamilton was an able organizer, and he brought together a top-flight staff of newspaper men, advertising and public relations men and researchers who did a good professional job. Over 300,000,000 pieces of literature were distributed. William Hard made a series of popular radio broadcasts. And the poison squad of the party started a whispering campaign regarding Roosevelt's family life, his health, his Jewish advisers and his Catholic advisers.

Landon was pictured as the "great economizer," a "Kansas Coolidge," a man of "common sense," hard-working self-made American, a man of his word.

The Democrats had failed to solve unemployment and had turned to "boondoggling." The Republicans would see that industry absorbed unemployment. The Republicans would resist all attempts to impair the authority of the Supreme Court. They would eliminate monopolies and bring back free enterprise and private competition. The budget would be balanced. The merit system would be restored. No more pigs would be killed while people were hungry. A sound currency would be reestablished. Business confidence would be restored.

Roosevelt continued serenely to make some more nonpolitical addresses during a presidential drought-inspection trip. He never gave his opponent any free publicity by mentioning his name. He ignored him in order to belittle him. To be sure, Charlie Michelson pictured Landon as muddleheaded and vacillating. Ickes blasted Landon's Hearst connections. Hopkins showed up the governor's relief record in Kansas. Roose-

[3] Excerpted from *Time*, Sept. 21 issue, copyright Time Inc., 1936. After the election, Hamilton said that the GOP lost because they forgot the people who live on the other side of the tracks.

velt never marred his dignity as a statesman by descending to personalities.

The Democratic campaign organization functioned smoothly. To counteract the whispers about Jewish and Catholic advisers, the Democratic Committee borrowed Dr. Stanley High, one-time editor of the *Christian Herald,* from the National Broadcasting Company. Dr. High organized a Good Neighbor League whose alleged object was to unite the forms of Feminism, Piety, and Pacifism behind Roosevelt. Among the directors were Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt and Methodist Bishop Edgar Blake. The League was active in organizing both white and colored voters with Protestant backgrounds.[4]

Organized labor lined up behind FDR in an impressive manner. John L. Lewis, of the United Mine Workers, and Sidney Hillman, of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, organized a Non-Partisan League which turned over half a million dollars to the Democratic campaign fund and furnished a vast throng of volunteer workers in the mining and industrial areas. This was the year when the rugged John L. Lewis, chief of the United Mine Workers of America, went all out for FDR. At the beginning of the New Deal the United Mine Workers Union had been in a very critical condition indeed. Internecine warfare, unemployment, and development of new coal fields in the unorganized areas had reduced its membership. But Lewis had the vision to see that the labor provisions of NRA could be used to restore his faded fortunes. His men swept through the unorganized regions, and by the end of 1934 Lewis was the leader of the most powerful union in the United States. In 1936 he was grateful to FDR.

President Roosevelt claimed that the first political speech he made in this campaign was the one before the Democratic State Convention which met at Syracuse, New York, on September 29, entitled "Never Has a Nation Made Greater Strides in the Safeguarding of Democracy." In this speech, before a wildly enthusiastic audience, he discussed false campaign issues and how the growth of Communism was prevented by his present Administration. He announced the rejection of all Communist support in the campaign, made a comparison of Republican and Democratic

[4] Stanley High, *Roosevelt—And Then?* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1937).

leadership and philosophy, and stated that liberalism was the best protection of farsighted conservatives.

In the Note to this speech, FDR discussed the procedure he followed in the preparation of speeches. He wrote:

> In the preparation of campaign speeches as well as speeches on other occasions, I have called on many different people for advice and assistance. This was also my custom during my term as Governor of New York. On various subjects I have received drafts and memoranda from different people, varying from short suggestions as to a sentence here and there, to long memoranda of factual material and, in some cases, complete addresses.
>
> In addition to such suggestions, I make it a practice to keep a "speech material file." . . .
>
> In preparing a speech I usually take the various drafts and suggestions which have been submitted to me and also the material which has been accumulated in the speech file on various subjects, read them carefully, lay them aside, and then dictate my own draft, usually to Miss Tully. Naturally, the final speech will contain some of the thoughts and even some of the sentences which appeared in some of the drafts or suggestions submitted.[5]

Roosevelt's chief assistants in writing speeches during the 1936 campaign were Charlie Michelson, Judge Rosenman, Stanley High, Thomas (Tommy, the Cork) Corcoran, and Benjamin Cohen. Of the Moley crowd, Adolf Berle and Rexford Tugwell were still around; but the party campaign people kept Tugwell strictly under wraps, since he had become a target for the opposition.

Roosevelt's first campaign trip, on October 1, was a short one through West Virginia and Pennsylvania. On this trip the principal address was made in Pittsburgh on the subject "The Only Way to Keep the Government Out of the Red Is to Keep the People Out of the Red." It was an obvious attempt to answer the charges that he had gone back upon his campaign promise of 1932 to balance the budget and reduce government expenditures. He presented some statistics on government finances and then described the Administration's battle against the depression. He claimed that the deflationary spiral had been checked, that there had been a restoration of purchasing power, and that the debt could be paid

[5] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1936,* p. 391. See also Samuel I. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt.*

Looks Like The Only Train Out

BY HARPER IN *BIRMINGHAM AGE-HERALD*, NOV. 19, 1934. Reproduced by permission.

out of increased national income. Between a balanced budget and human misery, he never hesitated:

To balance our budget in 1933 or 1934 or 1935 would have been a crime against the American people. To do so we would either have had to make a capital levy that would have been confiscatory, or we should have had to set our face against human suffering with callous indifference. When Americans suffered, we refused to pass by on the other side. Humanity came first.[6]

His most extensive campaign tour covered Maryland, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and upstate New York. In St. Paul he declared, "This Administration is determined to continue in active support of the ever-growing farm cooperative movement." After paying tribute to the late Governor Floyd Olson, he laid down the proposition that agriculture and industry were dependent on each other for prosperity. He defended the reciprocal foreign trade agreements on the ground that they opened foreign markets and worked for world peace.

At Omaha, Nebraska, he paid a growing tribute to the American farmer. As he put it, "The American farmer living on his own land remains our ideal of self-reliance and of spiritual balance."

. . . the source from which the reservoirs of the Nation's strength are constantly renewed. It is from the men and women of our farms, living close to the soil that this Nation, like the Greek giant Antaeus, rises with strength renewed a hundred-fold.[7]

In this same speech he deserted the Democratic candidate for United States senator and came out boldly for the reelection of Senator Norris, who was running on an independent ticket. He said:

On this platform sits a man whose reputation for many years has been known in every community—a man old in years, but young in heart—a man who through all these years has had no boss but his own conscience—the Senior Senator from the State of Nebraska, given to the Nation by the people of Nebraska—George W. Norris.

Outside of my own state of New York, I have consistently refrained from taking part in elections in any other state.

But Senator Norris's name has been entered as a candidate for Senator

[6] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1936,* p. 404. [7] *Ibid.,* pp. 438–439.

from Nebraska. And to my rule of non-participation in State elections, I have made—and so long as he lives I always will make—one magnificently justified exception.

George Norris's candidacy transcends State and party lines. In our National history we have had few elder statesmen who like him have preserved the aspirations of youth as they accumulated the wisdom of years.

He is one of the major prophets of America.[8]

When FDR came to Kansas, he gave Landon a working over. With great glee he invaded the enemy's territory. The gaiety of his campaign technique is well illustrated by his whistle-stop extemporaneous remarks at Emporia, Kansas, the home of William Allen White, the "discoverer" and one of the chief backers of Landon:

My friends, I am very glad to come to Emporia, but I do not see Bill White. (Laughter, applause.)

I wish he were here because I have known him for a great many years, and he is a very old friend of mine. He is a very good friend of mine for three and a half years out of every four years.

(Somebody in the audience said Mr. White was in the audience and coming up. The President said, "Where is he?" Mr. White then came toward the rear platform).

Hello, Bill, glad to see you. Come on over here. How are you?

Now that I see him, I shall not say anything about the other six months. . . . (Laughter, applause.)

Some day I hope I shall be able to come back to Emporia and spend a little more time with you and, when I get back, it may be in one of those three-and-a-half-year periods when Bill White is with me.

(The President then turned to Mr. White and said, "How are you? All right?" to which Mr. White replied, "Fine." There was a great deal of applause when the President shook hands with Mr. White).[9]

Going on through Missouri and Illinois to Chicago, the President made a major address in the windy city. He declared that it was his present administration which saved the system of private profit and free enterprise.

At Cleveland, Ohio, he stated that "the interest of every business man is bound to the interest of every wage earner." Fair wages and hours for workers were not only simple justice but also good business. He took

[8] *Ibid*, pp. 431–432.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 465–466.

the occasion to denounce the waste of stockholder's money in false propaganda.

Perhaps one of the gravest campaign errors of the Republicans was their propaganda against the new Social Security Act. It did not take Roosevelt long to take advantage of their stupidity. In a scathing denunciation of this form of campaigning, he said:

> Every message in a pay envelope, even if it is the truth, is a command to vote according to the will of the employer. But this propaganda is worse—it is deceit.
>
> They tell the worker his wage will be reduced by a contribution to some vague form of old-age insurance. They carefully conceal from him the fact that for every dollar of premium he pays for that insurance, the employer pays another dollar. That omission is deceit.
>
> They carefully conceal from him the fact that under the federal law, he receives another insurance policy to help him if he loses his job, and that the premium of that policy is paid 100 percent by the employer and not one cent by the worker. They do not tell him that the insurance policy that is bought for him is far more favorable to him than any policy that any private insurance company could afford to issue. That omission is deceit. . . .
>
> But they are guilty of more than deceit. When they imply that the reserves thus created against both these policies will be stolen by some future Congress, diverted to some wholly foreign purpose, they attack the integrity and honor of American Government itself. . . .
>
> I am sure the vast majority of law-abiding businessmen who are not parties to this propaganda fully appreciate the extent of the threat to honest business contained in this coercion.
>
> I have expressed indignation at this form of campaigning and I am confident that the overwhelming majority of employers, workers and the general public share that indignation and will show it at the polls on Tuesday next.[10]

In the same fighting speech President Roosevelt recognized that the upper income groups were against him. The members of his own group had disowned him. In a passage of unusual bitterness, he said:

> We had to struggle with the old enemies of peace-business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering.
>
> They had begun to consider the Government of the United States as a

[10] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1936,* pp. 569–570.

Looks Like Most of His Ammunition Is Melting Away —By Talburt

BY TALBURT IN WASHINGTON *DAILY NEWS.*

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mere appendage to their own affairs. We know now that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by organized mob.

Never before in all our history have these forces been so united against one candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their hate for me —and I welcome their hatred.[11]

The reports from the state chairmen that Chairman Farley was receiving were highly favorable. He maintained that they showed the unreliability of the *Literary Digest* poll, which was showing Landon in the lead. Other public-opinion surveys, such as the Gallup poll, which was making its first prepresidential election poll, indicated that Roosevelt was in the lead.

In the Democratic headquarters pool, Farley predicted that Roosevelt would carry every state except Maine and Vermont. The President himself was not that optimistic. He estimated that he would receive some 360 electoral votes and Landon 171.

Farley had hit the nail on the head. Landon lost his home state of Kansas and won only Maine and Vermont. The rout of the Republicans, begun in 1930, was complete. Landon did better in Kansas than in any state west of Vermont, but his pulling power as a favorite son could not overcome the overwhelming sentiment that Roosevelt had built up. In Nebraska, Senator Norris defeated both the Republicans and the Democratic candidates, although he ran behind Roosevelt. In the country as a whole, Roosevelt received 61 per cent of the total vote. The metropolitan regions made a very considerable contribution to Roosevelt's national vote.

In the 1936 elections we have for the first time the social and economic breakdowns for a national sample of the electorate. According to Gallup and Roper surveys, Roosevelt's vote had definite economic and social characteristics. He failed to carry the upper income group, the businessmen, or the professional group, but his popularity was great in the lower income group, the workers—especially those in trade unions—the farmers, and the unemployed. Among the religious groups he was most popular with Catholics, Jews and non-church members, barely carrying the Protestant vote.[12]

[11] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1936,* p. 568.

[12] C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, *The American Party System,* p. 137.

XVI

NOMINATED FOR A THIRD TERM

Those nine old men—a better fight none of us ever took in.
—HARRY HOPKINS

THE exhilaration of the 1936 election victory did not last for long. The Supreme Court issue, the isolationist question and the deepening crisis in world affairs, increasing defense expenditures and the fiscal crisis split the ranks of the Democratic party wide open. With harmony gone, Roosevelt faced as hostile a Legislature as he had in Albany.

The Supreme Court fight and the unsuccessful attempt to "purge" recalcitrant congressmen in the Democratic primaries of 1938 are usually referred to as political blunders on the part of a master politician. These battles aroused opposition and divided the party. FDR did not achieve his immediate objectives.

The Supreme Court fight began on February 5, 1937, when President Roosevelt delivered his bombshell message to Congress on the need for changing the size of the Court in order to have a court which would act in keeping with the times. The President did not like what the Court had done to his program. He had made that abundantly clear during his second Administration, when he delivered his famous "horse and buggy" tirade against the Court. The people knew where he stood.

The Court battle was the situation that the opposition was looking for, the opposition within his own party as well as the opposition that called itself the GOP. The Champ had slipped. He had attacked a sacred idol. Now they would get the Champ. The whole weight of mass communi-

cations, the "free press," would be thrown against him. His mightiest warriors would be defeated. The Champ had started a fight that he could not win, that is, he could not win and stay within the rules of the democratic game as it had been played by Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, and Wilson.

The President made a dignified speech outlining the issues at stake. He had a program which the people liked. America must choose. Did the farmer want crop controls and the parity system, or did he want to go back to the cutthroat competition and low prices of the "horse and buggy" days? Did organized labor want the Wagner Act or the sweatshop and child-labor system of the "free" labor market? Did the consumers want low prices for electricity or did they want to pay what the industry thought the traffic would bear? Of course, the Court did not put the case as baldly as that. American lawyers furnished them with a wonderful vocabulary for saying unpopular things as though they were inevitable, part of the sacred law, part of the divine covenant—the Constitution. The Court could say: The people established the Constitution; the Constitution attempts to save the people from themselves; therefore, the people whose will is embodied in the sacred document cannot have what the law says is not good for them. In other words, the Book says that the people in their more sober mood, that is, our ancestors who were living 150 years ago, in their great wisdom, foresaw that in the twentieth century we might try to do something foolish and therefore laid down the guiding principles.

The battle was joined. The odds against Roosevelt looked great indeed. If Louis Howe had been alive, he might have persuaded his chief not to take the risk. The nine old men would not live forever. Father Time would take care of the situation. Franklin should have been warned not to be impatient. At the time, however, Roosevelt did not know that he would have seven years more to change the composition of the Court. Much can happen to nine old men in seven years. The fact that nothing had happened during the preceding four was galling. FDR had not really learned the lesson of patience after all. If he had recognized that he had to bide his time in such matters, he would have been much better off.

Roosevelt had some brash young men around him who egged him on to do the impossible.

If 75 per cent of the press was against FDR's reelection in 1936, almost 99 per cent was against his "Court-packing" scheme.

The Court scheme was rejected by Congress, whose Democratic leaders were in open rebellion. Under our peculiar system of government, seniority controls in the legislative body. The elder statesmen in Congress were those from the South, where a convenient lack of opposition enabled them to weather popular storms. The senior congressmen from the South, in key positions both in the House and in the Senate, had much in common with the nine old men, including love of the Constitution when that document seemed to protect their interests, and they were impervious to popular clamor.

In the midst of the battle over Court reform, Senator Robinson, president pro tem of the Senate and leader of the Democrats in that august body, died. This was a terrific blow to the President, for Robinson had had a strong sense of party loyalty. At once the battle was joined for the choice of his successor. If the antireform forces could put a conservative Democrat in the key post, then the Court scheme would be as good as defeated. Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi was their man. FDR backed Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky. By the close vote of 38 to 37, Barkley won. In this connection the attempt to line up Senator Truman's vote presents a most interesting story.

Senator Truman had pledged his support to Senator Harrison. To the senator from Missouri a pledge was a pledge. According to William Hillman, Farley tried to influence Truman's vote by bringing pressure to bear upon Tom Pendergast, the political boss of Kansas City who had made Truman's political career possible. According to President Truman's notes on his relations with the Pendergast organization, we have the following:

T. J. Pendergast never talked to me about my actions as county judge—except in the routine manner of party patronage and that one time when he supported me on the bond issue contracts. He only got in touch with me once when I was in the Senate and that was when Senator Alben Barkley was running for floor leader. Jim Farley called Mr. Pendergast and asked him to call me and "tell" me to support Barkley. Pendergast called me from Colorado Springs and I told him that I was pledged to Pat Harrison of Mississippi because Pat had asked me to vote for him and that Pat had made

some speeches for me in the Missouri campaign, and that I'd stand by Senator Harrison. T.J. said "I told him that if you were committed you'd stand by your commitment, because you are a contrary Missourian." I voted for Pat and told Barkley in advance that I would. When Barkley was elected I supported him loyally.[1]

In the case of Senator William Dieterich of Illinois, White House pressure was more successful.[2]

The Barkley victory was not enough. Senator Barkley lacked Robinson's experience. The Court bill in the form that the President had recommended did not pass. With increasing resignations from the Court, time won the battle which a frontal attack could not win in 1937. Not many years after this, the nine men were said to constitute the Roosevelt Court.

Stung by the defeat in the Court battle and by reverses on social legislation and tax matters, the President decided to take the issue to the people in the primary and general elections of 1938. FDR did not undertake a large-scale operation. As he put it:

> The primary campaigns in which I actively spoke, consisted of one congressional campaign in my own home State, one senatorial campaign in my other home State of Georgia, one in Kentucky (where the choice was not between a conservative and a liberal, but between two liberals, one of whom was the experienced Democratic leader of the Senate), and one senatorial campaign in the State of Maryland, where I was accompanied by the chairman of the Democratic National Committee. It must be remembered, also, that in some of these States, and in some other States, a definite misuse was being made of my name by one candidate or the other, falsely claiming that I favored his election. Under such circumstances I exercised my clear right to speak out in the interest of truth.[3]

Limited though the President's activities were in the 1938 primaries, they aroused the Legislature against him. The power of the legislator

[1] William Hillman, *Mr. President* (New York, Farrar, Straus & Young, 1952), p. 188. A slightly different account is given in William P. Helm, *Harry Truman: A Political Biography* (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1947), p. 49.

[2] Grace Tully, *F.D.R. My Boss* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 225. Merlo John Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1951) gives a well balanced account of the court fight from the point of view of the Chief Justice.

[3] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. xxxii.

depends upon his ability to hold the support of his constituency over the years. If the prestige of the Executive is lined up against him, the independence of the Legislature is in danger. In Great Britain the executive can discipline the recalcitrant legislator, but an American President has no such power.

In the so-called "purge" of 1938, FDR had 435 House members and 96 senators against him. If FDR could discipline a few members of Congress whom he most disliked, then no member could be sure that his turn was not next. The members of the club did not like the thought. Everything must be done to see that the attempt was not successful. A legislator is elected by the votes of his constituency. He has a mandate. The crucial test is reelection. If the voters return him, that is proof that he interpreted his mandate correctly.

The President was attacking Congress in its weak spot. If the President could convince the local voters in a given district that he, and not their local representative, was the true interpreter of their mandate, then he was on the way to winning the battle.

When FDR was asking for votes for himself, the voters understood his appeals. When he asked the local voters to back his candidates, he had a much harder selling job. A voter who cast his ballot for FDR in 1936 might have supported House and Senate candidates who did not always see eye to eye with the President. On national issues the voter looked to the President for leadership. On local issues he looked to his local representatives. That there could be a conflict between national and local interests was entirely possible. A river and harbor improvement in Mississippi would not be of great direct benefit to the voters in Maine. This is the American system. It permits the citizens to eat cake nationally and locally. It is not the British system of representative government, under which the national representative is expected to be loyal to national interests.

The President lost the battle of the "purge." Localism, state pride, provincialism, local party organization, local mass communications, and local campaigning by the desperate victims of the intended "purge" were stronger than national party loyalty and the honeyed words of the great leader.

FDR actually waged a halfhearted campaign to give a lesson to the

most obstreperous of his party members. Only in Maryland did he get any support from National Chairman Farley. As a matter of fact, it was clear that Farley was dragging his feet. In New York the battle against O'Connor was largely in the hands of Edward J. Flynn. FDR could not, of course, put on an intensive personal campaign in 531 districts that would compete with the personal efforts of opponents of his legislative program, at least not before the days of television. He could have made, however, many more personal appeals than he did. As a matter of fact the label "purge" did not fit. There was no purge because FDR's heart was not in it. Had not he started his political career as a legislator?

The attempt to discipline the conservative members of his party was not the failure that it was made out to be in the press. The President indicated his preference for liberal candidates in four states. In New York and Kentucky the candidates he blessed won, and in Georgia and Maryland the candidates he had branded as conservatives won. In some games a .500 batting average is not considered bad.

The results of the 1938 primary elections were made to appear as a blow to Roosevelt's prestige as a vote getter. He could get votes for himself, but he could not count on getting enough votes for his favorite party candidates for Congress for them to win in more than half the cases. At least, using the methods which he did, he was unable to guarantee that crucial margin for his legislative favorites.

After the primaries the battle shifted to the general congressional elections to be held in November. President Roosevelt continued to plead for a liberal Congress. By this he meant a Democratic Congress, although we have seen that in Nebraska and a few other states he sometimes backed independent progressive candidates.

The Democrats knew that they would lose many seats in the 1938 elections. The pendulum effect in American politics was bound to assert itself again after the freak elections of 1934.[4] FDR was anxious to prevent his party from losing control of Congress.

In both the House and the Senate, the Democrats kept a substantial margin. They elected 262 representatives as against 169 Republican rep-

[4] C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, *The American Party System*, pp. 387–388; L. Bean, *How to Predict Elections* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

resentatives, and they retained 69 seats in the Senate as opposed to 23 Republican seats. Republican gains were made in the rural areas of the Northwest and in the Midwest. This marked a reversion to an earlier pattern. Democratic candidates in the urban centers were better able to hold their own.[5]

In the beginning of 1939 President Roosevelt faced some difficult decisions. According to the two-term tradition he had two more years left in the White House. He was making plans to return to private life. The practice of law could again be renewed, and journalism, his first love at Harvard, also had its attractions.[6] While being in the White House had been great fun, the Washington climate was not kind to his sinus trouble. He looked forward to relaxing the pace and spending more time with his family.

Who would carry on the program which was so dear to his heart? Which one of the New Dealers would be the most likely to continue on the trails that had been blazed? He could sense the competition among some of his Cabinet members for the mantle he thought he was soon to lay down. Hull, Farley, and Garner were obvious contenders. These men he regarded as too conservative.

The man who could really read FDR's mind and carry out his wishes was the frail Harry Hopkins. As Churchill was to put it later, "I am most grateful to you for sending so remarkable an envoy who enjoys so high a measure of your intimacy and confidence."[7] Moley contended that FDR never took the Hopkins presidential boom seriously.[8] In December, 1938, however, President Roosevelt appointed Hopkins Secretary of Commerce. What was the purpose of this? Was it to show the business world that Hopkins did not have horns? For his part, Hopkins considered seriously for a while the possibility of running, but he was soon convinced that his health precluded this prospect.[9]

Where should Roosevelt turn next? The problem did not seem to have an immediate solution.

[5] See maps in Merriam and Gosnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115.

[6] He had a contract with a well known magazine for a series of articles.

[7] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 243.

[8] Raymond Moley, *27 Masters of Politics* (New York, Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1949), p. 41.

[9] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–99, 172, 938–939.

In the meantime, the President's attention was absorbed more and more by international affairs. The rise of Hitler had coincided in point of time with the New Deal. By the end of 1938 Hitler had launched his program of German imperialism. Encouraged by Hitler's success, Mussolini was on a rampage in Ethiopia. Japan had stepped up her imperialistic adventures. In 1937 in his famous "Quarantine speech" FDR had warned the American people of impending disaster if the aggressors were not stopped. At Chicago he had called upon the peace-loving nations to "make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality." [10] These were prophetic words, but the reaction of the isolationists was immediate and violent. FDR was a "warmonger." His attitude would involve the United States in foreign wars. FDR had to be repudiated. The President, perhaps tired by the Supreme Court fight, dropped his schemes for world peace for the time being and proceeded to rearm against the increasing threat of aggression.

The issue of America's role in world affairs became more and more pressing. In 1938 the appeasement of Hitler at Munich alarmed many prominent Americans. A year later, when the famous pact between Hitler and Stalin was announced, World War II broke out. Poland and the Baltic states were overrun by Hitler's panzer divisions and the Soviet hordes.

The beginning of 1940 found the war at an inconclusive stage. Poland had been conquered and divided, but there were still left the French Army, the Maginot Line, and the British military forces. And then the blitzkrieg struck the Western European countries. Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France fell like ten pins. England was tottering on the verge of defeat. Maginot Line strategy had been disastrous. Isolationism was kin to Maginot Line thinking. To build up the defenses of our country, FDR called upon all patriotic citizens to put aside narrow partisanship. He appointed as Secretary of War the distinguished elder statesman Henry L. Stimson and as Secretary of the Navy a leading newspaperman who had been a bitter critic on domestic issues,

[10] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1937*, p. 408.

Frank Knox. These appointments, which were made on the eve of the Republican convention, led to confusion within the Republican ranks.

Harry Hopkins read the President's thoughts. Ickes had been saying for two years that the President must be drafted to run a third term. The world situation demanded it. To reporters asking about his intentions, FDR made evasive replies.

France's fall three weeks before the Democratic National Convention carried great weight with FDR. By this time he had apparently convinced himself that the world situation required him to defy the no-third-term tradition.

A third term would be acceptable to FDR but he would not appear to seek it. It must appear to be a draft similar to the draft for the gubernatorial nomination in 1928. Farley, *à la* Walter Trohan, quotes Roosevelt as saying to him, "Of course, I will not run for a third term." [11] Assuming that the remark is reasonably accurate, the meaning must have been that FDR did not want to be an open candidate. He did not want to go through the preconvention primary battles as he had in 1932. He did not say that he would not accept a nomination for a third term if it were handed to him on a platter.

Farley took great offense at the Lindley story to the effect that the President, in answering questions from a congressman, was quoted as saying that he would not run again unless Britain were overrun by Nazis, that Hull was his choice for his successor, that the Vice Presidency was between Jackson, McNutt, and Wheeler, and finally that Farley was not a sound Vice Presidential candidate because of his religion. Roosevelt was reported to have said that people might say "We were using Cordell Hull as a stalking horse for the Pope." [12] President Roosevelt denied this story in his press conference of March 19, 1940.[13] In view of the hearsay character of the evidence, too much weight cannot be given to it.

In the meantime the Republican National Convention which met in Philadelphia had broken a number of precedents by the nomination of Wendell Willkie, utility executive, for President. Until 1938 Willkie

[11] *Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years* (New York, Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 186.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

[13] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1940*, pp. 108–110.

had been a Democrat. Attention to him as a possible Republican candidate had been drawn by an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* of February 25, 1939, and by editorial support in *Fortune* magazine early in 1940.[14] A zealous group of journalists and public relations men espoused Willkie's candidacy and engineered Willkie's nomination in a remarkable preconvention and convention publicity campaign. The idea was sold to the delegates that Willkie had glamour and could compete successfully with the champion vote getter. The public-opinion polls conducted early in the summer showed Willkie running ahead of Roosevelt. It looked like a real contest.

An atmosphere of mystery still surrounded the preparations for the Democratic National Convention. The President had not made any clear declaration regarding his intentions. Farley, who had hoped to be the Vice-Presidential nominee with Hull as the presidential candidate, sensed that FDR would try for a third term, and he was deeply disappointed.[15] Other hopefuls were also disappointed, and many delegates came to the convention in a sour mood.

As National Chairman, Farley opened the convention in Chicago. In his address he referred to the President only once. His praises were chiefly for the delegates, the party workers, and Congress, to whom, by inference, he attributed a large share of credit for the Democratic victories and accomplishments.

Harry Hopkins, with a private wire to the White House in the bathroom of his suite in the Blackstone Hotel, was the President's self-appointed convention manager. This was a most unusual situation for a man who was not even a delegate to the convention. Edward Flynn was at Hopkins's side to soften the blow, and they passed the word along that Roosevelt would run again if drafted. Many of the party regulars were jealous of Hopkins's power, and they resented the way in which the convention was run.

The delegates went about their business in a sullen mood. Even the Resolutions Committee was torn by dissension. They knew that they had to stand on the record, but they were divided as to future foreign policy. Much to Secretary Hull's disgust, the isolationists inserted a plank which the Roosevelt supporters agreed to reluctantly. This plank

[14] *Fortune*, April, 1940.

[15] Farley, *op. cit.*, Chap. 24.

may have won votes, but Roosevelt knew it would not be a good guide to policy. It read:

> The American people are determined that war, raging in Europe, Asia and Africa, shall not come to America.
>
> We will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas, except in case of attack.[16]

An unusual feature of the platform was the section which mentioned the candidate of the opposing party:

> The nomination of a utility executive by the Republican party as its presidential candidate raises squarely the issue, whether the Nation's water power shall be used for all the people or for the selfish interests of a few. We accept that issue.[17]

The delegates shuttled back and forth between the Farley headquarters and the room occupied by Harry Hopkins. Roosevelt's statement on his position which had been read by Barkley in his address was one of the less frank declarations put out by FDR. It deceived no one. It was plain that FDR was a coy candidate who would like to see the initiative for his nomination come from the outside. The Roosevelt managers urged Farley to withdraw his candidacy in order to preserve harmony in a time of national crisis. Farley would not budge. The roll call gave Roosevelt 946, Farley 72, Garner 61, Tydings 9, and Hull 5.

To add bitterness to the cup the delegates were forced to drink, word came from the White House that the Boss's choice for Vice President was Henry Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture. This was too much for some of the delegates and their followers in the galleries. There were rumblings and catcalls.

Frances Perkins telephoned to the President to come to the convention and calm the delegates. FDR would not move. He did not have to run. If they didn't like Wallace, then he, FDR, could bow out. He added that the "Missus" might go to the convention.

Eleanor Roosevelt did go to the convention, and she did a masterful job. She lifted the sights of the hot and tired delegates. The world

[16] *Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1940.*
[17] *Ibid.*

was on fire. The man in the White House was doing his best to protect the country. It was no time for petty political squabbles.

Eleanor's speech turned the tide. While the delegates were not made happy, they were reconciled to accepting a difficult situation.

Henry Wallace was nominated as Roosevelt's running mate, although the vote was close. The 1940 presidential election campaign was on. Henry was not allowed to address the convention.

FDR's speech of acceptance, delivered by radio from Washington, explained why he thought it necessary to defy the tradition against a third term.

> Lying awake, as I have, on many nights, I have asked myself whether I have the right, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to call men and women to serve their country or to train themselves to serve and, at the same time, decline to serve my country in my own personal capacity, if I am called upon to do so by the people of my country. . . .
>
> Those, my friends, are the reasons why I have had to admit to myself, and now to state to you, that my conscience will not let me turn my back upon a call to service.
>
> The right to make that call rests with the people through the American method of free election. Only the people themselves can draft a President.[18]

In spite of the defeat which Roosevelt suffered on the Supreme Court issue, in spite of the unsuccessful attempt to "purge" certain recalcitrant congressmen, in spite of the growing splits within the Democratic party, and in spite of the strength of the two-term tradition, the President was able to win a nomination for a third term. The threatened world collapse led him to continue to offer his services to his country.

[18] *Nothing to Fear—The Selected Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt,* ed. B. O. Zevin (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946), pp. 216–217.

XVII

ELECTED FOR A THIRD TERM

I am an old campaigner, and I love a good fight.
—FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, *Oct. 23, 1940.*

THE Democratic Convention had not been harmonious, and it was necessary to heal the bruises if the party was to function as a successful vote-getting machine in the election. National Chairman Farley was out, and it would be difficult to find a successor. Other disappointed aspirants for the vice-presidential nomination had to have their feelings assuaged. The going was not likely to be as smooth as it was in 1936.

It took all the President's persuasive powers to convince Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx that he should become national chairman.[1] Flynn had been in politics longer than Farley, and he knew all the headaches that the job would bring. He also knew his own limitations, and on an earlier occasion he had paid tribute to the wonderful organizational abilities of his predecessor. It had always been Flynn's policy to keep in the background, and now he found himself in the limelight. He had to hold large press conferences. At first it was an ordeal, but he got used to it.[2] And then there was always at hand in such matters as a press conference that tower of strength Charlie Michelson.

The Democratic headquarters under Chairman Flynn functioned smoothly. Flynn was an old hand at the game; he knew the tricks of

[1] Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (New York, The Viking Press, 1947), pp. 159–160.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.

the trade. There was no danger that he might alienate some of the party workers. He went to bat with the President for the prerogatives of the organization.

Party finance was under the direction of Oliver A. Quayle, Jr., a Farley appointee who knew the political organizations; Wayne Johnson, a New York lawyer who, Flynn knew, was acquainted in financial circles, and Richard Reynolds of North Carolina, well known tobacco man, who contributed generously of his time and money. Among other principal contributors were Edwin C. Pauley of California, an oil man, and Marshall Field, Chicago newspaper proprietor.

As in previous campaigns some changes were made in the campaign strategy board. Hopkins, who was still far from well, took over duties in connection with the preparation of campaign speeches. Judge Rosenman continued to serve in the capacity of organizer of speech material. In addition, Roosevelt enlisted the aid of two of America's leading literary figures, Robert Sherwood and Archibald MacLeish, both of whom had been working valiantly for the cause of preparedness and aid to Britain.

Willkie's lack of campaign experience was a distinct liability to the Republicans. He even proposed that no national chairman be appointed. To set him on the right track in this matter, Moley, who had taken a walk into the Republican camp, arranged for a conference between Willkie and Will Hays, national chairman in 1920. Hays got Willkie back on the beam, and Congressman Joseph Martin of Massachusetts, Republican House minority leader, was appointed national chairman. While Martin knew the political game, he was also a target, for he had led the opposition to the New Deal.

Chairman Martin did not have complete charge of the Republican headquarters, but had to deal with a group of amateurs who were enthusiastic but ignorant regarding the facts of political campaigning. These Willkie volunteers wasted their energies and failed to hit upon a strategy that worked. Willkie ruined his voice and, intoxicated by his seeming success with crowds, made offhand remarks that were not understood by his radio listeners.

During the campaign the Battle for Britain was being waged across the seas. The President did not feel that he could spend the time on

campaigning that he had in previous elections. And yet he considered Willkie the toughest opponent that he had ever faced. This kind of campaign required precise timing. By bringing their guns to play at the right time they would save their energies and keep the enemy off balance.

Among the major events of the campaign, two students of the election selected a list which begins on the next page.

If an attempt was to be made to reconstruct the rules which guided the conduct of the 1940 presidential campaign by the Democrats, rule Number 1 would be, "Never mention the opposing candidate." To mention him, even unfavorably, would give him some free publicity. The worst that could happen to a candidate would be to be ignored. A candidate might make a foolish mistake, just to attract attention. As for FDR, he did not need to worry about free publicity. He got enough of it, even from his enemies.

While Willkie was mentioned in the platform, he was not mentioned in Roosevelt's speeches. Ickes was the hatchet man who could call Willkie that "poor little barefoot Wall Street boy." Though Roosevelt was strongly attracted to Willkie, and was thankful that the Republicans had nominated such a candidate rather than an isolationist, it was clear that he could not say this in public during the campaign.

Campaign rule Number 2 for the Roosevelt camp was to play down the third-term issue. The old French saying was applicable here: *Qui s'excuse, s'accuse* (He who excuses himself, accuses himself). No elaborate defense of the action was needed. The president had made his statement at the time he delivered his acceptance address. The country was in danger. Usual procedures were suspended in time of national emergency. The opponents might hammer away at this issue, but the Democrats would pay no attention to it. Get the minds of the voters on other subjects.

Rule Number 3 was to stress national unity, peace, and freedom. The world was on fire. Americans should stand together. Don't let the dictators divide and conquer the United States as they were conquering Europe. Real peace could only be obtained by being strong. Peace without freedom would be no real peace.

The fourth general rule was to remind the various economic groups

CALENDAR OF THE 1940 ELECTION [3]

DATE	CAMPAIGN ITEMS	NON-CAMPAIGN ITEMS
June 23–24	Republican Convention Willkie and McNary named	France falls
July 7	Roosevelt divulges third-term secret to Farley	
8	Joe Martin named head of Willkie's campaign	
15–19	Democratic Convention	
20–30	Roosevelt and Wallace named	Pan-American conference in Havana
August 1	Flynn succeeds Farley as Democratic national chairman	
17	Willkie's acceptance speech	
Sept. 2	Roosevelt's Labor Day speech	
3		American destroyers for British bases
14		Congress passes conscription bill
13–26	Willkie campaign trip through middle and far west	
27		Japan joins the Axis
28	Willkie at New York Republican State Convention	
Oct. 2–11	Willkie's swing through east	
10–19		Balkan crisis
11–12	Roosevelt's non-political defense inspection trip	
16		Draft registration
17–22	Willkie in the midwest	
23	Roosevelt's first "political" speech, in Philadelphia	
24	Willkie answers from Akron	
25	John L. Lewis for Willkie	
28	Roosevelt at New York	

[3] Adapted from Douglas Waples and Bernard Berelson, *Public Communications and Public Opinions* (University of Chicago Library School, 1941, mimeographed).

DATE	CAMPAIGN ITEMS	NON-CAMPAIGN ITEMS
28		Italy invades Greece
30	Roosevelt at Boston	
	Willkie at Baltimore	
31	Willkie at Camden	
Nov. 1	Roosevelt in Brooklyn	
2	Willkie at New York	
	Roosevelt at Cleveland	
4	Election eve broadcasts	
5	Election day	

of the benefits which they had received at the hands of the Democrats. The voters should be warned that they would lose those benefits if the Republicans came back. Had not the Republicans opposed these reforms?

Because of his preoccupation with preparedness and questions of foreign policy, the President made only five formal campaign addresses. The first of these came on October 23, at Philadelphia, after Willkie had already made some twenty-two major campaign addresses.

The campaign was waged on the issue of Roosevelt, with Willkie playing a secondary role. At first there was considerable interest in Willkie because he was comparatively unknown, but as the campaign progressed this interest died down. Roosevelt's record and his promises were what attracted the voters' attention. The President's first campaign address at Philadelphia was devoted to a defense of the Democratic record and a denial of the gloomy statements made by the Republicans regarding the progress of business recovery. He referred to some of these statements as "deliberate falsifications" of fact.

As in 1916, a leading issue of the campaign was the avoidance of involvement in the European war. The Republicans charged that such Roosevelt policies as aid to Britain would bring us into the war. President Roosevelt insisted that his foreign policy was calculated to keep us from entering the war. In the midst of the campaign, Roosevelt made all the arrangements for the exchange of destroyers for the use of British bases. Through an intermediary, Willkie agreed not to make a political attack on this deal. Toward the end of the campaign, however, the Republican command prevailed upon Willkie to go all out on the theme of charging

Roosevelt with warmongering. A vote for Roosevelt was a vote to send our boys to be killed on foreign shores. Draft registration began during the campaign, and it was easy to make these charges seem plausible. To meet them, Roosevelt made a speech in New York and another in Boston. Sherwood was very apologetic about these speeches because he thought they were not quite straightforward.[4] The FDR headquarters thought that they had to be made because of the gains which the public-opinion polls showed Willkie was making. Sherwood thought that the statements made were moves in the wrong direction. Sheer expediency was their only justification. The Boston address in particular had a passage which came back to plague the Democrats. The President said in part:

> And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance.
>
> I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again:
>
> Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.
>
> They are going into training to form a force so strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war far away from our shores.[5]

In the Boston speech another incident occurred which was seized upon by the opposition. FDR wanted to make a complimentary reference to Ambassador Kennedy, a man who was popular with the Irish-Americans in Boston. While the speech was being drafted, the President put in a reference to "my Ambassador." The use of the first personal pronoun was correct in legal and diplomatic usage. As warned by his advisers, the political effects were most unfortunate. The opposition press and radio commentators had a field day in elaborating this evidence of Roosevelt's dictatorial tendencies.

On domestic issues Roosevelt attacked the Republicans for trying to block the efforts of the administration to improve the lot of the farmer, the worker, the small businessman, the investor, the users of electric power, the unemployed, and racial and religious minorities. In these attacks Chairman Martin was a convenient target. His opposition to New Deal measures was a matter of record. Roosevelt charged that if a Republican were elected President, it would mean the end of parity

[4] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Chap. VIII.

[5] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940*, p. 517.

for farm prices, of Social Security for workers, of the provisions of the Wagner Labor Act protecting organized labor, of rural electrification, of the Federal power projects, and of other New Deal enterprises. The Republican nominee might say that he was not opposed to some of the aims of the New Deal, but Chairman Martin's acts spoke louder than Willkie's words. Republican Congressmen Bruce Barton and Hamilton Fish were also targets for Roosevelt's barbs. FDR used the following refrain with telling effect: "A perfectly beautiful rhythm—Congressmen Martin, Barton and Fish."

A Republican orator in Philadelphia was particularly maladroit in his reference to the lower income groups. President Roosevelt immediately picked this up in his Brooklyn speech:

> In a Republican campaign speech the other day, a prominent leader of the Philadelphia bar delivered himself in these words, quoted in The New York *Times*.
>
> "The President's only supporters," he said, "are paupers, those who earn less than $1,200 a year and aren't worth *that*, and the Roosevelt family."
>
> I think we might just as well forget the Roosevelt family, but these Americans whom this man calls "paupers," these Americans who, in his view, are not worth the income they receive, small though it is—who are they? They are only millions and millions of American families, constituting a very large part of the Nation! They are only the common men and women who have helped build this country, who have made it great, and who would defend it with their lives if the need arose. . . .
>
> "Paupers" who are not worth their salt—there speaks the true sentiment of the Republican leadership in this year of grace.
>
> Can the Republican leaders deny that all this all-too-prevailing Republican sentiment is a direct, vicious, unpatriotic appeal to class hatred and class contempt?
>
> That, my friends, is just what I am fighting against with all my heart and soul.[6]

We are fortunate in having a complete analysis of a carefully selected sample of what was said and how it was said in the 1940 campaign.[7] This quantitative analysis of subjects stressed on press and radio during the campaign indicated that beginning with the topic most frequently

[6] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1940*, pp. 538–539.

[7] Waples and Berelson, *op. cit.*

mentioned, the topics were ranked as follows: Democratic campaign methods, Republican campaign methods, victory for Republicans, victory for Democrats, Willkie's character traits, Roosevelt's character traits, participants in Republican campaign, Roosevelt's record on preparedness, Roosevelt's record in foreign policy, Willkie's future policy, and Roosevelt's record. On a purely quantitative basis, without reference to whether the comments were favorable or unfavorable, more attention was given to Roosevelt than to Willkie. In other words, the mass communications were slanted in Willkie's favor, but FDR got more mentions. According to the old rule, bad publicity is better than none, Roosevelt did not fare poorly in the press. A newspaper which was hostile to the President could not ignore him. In mentioning the President, that paper helped in the campaign. An unfavorable mention might bring an unexpected response. Some readers of metropolitan newspapers boasted that they voted for candidates which the papers opposed.

The analysis of how things were said in the 1940 campaign shows that in press and radio coverage Willkie had a two to one advantage over Roosevelt, that is, twice as many favorable mentions were made of the Republicans as of the Democrats. Especially marked was the Republican advantage in the magazines. Willkie received three favorable mentions to every one received by FDR. The Democrats were able to get more of their side of the story on the radio, but even here the Republicans were ahead. It was only when total mentions, whether favorable or unfavorable, were considered that the Democrats were ahead.

The persons interviewed in connection with the study of the 1940 campaign testified to the superiority of Roosevelt's radio appeals to those made by Willkie. One young man who finally decided to vote Democratic was quoted as saying: "Willkie's and Roosevelt's speeches on Saturday night made me decide to vote for FDR. They were the first speeches I heard. Willkie is no speaker— He knocks too much." [8]

No one in the Roosevelt camp expected a repetition of 1936. FDR was bound to lose votes after the events of his second term. The election returns showed that the President won 55 per cent of the major party vote, or 7 per cent less than he won in 1936. Willkie had done better

[8] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), p. 133.

than any previous Republican candidate had against Roosevelt, but the third-term issue, the war scare, the efficiency plea, and the glamour of the Republican candidate were not sufficient to turn back the Champ.

Breakdowns of the sample surveys by income and occupational groups show that Roosevelt ran behind his 1936 vote among the upper income groups, the businessmen, and the professional groups.[9] In the upper income group, his popularity dropped from 42 per cent of the major party vote in 1936 to 28 per cent in 1940. On the other hand, in the lower income group Roosevelt's popularity fell off the same number of percentage points that it dropped in the country at large. There was the least change in the vote of those on the relief rolls. In other words, FDR's 1940 vote was more sharply divided along economic lines.

Roosevelt held his own with organized labor in spite of the bitter attack which John L. Lewis made on him. In 1936, 80 per cent of all union members interviewed said that they were going to support Roosevelt. Four years later 72 per cent of the group indicated the same preference. The difference was exactly the same as that for the entire country. It may be inferred that the labor-vote decline reflected general and not special conditions. Sidney Hillman and his Political Action Committee were able to offset the opposition of Lewis.

Among the religious groups Roosevelt dropped off most among the Catholics. This decline may be attributed in part to the inclinations of the German-American and the Italian-American voters to favor Willkie because they thought that his party was isolationist. The Italian-Americans resented in particular Roosevelt's stab-in-the-back reference to Mussolini's joining Hitler at the time of the downfall of France.[10]

Gallup's 1940 sample surveys indicated that two-thirds of the voters were traditional voters, that is, they supported the same party in 1940 that they did in 1936. One-tenth of the voters were first voters (too young to vote in 1936), one-tenth failed to vote in 1936, and the remainder were voters who shifted from party to party. According to these figures, the 1940 election would have been very close if only those who said they voted in 1936 had been counted. Roosevelt won a large majority of the

[9] George Gallup, *The Gallup Political Almanac for 1948* (Princeton, N.J., The American Institute of Public Opinion, 1948), p. 9.

[10] *F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928–1945*, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 1072, refers to polls taken in Italian sections of the Bronx.

new young voters and of those who failed to vote in 1936. Moley said that Willkie had a wonderful chance to win the new young voters and that he muffed it.[11] The figures do not contradict Moley.

How did the Champ win in the face of a hostile press? The authors of *The People's Choice* were puzzled by this, and as an afterthought they presented the hypothesis that mass communications were not everything in the campaign.[12] Any precinct captain could have told them that. Why does a ward heeler make a house-to-house canvass? Roosevelt had a party organization which did not neglect the precinct captains. A Chicago study of the press and voting pointed out that Roosevelt got many of his votes in areas where not many people bought English-language dailies.[13] The Chicago machine did not neglect these voters. The Republicans did well with their press and radio appeals, but Willkie and his close advisers did not know how to build an effective precinct organization with the materials which they had at hand.

One of the public-opinion polling organizations made a postelection analysis for the Republican party. Willkie's defeat was attributed to the Republicans' lack of sensitivity to the currents of public opinion. It was asserted that Roosevelt and the Democrats realized the longing of the average citizen for social security and international security. With reference to the latter problem, the analyst pointed out the time-lag between the views of the public on preparedness issues and the voting behavior of Republican congressmen. Roosevelt used this effectively.

The 1940 election showed that Roosevelt had reduced political campaigning to a fine art. Without the aid of some of his original party organizers, without the help of several who once assisted in the preparation of speeches, and without spending the time on campaigning that he had in the past, he defeated one of the strongest candidates ever put up against him. The setbacks of his second Administration, the third-term issue, and the war scare had reduced his vote, but he kept together most of the divergent elements that had supported him in previous campaigns.

[11] Raymond Moley, *27 Masters of Politics*, p. 51.
[12] Lazarsfeld, *et al., op. cit.*, Chap. XVI.
[13] H. F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model.*

XVIII

WAR AND A FOURTH NOMINATION

One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.
—TENNYSON, *Ulysses*

THE decision of Franklin D. Roosevelt to seek a nomination for a fourth term as President was the product of world events. The state of his health dictated retirement, but his responsibilities as commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces in the middle of an all-out war demanded that he make every personal sacrifice to complete the winning of the war. When it came to a showdown, he felt that he should do his bit as his sons and the sons of other parents were doing theirs. If this meant facing death, he was willing to be a war casualty. As early as October 27, 1941, he said, "Today in the face of this newest and greatest challenge of them all, we Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations." [1]

Running for a fourth term did not appear immediately necessary. As Roosevelt started his third term we were not yet at war. As Rosenman pointed out, "A warship, however, is not a democracy." [2] Political differences were many, and national unity seemed far distant in spite of the closeness of the danger. The Axis military machine was driving

[1] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941,* Comp. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 438.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. xiii.

into the Balkans and threatening Britain's control of the Mediterranean. Japan was expanding in the Far East. Yet the Republicans and Democratic isolationists opposed Lend-Lease, opposed production and price controls to combat inflation, opposed the renewal of the Selective Service law, opposed amending the neutrality law to permit the arming of merchant ships, and opposed a rapid increase in appropriations for defense.

Many Americans believed that they had a choice of getting into the war or not, that war profiteering had involved them in the last war, and that the country could stay out this time. Within a little more than a year after the 1940 election, the Japanese had attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, and the country was directly involved in the war against the Axis. Japan and Germany declared war first. While Roosevelt's words in the 1940 campaign about "not sending our boys into foreign wars" came back to plague him, he could refer to his main point that the country would not participate in any *foreign* wars and that the Administration would not "send our Army, naval and air forces to fight in foreign lands outside the Americas *except in case of attack*." [3] The United States was attacked.

The defeat at Pearl Harbor was a disaster of first magnitude. At first the country was stunned. Opposition to defense seemed to disappear. Class and group hatreds fostered by fifth columnists seemed to die down. President Roosevelt's reactions were true to form. Calm, serene in the crisis, courageous, he reassured the American people, saying that ultimate victory was theirs although the road to victory would be hard. His precious Navy had been hit a devastating blow. During the first half of 1942, bitter reverses continued both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific theaters. Shipping losses from hostile submarine action in the Atlantic reached alarming proportions. The United States was humiliated by defeat in the Philippines.

Even the attack on Pearl Harbor did not eliminate partisan attacks on the President and the Administration. The opposition lay low for a while, but it was constantly on the lookout for opportunities to snipe at FDR and his cohorts. Pearl Harbor itself was destined to become a major political issue. The very people who had blocked the preparations

[3] Speeches of Sept. 11, 1940, and Oct. 23, 1940, *Public Papers and Addresses, 1940.*

for war now blamed the Administration for military reverses and the dislocations, bottlenecks, and waste that followed an attempt to convert rapidly to all-out war production. The attack on the Soviet Union by Germany on June 23, 1941, brought a new note into the picture. The Republicans had bitterly fought the recognition of the Soviet Union. Now the Soviet Union was an ally, and the rabid anti-Communists viewed with alarm this new predicament.

No truce was declared for the 1942 congressional elections. The Republicans made capital of difficulties that were inevitable in the conversion of our economy from peace to war. They appealed to farmers who did not like price controls, labor unions that did not like wage ceilings, small businessmen who were disturbed at the impetus which the war gave to the expansion of big business, the high-salaried executives who did not like the $25,000 limit on salaries, and other elements of the public which were disturbed by inflation, the growing shortages of certain consumer goods, and the restrictions placed upon our economy. They also expressed alarm at the strange alliance with Russia. Finally, the Republicans appealed to those former isolationists and other elements that thought that the Japanese should be the primary target and that the Communists were more dangerous than the Nazis.

In addition to his heavy military and psychological warfare responsibilities, President Roosevelt had to do what he could to maintain morale on the home front. He had to warn the people that the enemies were tough and that the sacrifices needed were many, and at the same time he had to maintain confidence in ultimate victory.

Even within the ranks of his own party, the President had determined and bitter political opponents. Some critics were conservative elements in the South, but others were found in his own back yard. The contest for the New York governorship showed how difficult it was to keep together the diverse elements that made up the Democratic party even in his own state. While James Farley had resigned from the national chairmanship following his opposition to Roosevelt's nomination for a third term, he retained the position of New York State chairman.

In the state convention of 1942, Farley supported Attorney General John James Bennett, Jr., for the gubernatorial nomination. Governor Lehman, President Roosevelt, and Edward Flynn preferred Senator

James Mead as the candidate. Farley had made commitments to Bennet and he was nursing a grudge against Roosevelt, so he held his forces firm, and Bennett was nominated despite warnings that he was not the strongest candidate and might lose the labor vote. Farley preferred defeat in November to losing control of the party organization.

The New York political situation brought severe criticisms upon the President. A cartoon in the New York *Herald Tribune* pictured him as neglecting the conduct of the war to repair his political fences. In a letter to Helen Rogers Reid, Roosevelt said:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Aug. 26, 1942

PERSONAL, CONFIDENTIAL, AND "OFF THE RECORD"

DEAR HELEN:

As you know, I have, during a long course of years, acquired, of necessity, the skin of a rhinoceros—but there are occasions—in fact, very rare instances —where I speak to real friends of mine in regard to matters which "just are not true."

That is why I am writing you about the cartoon on the editorial page of the Herald Tribune last Wednesday, August nineteenth. And because the good old Herald Tribune has on the whole a decent respect for veracity, I think a cartoon which is based on the opposite of veracity is something that you and Ogden and Mr. Parsons ought, for your own sakes, to take up.

I realize full well that there were various stories emanating from Washington by people like the Chicago Tribune bureau that I was spending a lot of time on the New York State political situation, but I think it would have paid your desk, and the cartoonist himself, to have made one simple little check on the veracity of these stories. Actually, the amount of time taken by me from war work hours in relation to the New York political situation was exactly zero. Purely for your private information, of course, I have carefully checked this thing and it comes to the following:

1. About six weeks or two months ago, Jim Farley lunched with me.
2. About ten days ago, I talked with Mr. Flynn on the telephone.
3. About ten days ago, I saw Mr. Kelly of Brooklyn at my study in the White House early in the morning.
4. On Monday evening at Hyde Park, I dictated and sent a message to Governor Lehman.

The point I wish to make is two-fold. First, that none of this time came out of any war work time. The total amount of it was not much longer than

the very nice visit I had with you the other day—which, by the way, was in "war" time!

Secondly, I talked to no one else and wrote no other letters in regard to the New York State political situation at any time.

You will see, therefore, that the cartoon is based on a false statement, and that the implication is based on a false statement, and that the objective is based on a false statement.

Therefore, all I can do is to tell you these facts "off the record" of course, and leave it to the Herald Tribune to make what, in the old days, we used to call the "Amende Honorable."

Don't for a minute imagine I am sore about this, but I have always thought that the Herald Tribune was big enough to know when it had printed something when it was not true.

Always sincerely,[4]

Internal dissensions within the Democratic party plus the Republican success in capitalizing on discontent arising out of dislocations brought about by the war meant that the Democratic party lost many votes in the fall elections of 1942. Bennett was defeated by Thomas E. Dewey, Republican candidate for governor of New York. The Democrats nearly lost control of the House of Representatives, and they lost nine seats in the Senate. Thus did party dissensions and criticisms of the conduct of the war prepare the way for the 1944 and 1948 campaigns of the Republicans with Governor Dewey as their candidate.

A comparison of the congressional election returns for 1942 with those for 1940 shows that the Democrats held their own in the South and South west and on the Pacific coast, and had mixed fortunes in other parts of the United States. In the Rocky Mountain States they did well in Montana but suffered relatively heavy losses in Utah, Nevada, and Colorado. In New England, Massachusetts and Rhode Island were banner states, but Connecticut and Vermont showed large Democratic declines. New Jersey Democrats held fast, but the party slipped in New York and Pennsylvania. In the Midwest the winter wheat and dairy states showed no marked Democratic decline, but elsewhere the Democrats lost heavily. Analyzing the results in other terms, it might be said that the Democrats lost in the grazing areas, the corn belt, and in some industrial and mining areas. Indifference was one of the causes of the

[4] President's Secretary's File—1942 (General-R), Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Democratic losses. The party organization failed to get out the full vote. In New York the vote was the lowest in eight years.[5]

For the balance of his third term, President Roosevelt had a slim majority to work with in Congress. Fortunately, not all the Republicans were isolationists and America First adherents. After Pearl Harbor, opposition to our participation in the war had to be cloaked, but it was none the less real and Roosevelt had a continuous battle with Congress. In a letter to his 1920 running mate, James Cox, dated April 10, 1943, he said, "Sometimes I get awfully discouraged when I see what is going on on the Hill. The truth of the matter is that neither we nor the Republicans have fighting leadership up there." [6]

The elections were hardly over when the United States began to score victories against the Axis. The successful landings in North Africa, the beginning of the offensive in the Pacific, and the building up of military production silenced the President's critics as far as the general administration of the war program was concerned. The North African landings were held up deliberately until the elections were over.

The snipers, however, were looking for targets. Early in January, 1943, the President furnished a target when he sent to the Senate the nomination of Democratic National Chairman Edward J. Flynn as Minister to Australia. The press and the opposition senators of both parties seized upon the nomination to strike at Roosevelt. Democratic Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee used the occasion to punish the President for his refusal to allow spoils appointments in the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Republican senators used it to bring up old charges against the boss of the Bronx.

While the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations cleared Flynn of the charges and reported the nomination favorably to the Senate, the press attack continued. Flynn asked that his name be withdrawn.

The nomination incident had created a vacancy in the national chairmanship, since Flynn had resigned to accept the appointment. Postmaster General Frank Walker was persuaded by the President and Flynn to accept the chairmanship until someone else could be found. About a year later Commissioner of Internal Revenue Robert Hannegan

[5] The New York *Times* of Nov. 6, 1949, carries a chart which brings this out.
[6] P.P.F. 53, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

of Missouri was suggested by Flynn and Mayor Kelly of Chicago for the position. Roosevelt agreed, and a series of events was begun that eventually led to Harry Truman's occupation of the White House.

In 1943 the war continued to go well even though a second front was not opened. The conduct of the war had not become a burning political issue.

While the war brought new priorities, Roosevelt did not lose sight of the social objectives which had characterized his first two Administrations. In his press conference of December 28, 1943, he explained the relationship of his third term to the other two terms. In 1933 "Dr. New Deal" had been called in to save "an awfully sick patient" who was suffering from "a grave internal disorder." Over a period of years the patient was cured by New Deal measures. On December 7, 1941, "the patient had a very bad accident—not an internal trouble . . . he was in a pretty bad smashup—broke his hip, broke his leg in two or three places." He has since been under treatment by a partner of . . . "old Dr. New Deal . . . an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Win-the-War."

> When victory comes, the program of the past, of course, has got to be carried on. . . . We must plan for, and help to bring about an expanded economy, which will result in more security, in more employment, in more recreation, in more education, in more health, in better housing for our citizens, so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won't come back again.[7]

The question of the fourth term, however, was beginning to loom as an issue. Tradition was not as important this time as the state of Roosevelt's health. Ever since he first ran for governor in 1928, he had to contend with the whisperings regarding his health. As long as he obviously appeared to be in good health, the whispers fell on dead ears. In 1943 the pictures and reports from those close to him indicated that his health was not as good as it had been. Some of his friends urged him not to consider a fourth term. Flynn, on a purely friendly basis, urged him not to think of it.[8] Farley found reinforcement for his views in the state of the President's health.[9]

[7] *Public Papers and Addresses,* pp. 570–571.
[8] Edward Flynn, *You're the Boss,* pp. 181–182.
[9] *Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years,* pp. 365–366.

In July, 1943, FDR received a letter from Governor Maw of Utah urging him to run for reelection in 1944. In answer he wrote:

THE WHITE HOUSE
Oct. 8, 1943

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

I would have answered your good letter of July 17th sooner, but its arrival found me engaged with our Chiefs of Staff, preparing for the Quebec Conference.

I appreciate very much your thoughtfulness in writing me and the confidence which you express in the Administration, and, particularly, in the foreign policy.

No man could but be pleased with your expression that I now agree to indicate that I will be a candidate for the Presidency in 1944. I want to give you, in all frankness, my reasons why I think this statement cannot be made on my behalf or by me.

I must ask you to believe me when I tell you that my one consideration now is to win this war. It is a stern and difficult business. My responsibility is great and I feel that I would not be keeping faith with the trust which the people have given me and in my legal responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces if I were to give any consideration whatever to the Presidential election, which is more than a year away.

This nation is also faced with determining its policy and responsibilities for securing a just and enduring peace—a peace in which American interests will be fully protected, and a realistic peace in terms of the mutual responsibilities of all the nations of the earth. Many preliminary steps must be taken to prepare the way. These pathfinding conferences, too, are a responsibility of the Executive Department. As in the case of the pending conferences with the Foreign Secretaries of Great Britain, Russia and the United States, they require my most careful consideration of the many important questions involved.

Our foreign relations at this time, are such that any consideration on my part of a 4th term would, I believe, be prejudicial to our own interests.

Very sincerely yours,[10]

The President was nurturing the bipartisan foreign policy, and he did not want to endanger it by taking a position on a fourth term. In his press conference he avoided bitter partisan attacks on the Republicans. Everyone wanted to win the war.

[10] President's Secretary's File—1943 (General-M), Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Nineteen hundred and forty-four compelled the President to make a decision. Preparations for the Democratic National Convention had to be started early in the year despite military necessities. A convention city was selected in January. The first primary election for the selection of delegates was held on March 14, in New Hampshire, and the last on May 19, in Oregon.

It was not until July 11, 1944, that Roosevelt announced that he would run for a fourth term if nominated. The affairs of the Democratic National Convention were firmly in the hands of the organization leaders, National Chairman Hannegan, New York National Committeeman Flynn, Postmaster General Walker, and others who had been prominent in organization work. Harry Hopkins did not exercise any influence in the convention, but Sidney Hillman, head of labor's Political Action Committee, was a powerful figure. The President did not pay too much attention to the convention because of his preoccupation with military strategy.

On the question of the Democratic platform, Roosevelt wrote to National Chairman Hannegan:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 15, 1944

DEAR BOB:

Will you give the enclosed rough draft of a "Gettysburg Address" type of platform to John McCormack? People are tired of the old type—don't read them—don't remember them, if they do.

Furthermore, if some group says their particular ism was not listed in the Democratic Platform, the very simple answer is the record of the Administration.

The Republicans had to put the fifty-seven different varieties of ism into their platform because they had no record—or if they did it was the record of their failures more than twelve years ago.

As ever yours,[11]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 15, 1944

DEAR BOB:

I am sending you some other Platforms which I think John McCormack

[11] President's Secretary's File—1944 (Platform), Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

would like to look over. He may get some ideas or phrases out of them. I still think they are—all of them—along the old-fashioned type and can be boiled down to five hundred words.

Please be sure that I get them back, as I have to have them for my own files.

Remember that fifteen hundred or two thousand words will not go into a box on the front page.

That box idea is really good, I think, and will save us many headaches on many subjects.

Always sincerely,[12]

Once that Roosevelt had decided to seek the nomination for a fourth term, the outstanding question became the nomination for Vice President. Wallace apparently felt that he should be renominated. On July 14 Roosevelt wrote to Senator Jackson that although he did not want to dictate to the convention, he, personally, if a delegate, would vote for Wallace.[13] A few days later, according to Wallace, he said, "Henry, I hope it's the same old ticket." [14]

Wallace should have realized that these statements indicated that Roosevelt would not support him in the emphatic way that he did in 1940. Wallace had had his chance and he had muffed it. He had not made friends with the senators, although he was their presiding officer; he had not avoided open controversy with the conservative elements represented by Jesse Jones, and he had failed to cultivate the state and local politicians. Roosevelt was busy and tired, and he was willing to let the convention itself have some freedom in choosing the vice presidential nominee. What he said in effect to Wallace was that he would not oppose him, but he would not rule out opposition. Let the best man win. FDR made it clear that he did not want to go through a bitter convention fight.

It is in these terms that the second pronouncement FDR made on the Vice Presidency should be interpreted. On July 19 the President wrote to Hannegan: "You have written me about Harry Truman and Bill Douglas. I should, of course, be very glad to run with either of them,

[12] Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[13] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1944–1945,* pp. 199–200.

[14] John Gunther, *Roosevelt in Retrospect,* p. 348.

and believe that either one of them would bring real strength to the ticket." [15]

Miss Tully states that the original letter had Douglas's name first.[16] This would tend to indicate that Roosevelt may have had a personal preference for Douglas. Flynn and Hannegan made it clear that Truman would be much easier to nominate. Ed Pauley and George Allen were also among the ardent Truman backers.[17]

Many other prominent Democrats hoped that Roosevelt's blessing would be bestowed upon them. Economic stabilizer James Byrnes thought at one time that he was in the running. Sidney Hillman had vetoed his candidacy. Out of this came the famous phrase "Clear it with Sidney," which Arthur Krock used in his column.[18] Catholics objected to Byrnes because he left the Catholic Church when he was married, organized labor did not like his record, and Negroes objected to his statements on civil rights issues.

Another hopeful, according to James Farley, was Senator Barkley.[19] In view of Roosevelt's lack of confidence in the Senate leaders,[20] it is not plausible to expect that he would come out for Barkley. In addition, the President and the Democratic majority leader had had bitter differences regarding the tax bill. In a veto message of February 22, 1944, the President had called the revenue bill "a tax relief bill providing relief not for the needy but for the greedy." [21] Senator Barkley had resigned as majority leader in protest at the veto message on the ground that the integrity of the Senate had been impugned. While Roosevelt had backed down on the issue and urged the reelection of Barkley as majority leader, the incident had not recommended Barkley as a running mate.

When the chips were down, Wallace made a good showing against odds. Farley claimed that Roosevelt double-crossed Wallace and stole votes from him. Wallace had against him the urban party leaders,

[15] President's Secretary's File—1944 (Convention), Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

[16] Grace Tully, *F.D.R.—My Boss*, pp. 276–277. Rosenman disputes this version, *op. cit.*, pp. 446–447.

[17] George E. Allen, *Presidents Who Have Known Me* (New York, Simon and Shuster, 1950), pp. 128–136.

[18] Gunther, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

[19] James Farley, *Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years*, p. 367.

[20] See above, p. 194. [21] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1944–1945*, p. 80.

except those that were close to organized labor. Roosevelt had been told that Wallace would hurt the ticket. It is hard to believe that Roosevelt was convinced by this argument. Rather, it appears that he was willing to let the convention choose between the three men he had mentioned. In the art of convention maneuvering and the manipulation of delegates, Wallace and his friends were no match for the professional politicians and urban bosses. President Roosevelt must have known this, but apparently he did not care. According to Rosenman, Roosevelt was convinced that Wallace had to go but he could not bring himself to tell Wallace so in clear and uncertain language.[22]

The city bosses, conservatives, and American Federation of Labor adherents in the convention combined to nominate Senator Truman. They used the device of drawing away from Wallace's support by putting favorite sons in the field. On the first ballot Wallace received 429½ votes and Truman 319½, while eight favorite sons divided the remaining 427 votes. Chairman Hannegan used Roosevelt's statement about Truman and Douglas as a lever to nominate Truman.

How was it that Senator Truman came to be regarded as an acceptable candidate by Roosevelt? The senator from Missouri was certainly not one of the main architects of the New Deal. In 1933 Truman was an obscure county official in the spoils-ridden metropolitan area of Kansas City, Missouri. Nominated for United States senator in 1934 by a narrow margin, with the support of the notorious Tom Pendergast, he rode to victory on the Roosevelt sweep of that year.

Truman's first term as United States senator was not distinguished. He was a party regular who voted down the line for New Deal measures but did not make any great name for himself. When he came up for nomination in 1940, he faced two formidable foes, and his original backer, Tom Pendergast, was in jail for tax evasion. His chances looked slim. They were pulled out of the fire by an energetic young man in St. Louis named Robert Hannegan, who on the eve of the primary instructed his precinct captains to support Truman.[23] In the fall the Roosevelt sweep again came to his aid. Of a total vote of a million and a half,

[22] *Op. cit.*, Chap. XXII.

[23] William Reddig, *Tom's Town: Kansas City and the Pendergast Legend* (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947), p. 381.

his plurality was 23,000 less than Roosevelt's. There was nothing in it to indicate presidential caliber.

The war gave Truman a chance to be better known. He was made the chairman of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, and with the aid of Donald Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, he was more in the limelight, but at the beginning of 1944 no one mentioned him as a vice presidential possibility.[24] Flynn described Truman's availability as follows:

> . . . We went over every man in the Senate to see who would be available, and Truman was the only one who fitted. His record as head of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program was excellent, his labor votes in the Senate were good; on the other hand, he seemed to represent to some degree the conservatives in the party, he came from a border state, and he had never made any "racial" remarks. He just dropped into the slot. It was agreed that Truman was the man who would hurt him least.[25]

Flynn added that when he, Hannegan, Walker, Mayor Kelly of Chicago, George Allen, and Roosevelt's daughter met with the President at the White House, they discussed the situation, including Senator Truman's association with the Pendergast machine, and it was agreed to get behind Truman for the Vice Presidency.

Truman was the candidate of the big city bosses, the senators, the party organizers, the labor leaders, the Missouri farmers, of whom he had once been one, and the minority groups that were attracted by his firm stand on civil rights issues.

In his letter to Hannegan, Roosevelt explained his attitude toward the fourth term:

July 11, 1944

DEAR MR. HANNEGAN:

You have written me that in accordance with the records, a majority of the delegates have been directed to vote for my renomination for the office of President, and I feel that I owe to you, in candor, a simple statement of my position.

[24] Harold Kellock, "Choice of Candidates for the Presidency," *Editorial Research Reports*, Vol. I, 1944, Jan. 1, 1944.

[25] Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss*, p. 181.

If the Convention should carry this out, and nominate me for the Presidency, I shall accept. If the people elect me, I will serve.

Every one of our sons serving in this war has officers from whom he takes his orders. Such officers have superior officers. The President is the Commander-in-Chief and he, too, has his superior officer—the people of the United States.

I would accept and serve, but I would not run, in the usual partisan, political sense. But if the people command me to continue in this office and in this war, I have as little right to withdraw as the soldier has to leave his post in the line.

At the same time, I think I have a right to say to you and to the delegates to the coming Convention something which is personal—purely personal.

For myself, I do not want to run. . . .

After many years of public service, therefore, my personal thoughts have turned to the day when I could return to civil life. All that is within me cries out to go back to my home on the Hudson River, to avoid public responsibilities, and to avoid also the publicity which in our democracy follows every step of the Nation's Chief Executive.

Such would be my choice. But we of this generation chance to live in a day and hour when our Nation has been attacked, and when its future existence and the future existence of our chosen method of government are at stake. . . .

Therefore, reluctantly, but as a good soldier, I repeat that I will accept and serve in this office, if I am so ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of us all—the sovereign people of the United States.[26]

[26] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1944–1945,* pp. 197–198.

XIX

THE LAST ELECTION

The contest of Dewey versus Fala.
—ANON.

IN his acceptance speech Roosevelt had hit a lofty note. He had said: "I shall not campaign in the usual sense . . . in these days of tragic sorrow, I do not consider it fitting." [1]

When Roosevelt said this, he undoubtedly intended to stay on a lofty level. In spite of wartime security measures, the people knew in general what he was doing. If the voters wanted to send him back to Hyde Park, he was ready to go. The conduct of the war was in good shape. He was too busy winning the war to bother with political campaigning.

As in his other campaigns, Roosevelt had to face the hostility of those who controlled the press and radio. The war had modified but not changed the opposition of those engaged in running the mass-communications industries. FDR was, however, still newsworthy, regardless of how bitterly opposed to him and his policies were the newspaper proprietors and radio magnates. Governor Dewey was better known than Willkie, so he did not have the benefit of the curiosity that helped advertise Willkie early in the 1940 campaign. Dewey's publicity advisers had had experience in New York politics, and they took advantage of every break in the campaign.

If there was to be any Democratic campaign, it had to be run by others

[1] *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, 1944,* p. 189.

than the boss himself and his immediate advisers. War duties in the White House were too exacting and too demanding for him to take time off for politics. The details of the campaign were left to the regular party organization and to the volunteer organizations such as the Political Action Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. National Chairman Hannegan was an energetic young man who had come up the hard way in the realistic school of politics found in the State of Missouri. The chairman had at his elbow for advice when needed such old hands as Former Chairmen Flynn and Walker. Mrs. Roosevelt also had a wealth of experience and wisdom in mobilizing the vote of the women. Farley was more remote than he had ever been before because of the unfortunate Bennett fiasco in New York State, but events were to prove that Farley was not indispensable to Roosevelt's success. As in the case of Moley and many others, the reverse situation was the case. Sidney Hillman of the PAC was a target, but his cohorts more than made up for any losses that might have been incurred because of the vicious press campaign against him. The people who were against Roosevelt would have opposed him anyway, even if Hillman had not led the PAC. On the other hand, PAC did a superb job in getting out the supporters of the Roosevelt ticket.

Governor Dewey relied heavily upon his New York State advisers. He did not make the mistake of neglecting the regular party organization as had Willkie. The Dewey crowd took over the Republican organization. On Governor Dewey's recommendation, the National Committee elected Herbert Brownell, Jr., as chairman. Brownell and Dewey had begun their political careers together. Brownell had managed Dewey's successful campaign against Bennett for governor in 1942, thereby administering a stinging defeat to Farley. The new chairman was not a target as Chairman Martin had been in 1940. He had demonstrated his skill in running a political campaign and in getting out the Republican vote.[2]

Governor Dewey started out on the theory that the Republican party should try to conciliate as many groups as possible. The die-hard anti-Roosevelt elements would be for him anyway. He needed to cause the defection of as many New Dealers as possible, and to attract the young

[2] *National Republican*, October, 1944, p. 25.

and new voters to his standard. He would promise as much as the New Dealers did, and he would promise better packages and better administration. The die-hards in the party would not like the new look, but one could not win votes with the old Republican shibboleths of the thirties.

As in earlier Roosevelt campaigns, the Democrats had to get along with less money than the Republicans had. Whereas the Republicans made total expenditures of over $13,000,000, the Democrats spent $7,400,000.[3] FDR had to put on a modest campaign because of the limited resources of his party and because of wartime security measures.

The difficult job of raising funds for the party fell to Edwin Pauley, California oil magnate, who was made treasurer of the Democratic National Committee. The biggest slice from any one source was the $1,400,000 from the PAC of CIO. Among the large individual contributors were the Warner brothers of the motion-picture industry, Marshall Field, publisher of the Chicago *Sun,* the Higgins family, the Ray Alan Van Clief family, Mrs. Adele M. Levy, the Heller family, the Ascoli family, and the Podell family. In more general terms, Democratic support came from organized labor, clothing manufacturers, officeholders, the professions, and beverage industries.[4]

While Roosevelt liked Willkie, he took a strong dislike to Governor Dewey. Some of the things that Dewey and other Republican speakers said in the early days of the campaign stung him to the quick. According to the Republicans there was "bedlam" in Washington; Roosevelt was the "Dictator"; his "foreign policy was good" but the war was "Roosevelt's war"; he was destroying free enterprise; the bureaucracy would ruin the country; high taxes and the dangerous national debt would impair the financial foundations of the country; there was much waste in the Administration; there were OPA bungling, coddling of labor, and regimenting of agriculture; "that man" was sending our boys into foreign wars; he wanted to be "Santa Claus to the world"; the government was in the hands of "tired old men" who still had their New Deal pipe dreams, and all in all "it's time for a change."

[3] Louise Overacker, "Presidential Campaign Funds, 1944," *American Political Science Review,* October, 1945, pp. 899–925.

[4] *Ibid.*

Roosevelt characterized the 1944 campaign as the dirtiest in which he had ever been engaged.[5] He felt that the whispering campaign about his health, the red scare, the doings of his family, particularly the war service of his boys and the morale-building trips of his wife, were all blows below the belt.

When it came right down to what alternatives Dewey and the Republicans had to offer, the differences between the Republicans and the Democrats did not seem so large.[6] Among the reactionary elements in his own party, Governor Dewey was charged with "me-tooism." In failing to repudiate the New Deal measures, Dewey was restricted to promising better administration of existing policies. He assumed the role of the prosecuting attorney and spoke as though he were indicting Roosevelt and his Administration for misdeeds in office.

It was not until mid-September that FDR entered the political campaign. In July he made a nonpolitical trip to the Pacific in order to confer with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz regarding strategy in that theater. Before going on the trip he delivered his last acceptance speech from the train at San Diego. On the same train a photograph had been taken which made him look tired, haggard, and old. This photograph was widely used in Republican campaign literature.[7] On his return trip President Roosevelt made a nation-wide broadcast, on August 12, 1944, from the Bremerton Navy Yard. The speech was a chatty one, and the conditions under which it was delivered were unfortunate. He wore his leg braces for the first time in many months, and they were painful. He leaned heavily on the lectern which was placed on the slanting deck of the ship. The wind was blowing and it was difficult to turn the pages of his manuscript. What the radio audience heard did not sound like the Roosevelt of earlier years. Instead of the calm, cheerful, and flowing delivery, the reading was halting and uncertain.

Hopkins was disturbed, and he sent a hurry call to Robert Sherwood, who was then abroad on duty as Director of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information.[8] Hopkins, Rosenman, Pa Watson, and Steve Early told Sherwood on his arrival that Roosevelt was in trouble in the

[5] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 829.
[6] Radio address of Dorothy Thompson, New York, Oct. 29, 1944.
[7] *National Republican*, October, 1944.
[8] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 819.

campaign. Lethargy among the Democratic ranks might bring defeat, as it had to many Democratic candidates for Congress in 1942. The greatest danger of all was the indifference of Roosevelt himself. FDR had taken the position that he had done his duty by becoming a candidate. Let the people decide if they wanted him.

Sherwood was shocked by the President's appearance, but he soon discovered that FDR's powers of recuperation had not left him. The President had decided to make not more than five political addresses. The famous Fala speech had already been drafted.

Dan Tobin of the Teamsters' Union had invited Roosevelt to make a speech at the dinner of the union in Washington. The President decided to open his campaign with this speech. He saw that it was necessary to come in swinging in order to prove that he was not failing in health and losing his old vigor and optimism. He began: "Well, here we are together again—after four years—and what years they have been. I am actually four years older—which seems to annoy some people. In fact, millions of us are more than eleven years older than when we started in to clear up the mess that was dumped in our laps in 1933." [9] This was the old Roosevelt, even though he was sitting down to read his speech. The audience caught the spirit of the speaker, and there were loud cheers and much laughter.

He went on to accuse the Republicans of using the Big Lie technique against him when they accused the New Deal administrations of being responsible for the depression. And then came the famous paragraph on his dog Fala:

> The Republican leaders have not been content to make personal attacks upon me—or my wife—or my sons—they now include my little dog, Fala. Unlike the members of my family, Fala resents this. When he learned that the Republican fiction writers had concocted a story that I had left him behind on an Aleutian Island and had sent a destroyer back to find him—at a cost to the taxpayer of two or three, or eight or twenty million dollars—his Scotch soul was furious. He has not been the same dog since. I am accustomed to hearing malicious falsehoods about myself but I think I have a right to object to libelous statements about my dog.[10]

[9] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944–1945*, p. 284.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

It was a typical Roosevelt touch. As someone put it, "From now on the American people will consider this as a contest of Dewey versus Fala." Roosevelt chuckled to himself and kept repeating in private that he thought the American people preferred a big man with a little dog to a little man with a big dog.[11]

In this speech by means of ridicule and sarcasm he had belittled Dewey and silenced the critics of his family. It was a master stroke, since it confused the enemy and inspired his own forces with new vigor. The old Champ was in there punching.

The speech made Governor Dewey very angry, and his camp was alarmed by its hard-hitting character.[12] Dewey labeled it as frivolous, and added:

> Last Saturday night the man who wants to be President for sixteen years made his first speech of this campaign. Gone was the high-sounding pledge. Forgotten were these days of tragic sorrow. It was a speech of mud-slinging, ridicule and wisecracks. It plumbed the depths of demagogy by dragging into this campaign the names of Hitler and Goebbels; it descended to quoting from *Mein Kampf* and to reckless charges of "fraud" and "falsehood." [13]

Governor Dewey swung wildly. His remarks were addressed to his immediate listeners, largely party men, who cheered at his vigorous jabs, but the larger radio audience was not impressed. Dewey shouted, "He asked for it, now we'll let him have it." He attacked Roosevelt bitterly. This was what Roosevelt wanted. He could roll with Dewey's punches.

Another issue which was stressed during the campaign by the Republicans was the danger of Communism. Republicans had never felt happy about the recognition of Soviet Russia, and they were reluctant to accept the Bolsheviks as allies. Communist penetration of American labor organizations had impeded the preparations for war prior to the Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union. In 1944 the charge was made that the CIO was a Communist-dominated labor organization, that the PAC was also controlled by Communists, and that therefore Roosevelt, who was

[11] Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember,* p. 336.

[12] Thomas L. Stokes, in the Washington *Daily News,* Nov. 10, 1944.

[13] Address by Governor Thomas E. Dewey, delivered Sept. 25, 1944, issued by Republican National Committee.

"ELECTION DAY"

BY DOYLE IN PHILADELPHIA *RECORD*, NOV. 12, 1944.
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getting substantial support from Hillman and his PAC, was getting support from the Communists.[14]

In a sweeping statement Roosevelt repudiated Communist support in his radio address from Washington of October 5, 1944:

> I have never sought and I do not welcome the support of any person or group committed to Communism, or Fascism, or any other foreign ideology which would undermine the American system of government or the American system of free competitive enterprise and private property.[15]

During the remainder of the campaign Roosevelt made only four major campaign speeches. He seemed to be worried very little about the outcome of the election.

The speech on foreign policy which was delivered in New York on October 21 was preceded by a fifty-mile drive in an open car through four New York boroughs in the pouring rain. Roosevelt went through this ordeal with flying colors. As his wife explained, contacts with the people he found exhilarating, and while the weather was cold the people were warm in their greetings.[16] His ability to make the trip with no bad effects was used as proof that his health was good. He could take it; he was still his smiling self.

The speech itself outlined his postwar policies and his belief in a United Nations organization. It furnished the note of idealism which was characteristic of all of his campaigns.

At Philadelphia his Navy Day speech gave a glowing account of the accomplishments of the "tired, quarrelsome, old men" in the war. The news of the stunning victories by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz was a more than adequate answer to the Republican charges that MacArthur's forces had been cramped by inadequate supplies. The Champ rubbed it in.

At Soldiers' Field in Chicago, the President sat in an open car and faced 100,000 people. His subject was the "Economic Bill of Rights," and he pledged prosperity in peace and stated that the aim of the Democratic postwar program was to build an economy supporting 60,000,000 jobs.

[14] *National Republican,* June, 1944.
[15] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1944–1945,* p. 323.
[16] Eleanor Roosevelt, *op. cit.,* p. 337.

His theme was that "the well-being of the Nation as a whole is synonymous with the well-being of each and every one of its citizens." [17]

The final major speech of the campaign was made in Boston on November 4 at Fenway Park. In this speech he referred to the 1944 campaign statement about foreign wars. He said:

> We got into this war because we were attacked by the Japanese—and because they and their Axis partners, Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, declared war on us. I am sure that any real American would have chosen, as this Government did, to fight when our own soil was made the object of a sneak attack. As for myself, under the same circumstances, I would choose to do the same thing—*again and again and again.*[18]

The crowd applauded loudly at this repetition of a phrase which had been used against the President.

Roosevelt won once again, even though his popular vote was down. Of a total of about 48,000,000 votes, he had only 3,500,000 more votes than Dewey.[19] Excluding the eleven states of the South, his plurality was only 1,500,000. The election was the closest of the four Roosevelt elections. FDR polled only 53.8 per cent of the major party vote. As usual, the electoral college vote was onesided and did not reflect the popular vote accurately. Roosevelt carried 36 states, which gave him 432 electoral votes, whereas Dewey carried 12 states, winning 99 electoral votes. The Dewey states were the Midwestern states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana, the mountain states of Wyoming and Colorado, and the New England states of Maine and Vermont. He came close in all the rest of the states with the exception of those in the South, the Far West, and Rhode Island. A shift of 3 percentage points would have elected Dewey.

Compared with 1940, the popular vote was down. This was due in part to dislocations created by the war. Many persons had migrated to take wartime jobs and could not meet the new residence requirements. In addition the provisions for soldier voting were not adequate to meet the

[17] *Public Papers and Addresses, 1944–1945,* p. 372.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 399.

[19] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Vote Cast in Presidential and Congressional Elections, 1928–1944* (Washington, D.C., 1946).

conditions of global warfare. Finally, the Democrats in the South showed their disaffection by staying at home on election day. The poll in the rest of the country was almost normal.

The public-opinion sample surveys indicate that Roosevelt kept together the complicated mixture of various groups that had supported him in previous elections. While he lost some support among the farmers and did not do quite as well among labor groups, he held his own or gained with the white collar and business groups. He also kept the support of Catholics, Jews, and non-church members. With CIO unionists he was more popular than with AF of L unionists. His popularity among the soldiers and sailors was overwhelming.[20]

A study of the election returns in the Northern cities where there were concentrations of Negroes shows that Roosevelt held his own among the Negro voters in spite of the tremendous efforts that the Republicans made to attract their vote. The Fair Employment Practices Committee and the stand of Roosevelt on civil rights questions weighed heavily with the nonwhite groups.[21]

Roosevelt's refusal to allow farm prices to soar cost him some votes in the farm belt. His wage controls cut into his former labor vote. The losses sustained were not severe in either case. The election was further proof of his great abilities in group diplomacy.

The 1944 election was an excellent illustration of FDR's skill as a campaigner. Tired by the terrific load of wartime responsibilities that had to be borne regardless of a persistent virus infection, he pulled himself together in valiant fashion, and with a few deft blows confused the opposition and inspired his own followers. It was the victory of a champion.

[20] George Gallup, *The Gallup Political Almanac for 1948*, pp. 8–11.

[21] Henry Lee Moon, *Balance of Power: The Negro Vote* (New York, 1948), pp. 35–36.

XX

DEATH TAKES A CHAMPION

Death opens the gate of fame, and shuts the gate of envy after it.
—STERNE

PEOPLE voted for Roosevelt in 1944 on the assumption that he would live for at least four years more. Certainly if anyone made that assumption it was the Vice Presidential candidate, Harry S. Truman, who did not act during the campaign as if he were running for President. He played the role of a humble follower of the great champion.

Much evidence is available showing that Roosevelt was not well as he started his fourth term.[1] His delivery of the inaugural address of January 20, 1945, lacked the vigor that he had had in 1933. Persons who were there noticed that he trembled.[2]

Roosevelt's doctors advised him to slow down his pace. His secretary, Grace Tully, noticed at this time that he looked excessively tired and would nod from time to time during his dictation.[3] His friends were shocked at his ravaged appearance. But what could anyone tell him in view of the heavy burdens which the President had to carry?

The trip to Yalta was a mistake from the standpoint of conserving his health. Wonderful traveler though he was, the long air trips, the rough conditions on the Crimean Peninsula, the late and exacting parties

[1] Ross T. McIntire, *White House Physician* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), and Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember.*

[2] Edward Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians* (Garden City, Doubleday & Company, 1949), p. 72.

[3] Grace Tully, *F.D.R.—My Boss,* p. 274.

of the Russians, and the strain of the conference itself were too much for him. It is interesting to note that Stalin was shocked at Roosevelt's appearance and told him that had he realized how tired Roosevelt was he would have arranged a more convenient place even though it meant going outside Soviet territory.[4] Stalin himself was under doctors' orders not to take any long and exhausting trips.

Who could keep Roosevelt from going to Yalta? The people had chosen him to do a job and he would find strength to do it. In other words, only the grim reaper could have kept him from going to Yalta. His daughter, Anna, went along to help look after him.

In spite of the ocean voyage, which he usually found invigorating, FDR came back from Yalta more tired than he had been when he left. The death of "Pa" Watson on the return voyage had been a great shock to him. Among his secretaries, Watson had been particularly close.

Roosevelt sat down during the reading of his address on the Yalta Conference before both houses of Congress, and he so informed his radio audience. He had not made a public reference to his affliction for seventeen years! It was in 1928 that he had last informed a New York audience in his campaign for governor that he could work actively for his election even though he could not walk. Newsreels and stills of the President making the address gave glimpses of a tired old man.

Other evidences of fatigue were at hand. His wife noted that seeing people had become a heavy task to him and that he no longer liked a good argument. Grace Tully noticed that he had lost some of the zest he used to have for his correspondence.

He went off to Warm Springs, Georgia, where he had first made such wonderful progress in regaining control of his muscles. Two of his favorite cousins went with him. No one was particularly alarmed. He was tired, but he had been tired before, and he always had had such wonderful powers of recuperation. The sunshine and the healing waters of the warm pool would soon restore his strength, people thought. If his wife had known he was so near the end, she certainly would have been with him.

The news of April 12, 1945, shocked the world. Franklin Delano Roosevelt had passed on to his reward. He now belonged to the immortals. The

[4] John Gunther, *Roosevelt in Retrospect*, p. 357.

story would go down through the ages of how this man who could not sit up, to say nothing of walk, trained his muscles to support his body, disciplined his mind and his soul to forget his bodily handicap, and went on to perform tasks that men far more mobile than he could never have performed. It was a glorious and inspiring example of the triumph of mind over body.

The world regarded it as such. Perhaps no man in history has been so universally acclaimed so soon after his death. In all lands immediate recognition was given to him as a great champion of the people. American broadcasting companies canceled all their programs and began a twenty-four-hour tribute to the dead President. Newspapers that had attacked him now paid him honor.[5]

In some quarters dismay was expressed that he had gone so quickly, leaving so many things undone. The war had not been won and the peace had not been begun. Perhaps some of the smart politicians who had put over the nomination of Harry Truman for Vice President had their misgivings. Robert Sherwood relates a failure on the part of those in the White House to accord the new President the recognition which went with the office. When Truman entered the room, nobody remembered to rise.[6] Truman's dismay over his own predicament was obvious to all. He had not been a member of Roosevelt's inner circle of advisers. In fact, he had not been in on what was going on. Eleanor Roosevelt showed that she sensed this situation when she wrote, "When the vice-president came I could think of nothing to say except how sorry I was for him, how much we would all want to help him in any way we could, and how sorry I was for the people of the country, to have lost their leader and friend before the war was really won." [7]

A psychologist asked a thousand Philadelphians whether they thought that FDR was a good leader and, if so, why.[8] The verdict was almost unanimous (96 per cent) that he was a good leader. Some 42 per cent stated that Roosevelt was the person they admired most, living or dead.

[5] Donald P. Geddes, ed., *Franklin Delano Roosevelt—A Memorial* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945).

[6] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* p. 881.

[7] Eleanor Roosevelt, *op. cit.,* p. 344.

[8] Fillmore H. Sanford in *Groups, Leadership and Men,* ed. H. S. Guetzkow (Carnegie Press, 1951), p. 173.

The reasons most frequently given by the Philadelphians for the wide acceptance of Roosevelt's leadership were that he personally was democratic, that he championed the "little man," and that he had great personal competence. Also mentioned, but less frequently, were his competence in the international field, his "common touch," his personal victory over hardships, and his advance of democratic ideals.

The psychologist concluded that the widespread acceptance of Roosevelt's leadership was based on the follower's need for material support. Roosevelt's programs benefited certain groups, particularly the lower income groups. His leadership was also based on the follower's need for love support. Roosevelt had a heartwarming personality that indicated he loved people. He met the people's need for approval and love from above. He was like an indulgent and affectionate parent who took good care of his children. There was also the need of the followers to submit to power. The rank and file want to be told what to do. Roosevelt fulfilled this need also.

Psychiatrists also noted the reactions of their patients to the event. Patients made explicit linkages of the President with the father figure. Some said, "I felt like I did when my father died." Others said, "I felt worse than I did when my father (or mother) died." Many mentioned the President's paralytic incapacity. In other words, to millions Roosevelt had become the ideal of a father.[9] Patients also commented on the institution of the Vice Presidency. At first gratitude was expressed that there was someone to step into the Presidential office. Then some stated that it was hard for them to associate the mantle of authority with the modest Harry Truman, who did not appear then to have a positive character.

So few years after Roosevelt's death is too short a time to evaluate his political leadership. It is possible in this time, however, to show that certain of his deeds have lasting qualities.

Were Roosevelt's electoral victories purely personal or were they built on more or less permanent foundations? In 1946 the fortunes of the Democratic party appeared to be on the decline. Drawing a historical parallel with 1918, it seemed that a period of personal leadership was

[9] Sebastian De Grazia, "A Note on the Psychological Position of the Chief Executive," *Psychiatry*, August, 1945, pp. 267–272.

Love Will Find a Way — By Hungerford



BY HUNGERFORD IN PITTSBURGH *POST-GAZETTE*, NOV. 20, 1934. Reproduced by permission.

drawing to an end. Woodrow Wilson won a great personal victory in 1916. The Democratic party went down to disastrous defeat in 1920. Wilson had not built a solid coalition that lasted after he stepped down. Democratic reverses in 1946 seemed to indicate that history might repeat itself after the Roosevelt era. The 1948 election was the test of this hypothesis. Roosevelt had laid a firm foundation for the future of his party. The Democrats won in 1948, although the almost universal opinion before the election was that Truman was not a strong candidate. While Truman was not able to hold the party together as well as Roosevelt had, enough was left of the party structure to enable him to win. Truman's detractors were confounded. He waged a much more skillful campaign than he was given credit for during the pre-election days and when the returns came in commentators and pollsters saw to their sorrow that a majority of the American voters were still Democratic.

XXI

THE PATTERN OF SUCCESS

Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.
—Matthew, 12:34

WHAT was it that made Roosevelt so successful in winning elections? Some of his critics said that his huge spending program, financed in part by borrowing money from the banks, was responsible for much of his popularity. "Easy money" was handed out by the government to the unemployed, the aged, farmers, and other special groups, but taxes were not greatly increased to finance these programs. Special protection was given to organized labor in its demands for higher wages. This explanation would not apply to his two campaigns for governor of New York and his first campaign for President. As a matter of fact, he stood for a program of government economy in these three elections.

Critics also pointed out that Roosevelt won elections with the support of the large city political machines, which were based upon patronage and spoils. They claim that he recognized these machines and winked at the questionable methods used by them to finance campaigns and win elections. In his first two campaigns for state senator, Roosevelt was an antimachine candidate. He won the nomination for President in 1932 without the support of the largest political machines, and he fought the Tammany Hall organization within his own state after he became President. It cannot be denied, however, that he was a realist in politics. He did not try to bring about reforms on all fronts at the same time.

Others have pointed out that elections are won or lost by forces outside

the individual candidates. It was the depression which defeated Hoover in 1932. It was the outbreak of war in Europe which enabled Roosevelt to win a third term in 1940. It was American participation in the war that made possible his fourth election in 1944. A candidate must swim with the current. Roosevelt never forgot that. The important thing to remember is that Roosevelt was a good enough politician to win the Democratic nomination for President in 1932. He and Howe had planned and worked to that end for twenty years. Crucial in attaining the goal was Roosevelt's election as governor of New York in 1928, when Smith failed to carry the state for President.

As a campaigner Roosevelt had certain qualities which enabled him to get ahead in politics. He had charm, optimism, confidence, generosity, faith, a vibrant voice, a handsome physique, a good memory, courage, a fine sense of humor, an excellent digestion, freedom from worry, a great gift for words, calmness, poise, and patience. He liked to use his talents to win the attention and affection of others. If one does not enjoy speaking, late and irregular hours, long trips, meeting strangers, riding on trains, planes, and ships, holding innumerable conferences, making difficult decisions, answering mountains of letters, writing speeches and public papers, and losing one's privacy, then one should keep away from politics. Roosevelt took the burdens of politics and campaigning in his stride. No matter how things went, he did not worry. He did what he thought was best and turned to the next task. He was confident that he had done all that he could at the time. If mistakes were made, he was willing to try something else.

Roosevelt had the great faculty of giving the impression that he liked the person to whom he was talking. A Republican party precinct captain paid him a great tribute: "While the Republican party organization man seems to roost on the voter's doorstep, the amazing Roosevelt has become one of the family." [1] The underprivileged felt that he had real sympathy for their problems.

Roosevelt did not acquire these assets as a candidate in a day. He started out with good equipment, but he learned the hard way, by experience. From his earliest days he learned to place a higher value upon

[1] J. T. Salter, "Letters from Men in Action, II," *National Municipal Review*, XXX (August, 1941), 471.

the winning of attention and affection than upon the winning of material rewards. In his home he found that he could get attention by pleasing his mother, his mother substitutes, his elderly father, his tutors, and the children of nearby estates. As a boy he was not given an allowance and he never knew the fierce competition for pecuniary rewards. He chose politics rather than business because politics seemed to satisfy better his demands for attention.

His family was moderately wealthy, and as a boy he was taken on many trips in this country and abroad. In Europe his parents mingled with the élite. The boy learned to look upon kings, queens, princes, princesses, high government officials, and prominent people as ordinary folk like the Roosevelts and Delanos. He learned to stand in awe of no one. These experiences helped to give him poise in the presence of the mighty.

His serenity was based in part on a religious foundation. Religion he acquired at an early age from his parents, and his beliefs were greatly strengthened by his attendance at an Episcopalian school as a teen-age boy. Later his wife was curious about his unquestioning faith in the religion of his ancestors. To have doubts about his religious faith did not enter his mind. His references to the Deity in his public papers were entirely sincere.

The use of his talents as a candidate for elective office he developed gradually. In his first campaign in his twenties he did not blossom forth as a finished speaker. He showed, however, that he had the makings of a new style of orator. He had a splendid voice, excellent diction, a friendly manner, and a fine sense of humor. Over the years he learned to project these qualities over a loudspeaker, over a radio, and on a screen. He learned to conserve his voice during a long and strenuous campaign. He did not shout. He did not rant. As a radio official put it in 1932: "One of the finest voices over the radio is that of President-elect Roosevelt. It is pleasant and clear, with a pleasing inflection. But above all, it has a tone of perfect sincerity, a quality that we consider supremely essential." [2] His fireside chats gave the impression that he was speaking personally to each radio listener. It was as if he were in the room, talking to his neighbors.

[2] John Carlile, cited by Belle Moses, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York, D. Appleton–Century Company, 1933), p. 29.

From his electoral defeats and personal trials during his thirties he learned the value of patience and teamwork. He found that it took time and hard work to win a state-wide party primary campaign. His struggle with his physical handicap taught him that he had to wait for some things. It kept reminding him that all of us are dependent on one another. People came to see him, and it became more and more natural for him to direct the activities of others. He also became more understanding of the troubles of others.

Roosevelt ascribed part of his success in politics to the fact that he regarded public office as an opportunity for public service. He was frank in stating his belief that persons should not go into politics unless they were economically independent:

> I think we can lay down a rule covering a political career entered into with the highest purpose of serving one's community or one's country. Either the individual should have enough money of his own safely invested to take care of him when not holding office . . . or else he should have business connections, a profession or a job to which he can turn from time to time.[3]

There are plenty of bright, well educated young aristocrats, but few of them are interested in politics, and those who try to win elective office sometimes have little success. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., was in this category. FDR had something more. He had many talents, and a burning desire to train himself to use those talents in politics.

When Roosevelt ran for the Presidency, he brought to the task of campaigning far more experience than any of his opponents, even including Hoover. In 1932 Roosevelt had held elective or appointive offices for fourteen years and Hoover for twelve. It was Hoover's second try at elective office and Roosevelt's seventh. In the later campaigns the disparity between FDR's political experience and that of his opponents was vastly greater. There is no substitute for trial and error in learning the political game. Willkie could not learn in one campaign what Roosevelt had learned in twenty-two years. Dewey had had much more experience than Willkie, but what were his ten years in public office as compared with Roosevelt's twenty-six years?

[3] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Why We Need Politicians," *American Magazine*, April, 1932.

There was no detail of running a political campaign which was too small for Roosevelt to consider. It was all so interesting! The speech writing, the conferences, the whistle stops, the conventions, the crowds, the parades, the busy headquarters, and the radio studio were all such fun! Raymond Moley, original head of the brain trust, and later a bitter critic of Roosevelt, said: "It is astonishing that Roosevelt so ordered the various divisions of his political activity, so sharply delegated authority and so clearly maintained personal contact with each of us, that there was never an overlapping of function. This was the mark of superb administrative ability in the political field." [4]

He kept up a vast correspondence. During the years when he was flat on his back, he maintained his contacts by mail. As one biographer wrote: "For years he had carried on an extraordinary, large personal correspondence, not only with political leaders, but with men in all walks of life. His correspondence was notable for the fact that even the most obscure person who wrote to him received a special answer, instead of a form letter." [5]

Roosevelt faced a hostile press during most of the years he was in public office, but at all times he showed great adroitness and skill in meeting journalists. The heyday of his popularity with the press was in the early days of the New Deal. This honeymoon period with the press did not last, but FDR as a source of news did. The press opposed him, but it could not ignore him. No man in American history was the source of so many words appearing in print. Even if the picture of what he said or did was sometimes distorted, he was able to put over the essential parts of his message.

In his years of campaigning, Roosevelt learned how language symbols could be manipulated to influence behavior. He developed a great feeling for words and the effect that they would have upon his audience. He devised many slogans for which millions of people came to have sentimental attachments. In a land of free enterprise, he was one of the nation's best salesmen. He sold himself and his policies to the public by means of his speeches, public papers, and his deeds. His slogans have become known in every language: "New Deal," "good neighbor," "Four

[4] Raymond Moley, *27 Masters of Politics*, pp. 37–38.
[5] Ernest K. Lindley, *The Roosevelt Revolution*, p. 32.

Freedoms," "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself," "forgotten man," "the Four Horsemen—Destruction, Delay, Despair, and Deceit," "Dr. Win-the-War," "Lend-Lease," and so on.

In the preparation of his public papers, he had help. No executive as busy as the President of the United States has time to write speeches entirely by himself. One task of the successful candidate is to organize the preparation of addresses and public papers. Roosevelt's assistants in the drafting of documents changed from time to time. Moley lasted for three years at the beginning of Roosevelt's first term. Robert Sherwood was with him during his last five years. Judge Rosenman stayed with him for some seventeen years, and Howe for twenty-five. The original instructions regarding what should go into a paper and the decision regarding the form and substance of the final draft were always Roosevelt's, however.

FDR was the champion vote getter of American politics because he exemplified the American tradition. In his speeches and in his actions he drew upon the words and deeds of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, and Wilson. The voters knew that he would not betray the democratic process. They knew that he would not assume the powers of a dictator. They knew that he would not use force and intimidation to get his way. Persuasion was the American method, and that was the method FDR used. Get the people to accept and like the program, even though this may take time and infinite patience. His spiritual kinship was close to Thomas Jefferson. Like Jefferson, he was a gentleman farmer, a lover of the soil, a believer in freedom, and an ardent supporter of government by the people.

In describing the democratic process, Roosevelt said in 1932: "Government includes the art of formulating a policy and using the political technique to attain so much of that policy as will receive general support; persuading, leading, sacrificing, teaching always, because the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate." [6] He looked upon politics as "the science of the adjustment of conflicting group interests." [7] One of his greatest political skills was the reconciling of antagonistic elements

[6] Campaign Address, Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Sept. 23, 1932, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1928–1932,* comp. S. Rosenman, p. 756.
[7] Address, Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla., March 23, 1936, *ibid., 1936,* p. 148.

within the Democratic party. He kept together under the same banner liberals and conservatives, whites and nonwhites, farmers and city dwellers, workers and employers, conflicting sectional groups, divergent religious groups, and conflicting groups of producers. His critics said he was an opportunist. His friends and supporters said he was a statesman.

Roosevelt's record as a political campaigner was unmatched in American history. While the popularity of the policies which he adopted fluctuated violently, there was never any question about his personal popularity. On four widely different occasions—a domestic crisis, a domestic upswing, a neutrality crisis and a war crisis—he carried two-thirds or more of the states as his party's candidate for President. Like every strong leader, he had many opponents who differed sharply with his policies. Even his worst enemies, however, could not deny that FDR was a champion campaigner.

APPENDIX

POPULAR VOTE CAST IN ROOSEVELT CONTESTS

1910–1944

Date	Contested Office	Candidate Opposing Roosevelt	Vote Cast For			Per Cent Roosevelt
			Roosevelt	Opponent	Total Combined	
1910	State Senate	Schlosser	15,708	14,568	30,276	51.5
1912	State Senate	Southard	15,590	13,889	29,479 [1]	53.0
1914	Nomination U.S. Senator	Gerard	68,879	133,815	202,694 [2]	34.0
1920	Vice President	Coolidge	9,147,353	16,152,200	25,297,553 [3]	36.0
1928	Governor of New York	Ottinger	2,130,194	2,104,630	4,234,824	50.5
1930	Governor of New York	Tuttle	1,770,342	1,045,341	2,815,683	62.0
1932	Presidential Preference Primaries	Smith			[4]	
1932	President	Hoover	22,821,857	15,761,841	38,583,698	59.1
1936	President	Landon	27,476,673	16,679,583	44,156,256	62.2
1940	President	Willkie	27,244,160	22,305,189	49,509,349	55.0
1944	President	Dewey	25,602,504	22,006,285	47,608,789	53.8

[1] Does not include 2,628 votes for Vossler, National Progressive candidate.
[2] Does not include 16,102 for McDonough.
[3] Does not include minor candidates.
[4] Official figures not available.

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